Anderson #180023 v. Muskegon Police Department et al
Filing
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OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL LYNN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-cv-141
v.
Honorable Janet T. Neff
MUSKEGON POLICE DEPARTMENT
et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as frivolous because it is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is incarcerated in the E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility. He is serving a
sentence of 35 to 65 years following his conviction in the Muskegon County Circuit Court for
second-degree murder. In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sues the Muskegon Police Department,
County of Muskegon, City of Muskegon, Detective Emilio Treja, Assistant Prosecutor Brett
Gardner, Probation Officer Karen Buie, Attorney Carl Kruger and two unknown Muskegon Police
Officers.
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested at his home by the two Defendant police officers
on September 26, 2003. The following day, Plaintiff was taken before a judge for a probation
violation and a hearing was scheduled for October 3, 2003. Following the hearing on October 3, the
court determined that there were no grounds for finding a probation violation and ordered Plaintiff
to be released. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Buie, Gardner and Treja conspired to fabricate
the probation violation charge for the purpose of detaining Plaintiff in connection with a murder
investigation, which constituted an illegal arrest. Plaintiff alleges that, “As a result of the 8-day
delay without bringing Plaintiff to a Magistrate on murder charges, Defendants Treja and Gardner
did obtain a recorded statement under duress . . ..” (Compl. ¶ 8, docket #1, Page ID#5.) According
to Plaintiff, Treja and Gardner had made numerous previous attempts to speak with him about
Wendy Curry’s murder, but Plaintiff had refused. Plaintiff further contends that in order to obtain
an arrest warrant on the murder charge, Gardner and Treja presented false evidence and withheld
exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Muskegon Police Department, City of
Muskegon, County of Muskegon, Gardner, Buie and others gave false accounts of the evidence to
the news media, which defamed Plaintiff’s character and prejudiced potential jurors and witnesses.
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In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kruger, who was appointed to represent him on October
10, 2003, conspired with other Defendants to waive Plaintiff’s arraignment without consulting with
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages of $250,000.
Discussion
State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness
of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For
civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the
claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.
1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins to run
when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.
Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.1
Plaintiff’s complaint is untimely. He asserts claims arising in October 2003. Plaintiff
had reason to know of the “harms” done to him at the time they occurred. Hence, his claims accrued
in 2003. However, Plaintiff did not file his complaint until February 2015, well past Michigan’s
three-year limit. Moreover, Michigan law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations
when a plaintiff is incarcerated. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5851(9).
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Further, it is well
28 U.S.C. § 1658 created a “catch-all” limitations period of four years for civil actions arising under federal
statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.
369 (2004), which applied this federal four-year limitations period to a suit alleging racial discrimination under § 1981
does not apply to prisoner claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because, while § 1983 was amended in 1996, prisoner civil
rights actions under § 1983 were not “made possible” by the amended statute. Id. at 382.
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established that ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.
See Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380,
385 (6th Cir. 1991); Mason v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at *2 (6th Cir. June
17, 2002).
A complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it is
time-barred by the appropriate statute of limitations. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508,
511 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that when a meritorious affirmative
defense based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint,
sua sponte dismissal of the complaint is appropriate. See Dellis, 257 F.3d at 511; Beach v. Ohio,
No. 03-3187, 2003 WL 22416912, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003); Castillo v. Grogan, No. 02-5294,
2002 WL 31780936, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2002); Duff v. Yount, No. 02-5250, 2002 WL
31388756, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2002); Paige v. Pandya, No. 00-1325, 2000 WL 1828653 (6th
Cir. Dec. 5, 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed as frivolous.2
2
Even if Plaintiff’s action was not barred by the statute of limitations, the majority of his claims would be barred
by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state
prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the
conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has been extended to actions seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th
Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL
246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff's allegations call into question
the validity of his murder conviction, they are barred by Heck until his criminal conviction has been invalidated.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: April 17, 2015
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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