Taylor #499227 v. Wawrzyniak

Filing 15

(DISREGARD - FILED IN THIS CASE IN ERROR) OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley (Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley, pjc) Text Modified - Filing Error on 5/27/2015 (pjc).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

DUSTIN CHARLES LEE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:15-CV-00104

v.

Consent Case

JENNIFER FRANCE, in her official
and individual capacity, and
CHIPPEWA COUNTY, MICHIGAN
Defendants.
___________________________________/

OPINION
Plaintiff Dustin Charles Lee filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and § 1988 alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant violated his rights under state law. Plaintiff sues
Chippewa County Public Defender Jennifer France, in her official and individual capacities, and
Chippewa County. Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief. Plaintiff’s
amended complaint alleges that Defendant France, with gross negligence, manufactured a false charge
against Plaintiff for escape, that the Plaintiff was wrongly imprisoned after he plead guilty to this
crime, and that Defendant France coerced him into pleading guilty to the charge.
On March 27, 2012, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to assault of a police officer in Chippewa
County and possession of a controlled substance, while also being found guilty of habitual offender
3rd. At this time, Plaintiff signed a tether agreement acknowledging that he would be monitored by
the courts. The tether agreement required Plaintiff to return to his residence within the scheduled time

or he would be considered an escaped inmate. On August 24, 2012, Plaintiff was sentenced to 365
days jail and ordered to report to the Chippewa County Jail on April 27, 2012, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff
failed to report to the Chippewa County Jail as ordered.
On May 9, 2012, while attempting to flee town, Plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiff
admitted to placing tinfoil around the ankle tether device in an effort to evade detection. Based on
this occurrence, Plaintiff was charged by the Chippewa County Prosecutor’s Office with escape under
M.C.L. 750.195 and habitual offender 4th. Defendant France was appointed by the court to represent
Plaintiff in this criminal case. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to escape and habitual offender 3rd. On August
7, 2012, Plaintiff was sentenced to a two to eight years, to be served consecutive to the underlying
charges from March 27, 2012 conviction.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiff has filed a response and the matter is ready for decision. Because
both sides have asked that the Court consider evidentiary materials beyond the pleadings, the
standards applicable to summary judgment apply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Summary judgment
is appropriate only if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact
for trial and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). If the movant carries the burden of showing there is an
absence of evidence to support a claim or defense, then the party opposing the motion must
demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that
there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324-25. The nonmoving party cannot rest
on its pleadings but must present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
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Thus, any direct evidence offered by the plaintiff in response to a summary judgment motion must
be accepted as true. Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Adams v.
Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994)). However, a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the
nonmovant’s position will be insufficient. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. Ultimately, the court
must determine whether there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. See also Leahy v. Trans Jones, Inc., 996 F.2d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1993)
(single affidavit, in presence of other evidence to the contrary, failed to present genuine issue of
fact); cf. Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439, 1448 (6th Cir. 1993) (single
affidavit concerning state of mind created factual issue).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants are barred
because Defendants were not acting under the color of state law. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws
and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th
Cir. 2009); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant France, his court-appointed Public Defender,
acted under color of state law. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme
Court held that defense counsel performs a private, not an official, function:
In our system[,] a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated
representatives of the State. The system assumes that adversarial testing will
ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness. But it posits that a defense
lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with
it, but rather by advancing “the undivided interest of his client.” This is essentially a

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private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and
authority are not needed.
454 U.S. at 318-19 (footnotes omitted). The Polk County Court further held that this is true even
of the state-appointed and state-paid public defender. Id. at 321. The Court indicated that, once a
lawyer undertakes the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same
whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serves in a legal aid or defender program.
Id. at 323. The Court held that, even though a public defender is paid by the state, he or she does
not act under color of state law in representing the accused. Id. at 325. Rather, defense
counsel—whether privately retained or paid by the state—acts purely on behalf of the client and
free from state control. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court-appointed Public Defender, Defendant
France, did not act under color of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against
her.
In addition, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Chippewa County fails as
well. Local governments “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Floyd v.
Cnty. of Kent, 454 Fed. App’x 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating without proof that County’s
practices, not its employee’s, were the “moving force” behind plaintiff’s violations, no § 1983
claim stands against it). Defendant France is an employee of Chippewa County. Plaintiff’s claim
of wrongful imprisonment rests on Defendant France’s actions and advice during Plaintiff’s
criminal case from June 15, 2012 to August 7, 2012. Because Plaintiff’s claim stems from actions
by Defendant France alone, Plaintiff is barred from bringing this § 1983 claim against Defendant
Chippewa County. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

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To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims of fraud and legal malpractice, these
claims arise solely under state law. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a
state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162,
1166 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit has stated that district courts should generally decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under these circumstances. See
Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993); Hawley v. Burke, No. 971853, 1998 WL 384557, at *1-2 (6th Cir. June 18, 1998). Even if Plaintiff’s federal claims had
not been barred, this Court likely would not have exercised its discretion in hearing the claims.
See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to sustain his
burden of proof in response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 56) will be GRANTED and this case will
be dismissed in its entirety.
An Order and Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: May 27, 2015
/s/ TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
TIMOTHY P. GREELEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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