Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan et al v. Borkholder Buildings & Supply, LLC
Filing
26
OPINION; Order and Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MICHIGAN et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 1:14-cv-1118
v.
HON. JANET T. NEFF
BORKHOLDER BUILDINGS
& SUPPLY, LLC,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Borkholder Buildings & Supply, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint (Dkt 22). Plaintiffs Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan,
DeYoung Pork, Inc., and DeYoung Farmland, LLC, have filed a Response in opposition (Dkt 25),
and Defendant has filed a Reply (Dkt 23). Having fully considered the parties’ briefs and the record,
the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary to resolve the pending motion. See W.D.
Mich. LCivR 7.2(d). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion.
I. Facts
In 2008, Plaintiff Farm Bureau’s insured, Plaintiff DeYoung Farmland, contracted with
non-party Farmer Boy Ag Systems, Inc., for the construction of an 81' x 324' hog building, using
trusses manufactured and supplied by Defendant Borkholder. The hog building was completed in
May of 2008. On or about February 18, 2014, several of the trusses failed, causing a large portion
of the hog building roof to collapse. The insureds submitted an insurance claim for $338,381.00 to
Farm Bureau for coverage related to the damage to the hog building and the loss of hogs.
Farm Bureau paid the claim and became subrogated to the rights of the insureds. Farm
Bureau paid DeYoung Farmland $300,000 for the damage to the hog building and $30,000.00 for
debris clean-up; and paid $8,381.00 to insured DeYoung Pork for the loss and relocation of hogs.
Plaintiffs allege that DeYoung Pork and DeYoung Farmland also incurred out-of-pocket damages
of $79,915.00. See Compl. ¶¶ 8-13. Plaintiffs assert that they sustained $388,296.00 total damages
caused by Defendant’s defective trusses (Pls. Resp., Dkt 25 at Page ID# 143).
Plaintiffs filed this one-count Complaint asserting a claim of breach of implied warranty
based on, among other things, alleged manufacturing defects in the trusses. There is no dispute that
Michigan law applies.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint if it
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In deciding a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Thompson v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2014). However, a court “need not ... accept as true legal
conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir.
2006).
The complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
This is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
2
and common sense.”
Id. at 679.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that because the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “is generally an inappropriate vehicle for dismissing a claim
based upon the statute of limitations,” Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir.
2012); however, there are exceptions to this general rule, including if “the allegations in the
complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred.” Id. (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
215 (2007)).
III. Analysis
This case presents a recurrent theme in deciding whether the judicially-recognized economic
loss doctrine precludes recovery for commercial property losses sustained by the plaintiff hog farm
businesses: that is—on which side of the dividing line between tort and contract law do the losses
fall based on the surrounding circumstances and case precedent? If they fall in the realm of tort law,
as Plaintiffs contend, then Plaintiffs may proceed with this action to recover potential damages of
$388,296.00 from the collapse of the hog barn. If, however, they fall in the realm of commercial
contract law, as Defendant argues, then the exclusive remedies of Michigan’s Uniform Commercial
Code1 apply, including the four-year statute of limitations, as does the economic loss doctrine,
barring Plaintiffs’ recovery.
1
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 440.2101 et seq.
3
A. Economic Loss Doctrine
“‘The economic-loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that bars all tort remedies where
the suit is between an aggrieved buyer and a nonperform[ing] seller, ... and the only losses alleged
are economic.’” Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Sullivan Indus., Inc. v. Double Seal Glass Co., Inc., 480 N.W.2d 623, 627 (1991)). The rationale
underlying the doctrine was explained in Detroit Edison:
Tort and contract law normally occupy distinct spheres. Tort law, and
products liability law specifically, governs the relationship between a consumer and
a manufacturer, where it is impractical or impossible for the parties to negotiate
either the terms of a sale or each party’s duty to the other. In this context, product
liability law places a burden on the manufacturer—the party in the better position to
avoid the harm of a defective product—to produce a safe product. In contrast,
contract law applies to commercial transactions, where the terms and conditions of
a transaction can be negotiated to each party’s satisfaction. Contract law operates
on the premise that commercial actors, because of their ability to bargain for the
terms of the sale, will be able to allocate the risks and costs of a product’s potential
nonperformance.
The distinction between tort and contract becomes problematic when … a
commercial buyer seeks to recover in tort for damages caused by a defective product
which was purchased in a commercial setting. In pursuing such recovery, the buyer
asks for more than the benefit of the bargain; the buyer wants to be put back where
he was before the product failed. In this situation, the economic loss doctrine defines
the boundary between what a buyer in a commercial setting can and cannot seek to
recover in tort.
35 F.3d at 239.
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the economic loss doctrine in Neibarger v. Universal
Cooperatives, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Mich. 1992), holding that “where a plaintiff seeks to
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recover for economic loss caused by a defective product purchased for commercial purposes, the
exclusive remedy is provided by the UCC, including its statute of limitations.”2 However, the court
has yet to provide clear guidance on the determinative factors for applying the economic loss
doctrine. Consequently, the task falls upon the litigants and courts applying Neibarger to discern
the distinguishing factors in each case that adhere to the doctrine’s rationale and result in a logical
and legally supportable outcome.3
B. Application
In this case, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the construction of a hog
building in which the trusses were used, and that the hog building was used for DeYoung’s pork
farming business, which is purely commercial. The damage caused by the allegedly defective
trusses was damage to the building itself, as well as to DeYoung’s livestock. DeYoung therefore
suffered only economic losses, and Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy is provided by the UCC, including
its four-year statute of limitations. See Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 618. Defendant thus contends that
the economic loss doctrine applies, and Defendant is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ tort action.
Further, because the trusses were delivered sometime in 2008, Plaintiffs’ October 20, 2014
Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.
2
The statute of limitations, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 440.2725(2), generally bars actions filed
more than four years after delivery of the goods, regardless when the customer discovers the product
is defective. Thus, the statute recognizes no “discovery rule.” Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 613.
3
As Plaintiffs note: “‘To the extent that the state supreme court has not yet addressed the
issue presented, it is [the federal courts’] duty to anticipate how that court would rule.’” Imperial
Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
5
In Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 613, the court considered two separate cases in which the
plaintiffs dairy farmers purchased milking systems designed and installed by the defendants. In
short, after a period of time, the cattle became ill and died or had to be sold for beef because of their
nonproductivity and unsuitability as milking animals. Id. at 613-14. Some seven or eight years after
the installation of the systems, the dairy farmers filed suit, alleging that the milking systems were
improperly designed and/or installed and seeking recovery for their losses. Id. The court held that
the damages sought by the farmers were commercial losses that could be remedied only under the
provisions of the UCC, finding that “the damages suffered by the plaintiffs are properly considered
to be economic loss, the result of a defect in the quality of the milking systems they purchased.” Id.
at 621. The court noted that “the UCC provides remedies sufficient to compensate the buyer of a
defective product for direct, incidental, and consequential losses, including property damage.” Id.
at 620. “Where damage to other property was caused by the failure of a product purchased for
commercial purposes to perform as expected, and this damage was within the contemplation of the
parties to the agreement, the occurrence of such damage could have been the subject of negotiations
between the parties.” Id. Because the plaintiff farmers’ attempts to recover for lost profits and
consequential damages were losses compensable under the UCC, the actions fell “squarely within
the economic loss doctrine” and were governed by the provisions of the UCC, including its four-year
statute of limitations. Id. at 621.
Plaintiffs argue that Neibarger does not dictate a similar result in this case. Plaintiffs argue
that they are not limited to remedies in contract or the UCC, but have a proper remedy in tort.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant designed, manufactured and sold an unreasonably dangerous product,
which caused extensive damage to property other than the product itself. Further, Plaintiffs had no
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contractual relation with Defendant, and thus the failure of the trusses and collapse of the roof would
have been beyond the contractual contemplations of the parties. Plaintiffs note that they are not in
the lumber business and did not deal in goods such as truss design and construction. Thus, because
Plaintiffs’ other property damages were not and could not have been contemplated and were instead
the result of a sudden calamitous event, they are remediable in tort. Accordingly, the three-year
statute of limitations for torts applies and began to run when Plaintiffs discovered that Defendant’s
trusses were defective, which was on February 18, 2014, when the roof collapsed (Pls. Resp. at Page
ID# 155, citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10), (13)). As a result, Plaintiffs’ action is not timebarred.4
The general rule from Neibarger remains the starting point for courts struggling with the
practical application of the economic loss doctrine:
The economic loss doctrine, simply stated, provides that “‘[w]here a
purchaser’s expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not
working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only
“economic” losses.’” This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between
transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic
expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the
sale of defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner
which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts.
Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 615 (footnotes omitted). While Plaintiffs’ arguments may have some
appeal under the general rule of Neibarger, subsequent case law informing the Neibarger principles
cannot be ignored, and those cases effectively foreclose Plaintiffs’ arguments.
First, the fact that Plaintiffs suffered damages to “other property” does not render Plaintiffs’
action exempt from the economic loss doctrine. As Defendant points out, following Neibarger, the
4
Plaintiffs note an issue whether the trusses are “goods” under the UCC, but they advance
no argument in this regard, and the Court therefore does not address the issue.
7
Sixth Circuit addressed the so-called “other property” exception to the economic loss doctrine in
Detroit Edison, 35 F.3d at 242-43. In that case, Detroit Edison brought a products liability action
against power plant pipe suppliers, arising from a pipe explosion at its Monroe power plant. Id. at
237-38. “The blast injured seventeen people, damaged the pipe itself and adjacent equipment,
demolished the brick walls of a storage room and office more than forty feet away from the pipe,
blew out windows, knocked out part of an aluminum wall, caused wall panel deformation, displaced
floor plating panels, damaged hydraulic lines, wires and insulation, causing an oil fire to ignite, and
blew asbestos-containing material throughout the entire plant, requiring substantial clean-up.” Id.
at 238. Relying on the approach adopted in Neibarger, the court held that the damages sought by
Detroit Edison for the alleged manufacturing defect in the pipe were economic losses, and
accordingly, the economic loss doctrine barred any tort claims by Detroit Edison. Id. at 242. “The
rule that emerges from Neibarger significantly narrows the ‘other property’ exception while
expanding the definition of economic loss.” Id. at 241.
“Michigan’s economic loss doctrine is broader than other jurisdictions in that it not only
includes damage to the product itself, but may also include damage to other property when ‘this
damage was within the contemplation of the parties to the agreement ….’” Quest Diagnostics, Inc.
v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 858, 862 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Neibarger, 486
N.W.2d at 620 and Detroit Bd. of Ed. v. Celotex Corp. (On Remand), 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich.
1992)). In Neibarger, the court noted that “there was support for the view that the UCC did not bar
a tort claim where the plaintiffs sought to recover for property other than the product itself, but ruled
that where the damage to other property was caused by the failure of a product to perform as
expected, and that damage was in the contemplation of the parties, the occurrence of such damage
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could have been negotiated by the parties.” State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., No.
10–10896, 2010 WL 1782148, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2010) (citing Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at
620).
Plaintiffs’ argument that a “calamitous event exception” to the economic loss doctrine was
left open by Neibarger, and should be applied in this case, is also dubious. Plaintiffs state that they
have been unable to find any Michigan court decisions defining this exception; however, courts in
Illinois have considered a similar “sudden and dangerous occurrence exception” (see Pls. Resp. at
Page ID# 148). Plaintiffs assert that their damages are not the result of a disappointment with
Defendant’s trusses that performed unsatisfactorily, but rather of a disaster—the roof collapse—a
sudden calamitous event. However, this type of exception has been addressed subsequent to
Neibarger in the context of Michigan law, and has been rejected with regard to commercial
contracts.
For instance, in Detroit Edison, the Sixth Circuit addressed Detroit Edison’s reliance “on a
distinction between ‘disaster and mere commercial disappointment,’” and the assertion that the
explosion was a “‘calamitous,’ unforeseeable disaster that falls within the purview of tort law.” 35
F.3d at 242. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “the extent of the damage—both to property and
persons—suggests a hazardous product and therefore implicates concerns addressed by tort law.”
Id. The Court noted, however, that the approach adopted in Neibarger focuses not so much on the
magnitude or extent of the damages as on the parties involved and the nature of the product’s use.
Id. And there, the parties were sophisticated commercial entities of equivalent bargaining power,
they were in a position to fully negotiate the issue of potential liability, and could have passed on
their respective costs for the risks of a defective product as a cost of doing business. Id.
9
In their response, Plaintiffs rely extensively on Citizens Insurance Company of America v.
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Mich. 1992), a Western District of Michigan
district court case in which the court took a “compromise approach” to the economic loss doctrine,
applying it to the damage to the defective product, but not to the damage to the “other property.”
In Citizens Insurance, a subrogated insurer brought suit on behalf of the Koeze Company, which
suffered damages when a peanut roaster purchased through a sales agreement with the defendant
company, caught fire and caused substantial damage to the roaster and a conveyer cleaner (also
purchased in the agreement), as well as other property owned by Koeze. 802 F. Supp. at 136. The
court found that the damages were caused by a sudden calamitous event and were the result not of
disappointment with machinery that performed unsatisfactorily, but of a disaster, the fire, allegedly
caused by the defective product. Id. at 140. The court observed that the losses caused by fire
damage to property other than the defective product, were the sort traditionally remediable in tort:
“Even though they are ‘economic losses,’ in the sense that they are assigned monetary values, they
are not the sort of usual commercial losses that should naturally have been within the parties’
contractual contemplation and that would therefore be remediable exclusively in contract.” Id.
Plaintiff is correct that the court held that the economic loss doctrine barred recovery in tort for
losses caused by fire damage to the peanut roaster and conveyor cleaner, but did not bar Citizens’
tort claims for losses resultant from fire damage to other property. Id. at 142. However, the Sixth
Circuit subsequently explicitly rejected the approach taken in Citizens Insurance:
The “compromise” position of the district court in Citizens Insurance, like
the prior position of the Michigan Court of Appeals, by applying the economic loss
doctrine while still allowing some recovery in tort (recovery which could be
substantial), eviscerates both the effect of Neibarger as well as the policies
underlying the economic loss doctrine.
10
Detroit Edison, 35 F.3d at 242-43. Plaintiff’s reliance on Citizens Insurance is of no avail. The
Sixth Circuit’s rejection of Citizens Insurance is clear, as is its rejection of the “other property
exception” urged by Plaintiffs:
Finally, Detroit Edison urges this court to make a factual distinction between
Neibarger and the present case. However, our approach requires neither reliance on
nor distinction from the facts of Neibarger. The aspect of the Neibarger decision
that is dispositive of the present case is [the] definition of economic loss. The
Neibarger decision’s interpretation of economic loss significantly curtails the
applicability of the “other property” exception to the economic loss doctrine, while
expanding the meaning of “economic loss.” Therefore, we believe that the Michigan
Supreme Court, considering its decision in Neibarger and the stated policies
underlying that decision, would bar Detroit Edison’s tort claims and find that Dravo
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Detroit Edison, 35 F.3d at 243. That Plaintiffs argue that Detroit Edison incorrectly interpreted
Neibarger and was wrongly decided does not advance their position before this Court, which is
bound to apply Detroit Edison as decided.
Plaintiffs also cite Safeco Insurance Company of America v. CPI Plastics Group, Ltd., 625
F. Supp. 2d 508 (E.D. Mich. 2008), in which an insurer, as the insured property owners’ subrogee,
brought an action against the manufacturer of deck planks to recover for the fire loss of a personal
residence. The court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, which
concluded that tort law would be served by the assertion of a products liability claim, and that the
economic loss doctrine did not apply. Id. at 521.
Safeco Insurance is clearly distinguishable. That case involved a consumer transaction, as
opposed to a commercial transaction as in this case. The plaintiff homeowners’ residence was
substantially destroyed in a fire that resulted from highly flammable deck planking manufactured
by the defendants; the homeowners purchased the deck product from a local hardware outlet. Id.
at 511. The subrogee insurer sought recovery against the manufacturers for loss of the residence.
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Id. at 510-11. The court concluded that the economic loss doctrine did not apply given that the case
involved a consumer transaction and tort concerns in product safety. Id. at 511-12. The court
concluded: “In short, the plaintiff has been injured in a manner that is traditionally considered in tort
and not in contract. It is thus proper for the plaintiff be permitted to pursue a claim in tort.” Id. at
512.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that the economic loss doctrine does not apply here because
there is no “privity” also does not prevail. Plaintiffs rely primarily on Quest Diagnostics, 656
N.W.2d 858, and Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corporation, 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992), as cases in point; however, both cases are easily distinguished from this case. Plaintiffs
accurately quote Quest Diagnostics, id. at 864: “In order for the economic loss doctrine to bar
recovery in tort, there must be a transaction that provides an avenue by which the parties are
afforded the opportunity to negotiate to protect their respective interests.” But there, unlike here,
the purported class plaintiffs were uninvolved third parties—individuals and businesses, who
suffered damages from the alleged negligent rupture of a water main by an excavator hired by the
defendant communications companies. Id. at 860. The plaintiffs were without running water for
several days, they had to boil their drinking water for several days, and the business plaintiffs were
forced to close or curtail their operations. Id. The court observed that “[a] factor present in all cases
in which Michigan courts have applied the economic loss doctrine is that the parties to the litigation
were involved, either directly or indirectly, in a transaction for goods.” Id. at 862. Unlike in that
case, here, Plaintiffs were involved in a transaction for goods, albeit indirectly, for the purchase of
the trusses.
12
Likewise, the unique circumstances that precluded the economic loss doctrine from applying
in Celotex Corporation bear no relationship to those in this case. There, the plaintiff class consisted
of several hundred public school districts and private schools in Michigan, faced with abating the
potential health hazards of friable asbestos products, which could not have been bargained over at
the time the products were sold because it was not until years later that the risks of asbestos material
became known. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d at 516, 519-20. In declining to apply the economic loss
doctrine, the court noted that “asbestos cases are unique in the law,” and that all jurisdictions that
have considered the question declined to apply the economic loss doctrine to cases concerning
asbestos contamination of buildings. Id. at 518.
The cases relied on by Plaintiffs offer no support for a “privity” exception to the economic
loss doctrine in the contractual circumstances presented here.
While no case cited by the parties is squarely on point with all the circumstances presented
in this case, the decision in Citizens Ins. Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 314, 316
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998), cited by Defendant, is closely analogous and effectively forecloses the
entirety of Plaintiffs’ arguments. In that case, the roof of a restaurant owned and operated by Kim’s
of Novi (Kim’s) collapsed under circumstances even more contractually remote than those in this
case:
Kim’s owned and operated a restaurant in Novi, Michigan. During the
original 1978 construction, the builders installed wood trusses and plywood roof
decking that had been treated for flame retardancy using chemicals manufactured by
defendant. In 1982, Kim’s had an addition to the building constructed. The roofing
materials that were installed at that time had also been treated for flame retardancy
using defendant’s chemicals. Apparently, the wood was treated by a subcontractor
according to instructions provided by defendant. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that
on January 27 and 29, 1994, the wood trusses and plywood roof decking utilized in
the 1978 and 1982 construction deteriorated and collapsed, “causing extensive
13
damage to Plaintiff’s subrogor’s real and business personal property.” Pursuant to
its insurance policy with Kim’s, plaintiff paid $556,111.68 for damages caused by
the collapse.
Id. at 315. The insurer-subrogee sued the defendant manufacturer of the flame-retardant chemicals,
among others, alleging that the roof collapse was caused by the deterioration of wood roofing
materials that were adversely affected by the flame-retardant chemicals. Id. The court held, in a
split decision, that the economic loss doctrine and the UCC statute of limitations applied. Id. at 317.
Relying on Neibarger, the court noted that “[u]nlike some jurisdictions, the economic loss doctrine
applies in Michigan even when the plaintiff is seeking to recover for property other than the product
itself.” Id. at 316.
As here, the plaintiff in Osmose Wood argued that the economic loss doctrine should not
apply because, unlike in Neibarger, “(1) there was no contractual relationship between Kim’s and
defendant, (2) Kim’s was not in a position to negotiate the terms of the sale, (3) the
fire-retardant-treated wood was not directly related to Kim[’s] business, and (4) Kim’s could not
have anticipated such an ‘unforeseeable disaster.’” Id. The court rejected these arguments, on the
grounds that the express Neibarger holding could not be avoided simply by distinguishing Neibarger
on its facts. Id. The court further noted that in both Sullivan Industries, Inc. v. Double Seal Glass
Co., Inc., 480 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), and Freeman v. DEC International, Inc., 536
N.W.2d 815 ( Mich. Ct. App. 1995), the Michigan Court of Appeals expressly rejected the argument
that the economic loss doctrine does not apply in the absence of privity of contract. Osmose Wood,
585 N.W.2d at 316.
Plaintiffs do not address, let alone distinguish, Osmose Wood. Here, as in that case, the
damages were sustained by a commercial business and the product at issue was purchased for
14
commercial purposes, and because the losses are economic in nature, under Neibarger, the UCC
provides the exclusive remedy. See Osmose Wood, 585 N.W.2d at 316.
IV. Conclusion
Having fully considered the parties’ arguments and relevant legal authority, the Court
concludes that this action is subject to Michigan’s UCC four-year statute of limitations and the
economic loss doctrine, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted.
An Order and Judgment will be entered consistent with this Opinion.
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Dated: September ___, 2015
/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge
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