Davis #223815 v. Heyns et al

Filing 58

OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 56 ; Defendants' motion for summary judgment 50 is GRANTED; Plaintiff's state-law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RONALD L. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-cv-19
v.
HON. JANET T. NEFF
DANIEL H. HEYNS, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
This is a prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving
Plaintiff’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), First Amendment,
Equal Protection Clause, and various state law claims alleging failure by Defendants to accede to
his religious dietary requests while incarcerated (Dkt 1). Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment (Dkt 50). The matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and
Recommendation (R&R), recommending Defendants’ motion be granted (Dkt 56). The matter is
presently before the Court on Plaintiff’s objections to the Report and Recommendation (Dkt 57).
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), the Court has performed
de novo consideration of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections
have been made. The Court denies the objections and issues this Opinion and Order.
Plaintiff

presents

fifteen

objections

to

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

Report

and

Recommendation. The Court will consider each of Plaintiff’s objections, in turn, and in the
order and format presented by Plaintiff.

I.

OBJECTIONS
A. RLUIPA

Plaintiff’s First Objection.

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge’s RLUIPA

conclusion is contrary to law (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.536). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument
is that Defendants’ “evidence and/or facts . . . should not have been given more weight then [sic]
the Plaintiffs [sic] verified complaint inwhich [sic] according to Federal Rules and Civil
Procedures Rule 8(b)(6) should be considered as undisputed facts because the Defendants never
denied any of the allegations with in [sic] the complaint” (id.).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because the premise is inaccurate. According to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997(e), “any defendant may waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner
confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility,” and “such waiver shall not constitute an
admission of the allegations contained in the complaint under section 1983 of this title or any
other Federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(g)(1). A court may require a defendant to reply to a
complaint.

42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(g)(2).

However, the Magistrate Judge did not require

Defendants to file a response to Plaintiff’s complaint in this case (Dkt 15 at PageID.130).
Defendants waived the right to reply to Plaintiff’s complaint when replies were not filed by
Defendants. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(g)(1), Defendants’ waiver is not deemed an admission
of Plaintiff’s allegations within the complaint. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s analysis was
not contrary to law when she considered both Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s evidence and facts.
Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Second Objection. Next, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred
when she did not “accept[] Plaintiff’s undisputed allegations that he is commanded by Allah and
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to eat meat and that if he does not adhere to this command that
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it takes him out of the fold of Islam for being disobedient” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.538).
Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is again, that Defendants failed to file a response to Plaintiff’s
complaint and affidavit and that Defendants therefore admitted Plaintiff’s allegations contained
therein (id.).
Plaintiff’s second objection fails for the same reasons stated supra. Plaintiff’s objection
is denied.
Plaintiff’s Third Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
determined that a Halal meal does not require specific menu items of Plaintiff’s choice (Pl. Obj.,
Dkt 57 at PageID.539). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that the Magistrate Judge relied on
case law instead of Plaintiff’s complaint, affidavit, and deposition (id.).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because the premise is inaccurate. Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt 1),
affidavit (Dkt 52), and deposition (Dkt 51-3) are largely based on interpretations of the Quran.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
Judicial review considers “the facts as found and conclusions are drawn.” Id. The Magistrate
Judge determined that Defendants offered Plaintiff a vegan meal option (Dkt 56 at PageID.528).
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendants’ vegan meal option is, in fact, Halal, even
though it does not contain Plaintiff’s specific menu items (id.).

The Magistrate Judge’s

conclusions are based on law (Dkt 56 at PageID.528). The Sixth Circuit has “explicitly held that
vegetarian meals are, in fact, Halal.” Robinson v. Jackson, 615 F. App’x 310, 313 (6th Cir., June
15, 2015). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit also determined that if a prisoner “is not being denied
Halal meals,” then the prisoner “fails to state a claim as a matter of law under RLUIPA.” Id. at

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314. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any error in the Magistrate Judge’s legal analysis
or conclusion. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
concluded that Defendants’ decision “to accommodate the religious dietary needs of thousands
of prisoners by providing a vegan menu option satisfies RLUIPA” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at
PageID.539-540). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that “Defendants have not presented this
argument nor is it supported by any evidence on [sic]the recorded [sic]” (id. at PageID.539).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because the premise is inaccurate. In Defendants’ brief in
support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants stated that the “MDOC provides
Davis with nutritionally sound meals that do not require him to eat food that is haram” (Def. Br.,
Dkt 51 at PageID.433). Defendants also stated that the “MDOC provides Davis with a meal that
does not violate the tenants [sic] of his religion” (id. at PageID.435). Finally, Defendants stated
that the MDOC’s “religious meal is not a substantial burden on Davis’ religion” (id. at
PageID.433). Defendants cite 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2), which provides that “the court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system . . . ” (id. at PageID.435). Defendants identified the “increased costs associated with
providing Halal meat system-wide,” which would force the MDOC “to expend incredibly scarce
resources to provide meals” with Halal meat (Def. Br., Dkt 51 at PageID.435). The Magistrate
Judge considered the record before granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims.
Defendants’ argument was preserved for review, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated any error in
the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.

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B. First Amendment
Plaintiff’s First Objection. Plaintiff argues that Defendants are coercing Plaintiff to
practice a “virtually” “new religion” aside from Islam (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.540).
Plaintiff’s argument improperly raises a new issue on objection. Neither Plaintiff’s
complaint (Dkt 1) nor his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt 52)
presented this issue; hence, the Magistrate Judge did not address this issue.

Because the

Magistrate Judge did not have an opportunity to address this issue, the Court deems this issue
waived.

See Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902, n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (“While the

Magistrate Judge Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq., permits de novo review by the district court if
timely objections, absent compelling reasons, it does not allow parties to raise at the district court
stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate.”); United States v.
Water, 158 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]ssues raised for the first time in objections to
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation are deemed waived.”).
Even if Plaintiff’s argument were not waived, the argument does not compel a different
resolution. In Defendants’ brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants
stated that the “MDOC developed the religious diet to accommodate all religions” (Def. Br., Dkt
51 at PageID.430). Defendants also stated that the MDOC provides Plaintiff with “meals that do
not require him to eat food that is haram” (id. at PageID.433). Plaintiff’s mere assertion does not
suffice to demonstrate that Defendants intended to create a new religion by offering a vegan
menu option. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Second Objection.

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge’s First

Amendment conclusion is contrary to law (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.540). Plaintiff’s basis for

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this argument is that “Defendants have not presented to this Court evidence that what they are
doing to the Plaintiff is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest” (id.).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because the premise is inaccurate. In Defendants’ brief in
support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants identified “increased costs associated
with providing Halal meat” as its penological interest (Def. Br., Dkt 51 at PageID.435). The
Sixth Circuit recognizes that controlling costs of special religious diets for prisoners is a
legitimate penological interest. Berryman v. Granholm, 343 F. App’x 1, 6 (6th Cir. 2009). The
Magistrate Judge relied on well-recognized law when she concluded that Defendants’ serving of
a “single vegan menu option” is “eminently reasonable” in controlling costs (Dkt 56 at
PageID.532). Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any error in the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Third Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
concluded that Defendants had a valid penological reason for declining Plaintiff’s special
religious meal request (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.541). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that
“Plaintiff is only asking that the Defendants provide him with the Halal diet that they said that
they would provide him with and that is with a [sic] Islamic Halal meal that does not violate his
religious dietary tenets” (id. at PageID.541).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because Plaintiff identifies no evidence that Defendants agreed
to provide Plaintiff with a Halal diet that is an “Islamic Halal meal that does not violate his
religious dietary tenets.” In Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff stated that an Islamic Halal meal that
does not violate his religious dietary tenets must include Halal meat (Dkt 1 at PageID.8-9, 50).
Plaintiff requested Defendants provide him with a special religious meal containing Halal meat
(id. at PageID.46-54). Contrary to Plaintiff’s objection, Plaintiff’s complaint evidences that

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Defendants denied Plaintiff’s request for a special religious meal containing Halal meat (Dkt 1-1
at PageID.46, 49-54). Plaintiff has not demonstrated any agreement by Defendants to provide
Plaintiff with anything other than a vegan menu option. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s First Amendment
claims (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.541-52). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that Defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff, “based solely on the evidence presented
by Plaintiff,” “proved that the Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity of his claims
under the First Amendment” (id.).
Plaintiff appears to misunderstand the qualified immunity analysis. The Magistrate Judge
concluded that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a violation of his First Amendment right. “If no
constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no
necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001). See also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (describing the discretion
afforded a court in analyzing qualified immunity). Plaintiff’s objection therefore reveals no error
in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Fifth Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
concluded that “the vegan menu option, from which Plaintiff has been approved to eat, satisfies
the requirement that Plaintiff eat Halal” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.542). Plaintiff’s basis for
this argument is that the Magistrate Judge “has no evidence in support of it presented to this
Court from the Defendants in anytype [sic] of way” (id.).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because the premise is inaccurate. In Defendants’ brief in
support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants stated that the “MDOC provides

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Davis with nutritionally sound meals that do not require him to eat food that is haram” (Def. Br.,
Dkt 51 at PageID.433). Defendants also stated that the “MDOC provides Davis with a meal that
does not violate the tenants [sic] of his religion” (id.) Plaintiff does not deny that Defendants
provide a vegan menu option on the religious meal line. Defendants approved Plaintiff’s request
to participate in the religious meal line. Again, the Sixth Circuit has “explicitly held that
vegetarian meals are, in fact, Halal.” Robinson, 615 F. App’x at 313. The Magistrate Judge
considered the facts and concluded that the vegan menu option satisfies the requirement that
Plaintiff eat Halal. Plaintiff’s objection does not reveal that the Magistrate Judge erred in
reaching her conclusion. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Sixth Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
determined that “affording Plaintiff an individualized diet could engender resentment among
other prisoners who are not afforded such an individualized diet and, therefore, implicate
legitimate security concerns” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.543).

Plaintiff’s basis for this

argument is that Defendants provide prisoners with “individualized diet through health care”
with no security concerns; therefore, providing Plaintiff with an individualized religious diet
would not cause resentment or security concerns (id.)
Plaintiff’s objection does not reveal any error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the
factors that are relevant in determining the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation (Dkt
56 at PageID.529-532, citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
argument does not compel a resolution other than the recommendation by the Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff’s objection is denied.

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C. Equal Protection
Plaintiff’s First Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge is “biased towards
the Plaintiff” because she concluded that Defendants’ vegan menu option is an attempt to
accommodate the religious needs of prisoners, not to discriminate against said prisoners (Pl.
Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.543-544). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that the Magistrate Judge
relied on evidence not in the record (id. at PageID.544).
Plaintiff’s objection fails because Plaintiff’s premise is inaccurate. As stated supra,
Defendants were not required to reply to Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt 15 at PageID.130).
42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(g)(1). Moreover, in Defendants’ brief in support of their motion for
summary judgment, Defendants stated that the “MDOC developed the religious diet to
accommodate all religions” (Def. Br., Dkt 51 at PageID.430). Defendants also submitted that
“providing a religious diet that satisfies prisoners of multiple faiths, has sufficient calories, and is
nutritionally sound does not amount to purposeful discrimination” (id.). The Magistrate Judge
considered the facts in evidence and concluded that Defendants intended to accommodate the
religious needs of thousands of prisoners, not to discriminate against said prisoners, including
Plaintiff. Plaintiff objection does not reveal any bias in the Magistrate Judge’s Equal Protection
analysis. Further, Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit because “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Second Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims
(Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.546). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that Defendants proffered
no evidence that the vegan menu complies with Halal religious tenets (id. at 545-46).
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Plaintiff’s argument reveals his misreading of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation.

In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge referenced a

holding from the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan: implementation by the
MDOC of a vegan menu option which “complies with Kosher and Halal religious tenets . . .
suggests an intent to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, not to discriminate against
Plaintiffs on the basis of religion or to impose a substantial burden on their beliefs” (Dkt 56 at
PageID.534, quoting Stornello v. Heyns, 2013 WL 6842561, at *5 (E.D. Mich., Dec. 27, 2013)).
It appears from Plaintiff’s objection that he believes this statement to be the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion. It is not. The Magistrate Judge merely relied upon the guidance of other courts,
including the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan, when she considered
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment
because Plaintiff “presented no evidence that any similarly situated prisoner has requested and
obtained a religious diet substantially similar to that requested by Plaintiff” (id.). Plaintiff’s
objection reveals no error by the Magistrate Judge in granting summary judgment regarding
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
Plaintiff’s Third Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims
(Pl. Obj., Dkt 57 at PageID.546). Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that Plaintiff properly
defended Defendants’ request for qualified immunity (id. at 546-47).
Again, Plaintiff’s objection fails because Plaintiff appears to misunderstand the qualified
immunity analysis. The Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s Equal
Protection claims based on Plaintiff’s lack of evidence showing that “any similarly situated
prisoner has requested and obtained a religious diet substantially similar to that requested by

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Plaintiff” (Dkt 56 at PageID.534). “[I]f no constitutional right would have been violated were
the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified
immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Plaintiff’s objection is therefore denied.
D. State Law Claims
Plaintiff’s First Objection. Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she
recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims (Dkt 57 at PageID.547). Plaintiff provides
no basis for this argument.
Plaintiff’s objection fails because this Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims if all claims over which this Court has jurisdiction have been dismissed. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Taylor v. First of
America Bank–Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
E. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Final Objection. Plaintiff argues that “there is a clear dispute on several
genuine issues as to the material facts within this litigation in which as a matter of law must be
presented to a jury for them to decide the outcome of the matter” (Dkt 57 at PageID.547).
Plaintiff’s basis for this argument is that a “strict vegan menu . . . is not Islamicly Halal;”
therefore, Defendant’s strict vegan menu “violates Plaintiff’s religious dietary obligations” (id.).
The Court considered each of Plaintiff’s objections contained herein and denied each in
turn. Plaintiff’s final objection is similarly denied for the reasons previously stated.
II.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation as
the Opinion of this Court and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
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remaining state-law claims. Because this Opinion and Order resolves all pending claims in this
matter, a corresponding Judgment will also enter. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58. Last, because this
action was filed in forma pauperis, this Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an
appeal of this decision would not be taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 206,
211-12 (2007). Therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objections (Dkt 57) are DENIED and the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt 56) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the
Opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt
50) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), that this Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims, and the
state-law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of this decision would not be taken in good faith.

/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge

Dated: February 28, 2017

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