Antoine #581263 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

Filing 7

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SUFFREN ANTOINE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:14-cv-1135

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Gus Harrison Correctional facility. He sues the MDOC and Daniel H. Heyns, the
Director of the MDOC. Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely convicted and sent to prison due to
“harassment.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4.) Since his incarceration, Plaintiff has been harassed
by every MDOC corrections officer with whom he has come into contact. Plaintiff was involuntarily
placed into the MDOC Mental Health Services as a result of harassment and since there, Plaintiff
alleges that he has been abused physically, sexually harassed, humiliated and “mentally abuse[d].”
(Id.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages and the incarceration of those responsible for
physically abusing him.
Discussion
I.

Immunity

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of
Corrections. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune
under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity
or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979),
and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,
803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has
specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
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See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 001182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting
through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983
for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the Michigan Department of
Corrections.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
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v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff challenges his incarceration by the State of Michigan. A challenge to the fact
or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper
subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore,
to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact or duration of his incarceration, it must be
dismissed. See Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissal is appropriate
where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration of confinement); see also
Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not construing a § 1983 action
as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3) and § 2253(c), (4) differing
fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition doctrine or three-strikes
rules of § 1915(g)).
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To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief for alleged
violations of Constitutional rights underlying his conviction, his claim is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been [overturned].” See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997)
(emphasis in original). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a
cognizable claim under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows
that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The
holding in Heck has been extended to actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards,
520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998)
(claim for injunctive relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035,
1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s allegations clearly call
into question the validity of his conviction. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck until his
criminal conviction has been invalidated.
To the extent that Plaintiff complains about his treatment in prison, his claim is
properly before the Court in this civil rights action. However, Plaintiff fails to make specific factual
allegations against Defendant Heyns. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual
allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state
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a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim).
Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is
subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff
failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint
did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved
in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL
1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each
defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990)
(“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally
devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his
injuries”). Because Plaintiff’s claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED. R.
CIV. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief”), his complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Heyns.
Even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff intended to allege that Defendant
Heyns was responsible for the conduct of the correctional officers who are allegedly harassing
Plaintiff and the MDOC employees who involuntarily placed Plaintiff into the MDOC Mental Health
Services, he would still fail to state a claim. Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation
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must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th
Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are
not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d
at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover,
§ 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance
or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff
has failed to allege that Defendant Heyns engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Heyns.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

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This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

December 8, 2014

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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