Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security
OPINION affirming the Commissioner's decision; signed by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody (Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody, jal)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Hon. Ellen S. Carmody
Case No. 1:14-cv-1323
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim
for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On April 22,
2015, the parties agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of
final judgment. (Dkt. #12).
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides
that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The
Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons
stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and
of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security
case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in
making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that
decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.
1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for
disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v.
Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the
Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 735
F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984).
As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the
existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial
interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This
standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a
decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would
have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 45 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 132). She
successfully completed high school and previously worked as a harvest worker and child monitor.
(Tr. 41-42, 67). Plaintiff applied for benefits on August 10, 2011, alleging that she had been
disabled since January 1, 2010, due to “back and hip problems” and incontinence. (Tr. 132-40, 154).
Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 49-131). May 9, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Yvette Diamond with
testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (Tr. 14-48). In a written decision dated
June 28, 2013, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 59-68). The Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s final decision
in the matter. (Tr. 1-5). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be “disabled”
regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b));
2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c));
dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional
impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining her residual
functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders,
and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable
to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC)
is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears
the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from: (1) degenerative disc disease; (2)
incontinence; (3) obesity; (4) depressive disorder; and (5) anxiety disorder, severe impairments that
whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the
3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and
which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled”
will be made without consideration of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d));
4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of “not disabled” must be
made (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e));
5. If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age,
education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can
be performed (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f)).
requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 61-63). With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform work subject to the following limitations:
(1) she can lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; (2) in an 8-hour workday, she can
stand/walk and sit for 6 hours each; (3) she can occasionally push/pull, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
crawl, and climb stairs; (4) she cannot climb ladders; (5) she requires the option to sit or stand at
will; (6) she is limited to simple, routine tasks and low stress work defined as only occasional
decisionmaking and occasional changes in work setting; and (7) she can have frequent contact with
supervisors, co-workers, and the public. (Tr. 63).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, at which
point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a
significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, her
limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to
question a vocational expert on this issue, “a finding supported by substantial evidence that a
claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs” is needed to meet the burden.
O’Banner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis
added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant
can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly,
ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a
significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can perform, her limitations notwithstanding.
The vocational expert testified that there existed approximately 226,000 jobs in the
United States which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform, such limitations
notwithstanding. (Tr. 40-43). This represents a significant number of jobs. See Born v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Services, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274
(6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 170 Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir., Mar.
1, 2006). The vocational expert also testified that if Plaintiff were further limited in that she could
only lift a maximum of 10 pounds, stand/walk for 2 hours daily, and could not push/pull, there still
existed more than 200,000 jobs nationwide which Plaintiff could perform despite her limitations.
(Tr. 43-44). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits.
The ALJ Properly Developed the Record
Plaintiff first asserts that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ failed to fully
develop the record. Specifically, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to obtain (1) opinion evidence
from her treating physician, Dr. Alfonso Llanto, or (2) testimony from a medical expert. The Court
is not persuaded.
On August 16, 2011, the Disability Determination Service specifically requested from
Dr. Llanto that he provide input regarding Plaintiff’s ability to function. (Tr. 240-41). That the
doctor failed to comply with this request is not attributable to the ALJ or the Commissioner. As for
the ALJ’s failure to obtain testimony from a medical expert, the Court notes that the ALJ is not
required to supplement the record with additional evidence unless the record as it then exists is
insufficient to assess Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity or otherwise resolve her claims. See,
e.g., Lamb v. Barnhart, 85 Fed. Appx. 52, 57 (10th Cir., Dec. 11, 2003); Ruby v. Colvin, 2014 WL
5782930 at *13 (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 6, 2014); Haney v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3859778 at *3 (E.D. Okla.,
Sept. 15, 2010); Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security, 709 F.Supp.2d 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Allison v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1276950 at *5 (6th Cir., Aug. 30, 2000). Because the record was
sufficient to resolve Plaintiff’s claim for benefits this argument is rejected.
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was unable to perform any
activities of daily living due to extreme back pain. (Tr. 30-37). The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s
testimony. (Tr. 61-66). Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s rationale for
discounting her statements is not supported by substantial evidence.
As the Sixth Circuit has long recognized, “pain alone, if the result of a medical
impairment, may be severe enough to constitute disability.” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); see also, Grecol v. Halter, 46 Fed. Appx. 773, 775 (6th Cir., Aug. 29,
2002) (same). As the relevant Social Security regulations make clear, however, a claimant’s
“statements about [his] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that [he is] disabled.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir. 1997) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)) Hash v. Commissioner of Social Security, 309 Fed.
Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009). Instead, as the Sixth Circuit has established, a claimant’s
assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated pursuant to the following standard:
First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1)
whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively
established medical condition is of such a severity that it can
reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.
Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citations omitted). This standard is often referred to as the Duncan
standard. See Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801 (6th Cir., July
Accordingly, as the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held, “subjective complaints may
support a finding of disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged symptoms.” Id. (citing Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989)).
However, where the objective medical evidence fails to confirm the severity of a claimant’s
subjective allegations, the ALJ “has the power and discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to
resolve the significant conflicts in the administrative record.” Workman, 105 Fed. Appx. at 801
(citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 531).
In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s credibility assessment “must be
accorded great weight and deference.” Workman, 105 Fed. Appx. at 801 (citing Walters, 127 F.3d
at 531); see also, Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[i]t
is for the [Commissioner] and his examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses and weigh and evaluate their testimony”). It is not for this Court to reevaluate such
evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must
stand. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective allegations to not be fully credible, a finding that should
not be lightly disregarded. See Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777, 780
(6th Cir. 1987). In fact, as the Sixth Circuit recently stated, “[w]e have held that an administrative
law judge’s credibility findings are virtually unchallengeable.” Ritchie v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 540 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013) (citation omitted).
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony on the ground that such was inconsistent
with her previous activity report and the medical evidence. (Tr. 61-66). This conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence. As the ALJ correctly noted, Plaintiff’s testimony was not
consistent with an August 23, 2011 function report that Plaintiff previously completed. (Tr. 176-83).
Plaintiff argues that this discrepancy is the result of a deterioration of her condition. The sparse
medical evidence, however, does not bear that out. A March 30, 2010 MRI revealed “a disc
protrusion with marked narrowing of the disc space at L5-S1.” (Tr. 215). This evidence predated,
by more than one year, the aforementioned function report. The record does not suggest that
Plaintiff’s condition subsequently deteriorated. Rather, the results of an October 29, 2011
examination suggest that Plaintiff was capable of functioning at a level consistent with the ALJ’s
RFC determination. (Tr. 242-45). Likewise, the medical evidence is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
allegations of extreme pain and limitation. The ALJ’s determination to discount Plaintiff’s
credibility is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
The ALJ Properly Relied on the Testimony of a Vocational Expert
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding at Step V of the sequential evaluation
process is unsupported by the evidence. While the ALJ may satisfy her burden through the use of
hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert, such questions must accurately portray
Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments. See Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 150
(6th Cir. 1996). The hypothetical question which the ALJ posed to the vocational expert simply
asked whether there existed jobs which an individual could perform consistent with Plaintiff’s RFC,
to which the vocational expert indicated that there existed approximately 226,000 such jobs in the
United States. The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence and there was
nothing improper or incomplete about the hypothetical questions the ALJ posed to the vocational
expert. The Court concludes, therefore, that the ALJ properly relied upon the vocational expert’s
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. The
Court further finds that appeal of this matter would not be taken in good faith. See Smith v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 1999 WL 1336109 at *2 (6th Cir., Dec. 20, 1999); Leal v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 2015 WL 731311 at *2 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 19, 2015); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3). A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.
Date: October 13, 2015
/s/ Ellen S. Carmody
ELLEN S. CARMODY
United States Magistrate Judge
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