Hollis #247453 v. Nichols et al

Filing 9

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CORNELIUS HOLLIS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:14-cv-1301

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

UNKNOWN NICHOLS et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on the grounds
of immunity and failure to state a claim.

Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff Cornelius Hollis presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility although the events about which he
complains took place while he was housed at the West Shoreline Correctional Facility (MTF).1
Plaintiff sues the MDOC and the following MTF personnel: Correctional Officer (Unknown)
Nichols; Sergeant L. Smith; Assistant Resident Unit Managers (Unknown) Gunn and Sandra
Galiton; Lieutenant (Unknown) Thedorff; Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Robert L. Darnell;
Hearing Officer D.J. Pallas; Hearing Investigator James Kitchen; and Warden Mary Berghuis.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 3, 2012, he went to the visiting room to meet with a
visitor. When he arrived, Defendant Nichols noticed that Plaintiff was wearing clothes that did not
belong to him and therefore were contraband under MDOC Policy. Nevertheless, Defendant Nichols
allowed Plaintiff to enter the visiting room. Meanwhile, Defendant Nichols confirmed that Plaintiff
had borrowed another prisoner’s clothes. Apparently, Plaintiff was allowed to meet with his visitor
for some period of time, until Defendant Nichols told Plaintiff that he could not continue his visit
in the borrowed clothes. Defendant Nichols gave Plaintiff a set of his own prison-issued clothes,
which Plaintiff alleges were dirty and soiled, and told Plaintiff that he would have to wear his own
clothes if he wanted to continue his visit. Plaintiff requested a shift supervisor. Lt. Robinson, who

1

Plaintiff states that “[a]ll claims of constitutional right violations manifested in ‘MTF’ or Muskegon
Correctional Facility.” MDOC records reflect that MTF is the West Shoreline Correctional Facility while the Muskegon
Correctional facility is identified as MCF. See http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119--5373--,00.html (last
visited on 2/18/15). MDOC records reflect that Mary Berghuis is the warden at MTF. See id. Because the documents
Plaintiff attaches as exhibits to his complaint originated at MTF and because Warden Berghuis is named as a defendant
in this action, the Court assumes Plaintiff meant to identify the West Shoreline Correctional Facility or MTF as the
correctional facility in which he was housed at the time of the alleged civil rights violations.

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is not a defendant, arrived and discussed the situation with Plaintiff. Lt. Robinson allowed Plaintiff
to continue his visit in the borrowed clothes.
During the same June 3rd visit and after Plaintiff’s discussion with Lt. Robinson,
Defendant Smith arrived on duty. Defendant Smith approached Plaintiff during his on-going visit
and told Plaintiff that he would have to take off the borrowed clothes and put on his own clothes.
Defendant Thedorff, who was shift supervisor at that time, confirmed that Plaintiff must remove the
borrowed clothes and put on his own clothes if he wished to continue his visit. Plaintiff ultimately
complied and changed into his allegedly soiled prison-issued clothes
Plaintiff appears to allege that because he was allowed to wear borrowed clothes for
the first part of his June 3, 2012 visit, Defendants Smith and Thedorff should never have required
him to change his clothes. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Smith and Thedorff
behaved inappropriately and mistreated him by making him change into soiled clothes. In
connection with the June 3, 2012 visit, Defendant Nichols wrote a misconduct report against Plaintiff
for possession of contraband.
Plaintiff seems to have had another similar incident on June 22, 2012. However, it
appears that during this incident Sergeant Edgerton, who is also not a defendant, made Plaintiff go
back to the housing unit and change his clothes. Plaintiff did not receive a misconduct.
Plaintiff alleges that another prisoner heard Defendants Smith and Thedorff
“conspiring to make a false story [regarding] the events that happened on 6/3/12 as to plaintiff.”
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#5.) Plaintiff alleges that this conspiracy was intended to “cover-up
inappropriate behavior and the mistreatment of plaintiff.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for his filing grievances and complaints against
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Defendants Nichols and Smith, Defendant Darnell refused to continue to notarize affidavits for him.
Additionally, Defendant Darnell moved Plaintiff to a different unit.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 10, 2012, Defendant Smith entered Plaintiff’s his
housing unit and discovered a tattoo gun under the desk attached to a bottom bunk. Defendant Smith
wrote a misconduct report charging Plaintiff with possession of dangerous contraband and
unauthorized occupation of a cell or room. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith charged him with
the misconduct in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievance and complaint writing.
An investigation was conducted and a hearing held on August 15, 2012, before
Defendant Pallas. Plaintiff’s statement and the statements of four other prisoners who were present
during the incident were admitted into evidence. Additionally, Defendant Pallas admitted into
evidence Defendant Smith’s written responses to six questions that Plaintiff had submitted,
photographs of the evidence and the Contraband Removal Record. Defendant Kitchen was present
at the hearing. At some point the hearing was adjourned so that Defendant Pallas could speak with
Defendant Smith before making his decision. Ultimately, Defendant Pallas found Plaintiff guilty
of a Class I misconduct for possession of dangerous contraband and unauthorized occupation of a
cell or room. (See Ex. G, docket #1-1, Page ID#50.) Plaintiff was sanctioned with 15 days loss of
privileges. (See id.) Plaintiff appealed to the Gratiot County Circuit Court, which issued an opinion
and order on March 17, 2014, affirming Defendant Pallas’ decision.
Shortly after the tattoo gun incident, Defendant Galiton transferred Plaintiff to the
Central Michigan Correctional Facility (STF). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Galiton transferred him
in retaliation for his grievance and complaint writing.

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As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive
relief.
II.

Immunity

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC. Regardless of the
form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment
from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v.
Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of
Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874,
877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that
the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., McCoy v.
Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000
WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the
Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money
damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the MDOC.
III.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

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A.

Defendants Berghuis and Pallas

Plaintiff expressly states that he sues Defendants Berghuis and Pallas “strictly” based
on “supervisory liability.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#9.) Government officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior
or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional
violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567,
575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s
subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act.
Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir.
2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an
administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Berghuis and
Pallas engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior.2 Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against
them.

2

To the extent Plaintiff intends to allege that Defendant Pallas, in his capacity as a hearing officer, violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit has held that Michigan hearing officers
are professionals in the nature of administrative law judges. See Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
As such, they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from inmates’ § 1983 suits for actions taken in their capacities
as hearing officers. Id.; see also Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2007); Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665,
674 (6th Cir. 2007).

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B.

Defendant Gunn

Plaintiff fails to make any factual allegations against Defendant Gunn. It is a basic
pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations
to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an
allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal
construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188,
190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant
was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.
2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation
of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000)
(requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 901010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals
are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would
suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”). Because Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Gunn fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), his complaint
against Defendant Gunn must be dismissed.
C.

Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for writing grievances and
complaints. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Defendant Galiton retaliated against him by
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transferring him to STF; (2) Defendant Darnell retaliated against Plaintiff by refusing to notarize
affidavits and by moving Plaintiff to a different unit; (3) Defendant Nichols retaliated against him
by telling him to change into allegedly soiled prison-issued clothes during a visit; (4) Defendant
Smith retaliated against him by writing a false misconduct report charging Plaintiff with being in
possession of the tattoo gun; and (5) Defendant Kitchen retaliated against him by conducting an
inadequate and intentionally one-sided investigation into the tattoo gun incident.
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates
the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order
to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged
in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least
in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise
of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory
conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against Defendants Galiton, Darnell, Nichols,
Smith and Kitchen. With respect to his claims against Defendants Gailton and Darnell, Plaintiff fails
to show adverse action. In certain circumstances, transfer to another facility or unit can be
considered adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that transfer to administrative segregation or another prison’s lock-down
unit or can be sufficient to constitute adverse action). The Hill court held that transfer to a lockdown unit at another facility is more than just a transfer, and is more akin to the transfer in Siggers-9-

El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701-02 (6th Cir. 2005), in which the consequence of transfer would
affect the prisoner’s ability to pay his lawyer, thereby affecting his access to the courts. Here
however, Plaintiff fails to allege that he suffered any adverse consequences, or that he was confined
in a more restrictive environment, because of his transfer between units or facilities.
With respect to his claim against Defendant Nichols and his claim against Defendant
Darnell for failing to notarize affidavits, Plaintiff fails to allege any adverse action at all. The mere
fact that Defendant Nichols told Plaintiff to change into allegedly soiled clothes during a visit is not
sufficiently adverse to support a retaliation claim. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674
(1977) (“There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not
concerned.”); Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 397 (noting that a “de minimis inconvenience” does not
constitute cognizable First Amendment retaliation.) Likewise, Defendant Darnell’s decision not to
continue notarizing affidavits for Plaintiff, without more, is simply a de minimis inconvenience.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Smith and Kitchen retaliated against
him in connection with the reporting and investigation of the tattoo gun incident, he fails to state a
claim. A prisoner’s claim that he was falsely accused of a major misconduct is barred where there
has been a finding of guilt. See Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905, 917 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that
a factual finding in a major misconduct proceeding has preclusive effect and is not subject to
challenge in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff was found guilty of possession of the tattoo gun, and that
finding was upheld by the state court. Plaintiff cannot state a retaliation claim against Defendants
Smith and Kitchen based on their actions in connection with the tattoo gun incident where, as here,
he was found guilty of the very act upon which he bases his retaliation claim. See id.

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Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against Defendants
Galiton, Darnell, Nichols, Smith and Kitchen.
D.

Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Nichols, Smith and Thedorff violated his rights under
the Eighth Amendment by telling him to, or making him, change into allegedly soiled prison-issued
clothes in order to continue with a visit.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states
to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential
food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
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standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)).
The discomforts and inconveniences of being required to wear soiled prison-issued
clothes are simply not “conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
Moreover, Plaintiff's discomfort in having to wear allegedly soiled clothes during his visit was
temporary. Allegations about temporary inconveniences, e.g, being deprived of a lower bunk,
subjected to a flooded cell, or deprived of a working toilet, do not demonstrate that the conditions
fell beneath the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities as measured by a contemporary
standard of decency. Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); see also J.P.
v. Taft, 439 F.Supp.2d 793, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“[M]inor inconveniences resulting from the
difficulties in administering a large detention facility do not give rise to a constitutional claim.”
(internal citation omitted)). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficiently serious risk to his
health or safety, he does not state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Nichols, Smith
and Thedorff.
E.

Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith conspired with Defendant Thedorff to create
a false story about what transpired during the June 3, 2012, visit.
A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to
injure another by unlawful action.” See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the
existence of a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial
objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance
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of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 695; Bazzi v. City of
Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with
particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by
allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one);
Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir.
2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff bases his allegations on the declaration of a fellow prisoner who allegedly
overheard a conversation between Defendants Smith and Thedorff regarding their desire to make up
a story to cover-up their allegedly inappropriate behavior. Whether Defendants Smith and Thedorff
engaged in such a conversation or not is irrelevant, because Plaintiff cannot establish that these
defendants acted together with the intention of depriving Plaintiff of a federal right. As explained
above, requiring Plaintiff to wear his own prison-issued clothing, even if the clothing was soiled, did
not violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy
claim against Defendants Smith and Thedorff.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on the grounds of immunity and failure to state
a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
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good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

March 17, 2015

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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