Sango #252200 v. Aramark et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT D. SANGO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-cv-247
v.
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell
ARAMARK et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION DENYING LEAVE
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES
Plaintiff Robert D. Sango, a prisoner incarcerated at Ionia Correctional Facility, filed
a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Because Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for
failure to state a claim, he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the $400.00 civil action filing fee applicable to those not
permitted to proceed in forma pauperis within twenty-eight (28) days of this opinion and
accompanying order. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed
without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be responsible for payment of the
$400.00 filing fee in accordance with In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).
Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner’s
request for the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA
was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners – many of which are meritless –
and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts.” Hampton v. Hobbs,
106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives
to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think” before filing a complaint. Id. For example, a prisoner is
liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis, the
prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The
constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at
1288.
In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by
preventing a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless
lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on
the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and
unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule
against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process,
and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is ex post facto legislation. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d
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596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); accord Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Wilson, 148 F.3d at 604-06); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); Rivera v.
Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir.
1997).
Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan. In more than
three of Plaintiff’s lawsuits, the Court entered dismissals on the grounds that they were frivolous or
failed to state a claim. See Sango v. Lewis et al., No. 1:14-cv-342 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2014);
Sango v. Huss, No. 1:14-cv-2 (W.D. Mich. June 12, 2014); Sango v. Hammond et al., No.
1:14-cv-283 (W.D. Mich. May 6, 2014); Sango v. Novak, No. 1:14-cv-343 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 23,
2014). In addition, Plaintiff repeatedly has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this
Court because he has three strikes. See Sango v. Eryer et al., No. 1:15-cv-71 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 12,
2015); Sango v. Nevins et al., No. 1:15-cv-179 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2015); Sango v. Michigan State
Office of Administrative Hearings & Rules et al., No. 1:14-cv-1272 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2015);
Sango v. Curtis et al., No. 1:14-cv-823 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2014); Sango v. Wakley et al., 1:14-cv703 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 2014).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations do not fall within the exception to the three-strikes
rule for a prisoner under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The Sixth Circuit set forth the
following general requirements for a claim of imminent danger:
In order to allege sufficiently imminent danger, we have held that “the threat
or prison condition must be real and proximate and the danger of serious physical
injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed.” Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x
796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus a prisoner’s
assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the
exception.” Id. at 797–98; see also [Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App’x 488,
492 (6th Cir. 2012)] (“Allegations of past dangers are insufficient to invoke the
exception.”); Percival v. Gerth, 443 F. App’x 944, 946 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Assertions
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of past danger will not satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception.”); cf. [Pointer v.
Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007)] (implying that past danger is
insufficient for the imminent-danger exception).
In addition to a temporal requirement, we have explained that the allegations
must be sufficient to allow a court to draw reasonable inferences that the danger
exists. To that end, “district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant
to § 1915(g) when the prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or
ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level
of irrational or wholly incredible).” Rittner, 290 F. App’x at 798 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Taylor, 508 F. App’x at 492 (“Allegations that
are conclusory, ridiculous, or clearly baseless are also insufficient for purposes of the
imminent-danger exception.”).
Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner’s claim of
imminent danger is subject to the same notice pleading requirement as applied to prisoner
complaints. Id. Consequently, a prisoner must allege facts in the complaint from which the Court
could reasonably conclude that the prisoner was under an existing danger at the time he filed his
complaint, but the prisoner need not affirmatively prove those allegations. Id.
Plaintiff, who receives a vegan meal accommodation, claims that Food Service
Director Jennifer Daughdree has served nutrient-deficient vegan meals from canned or overcooked
food. Plaintiff also alleges that only one vegan meal tray was sent to segregation to be shared by
Plaintiff and another prisoner for about two months “earlier this year.” (Compl., docket #1, Page
ID#2.) After writing to Daughdree, Plaintiff received a vegan tray about “[two-thirds] the size of
a normal tray.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s allegations do not fall within the exception to the three-strikes rule because
he does not allege any facts establishing that he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
First, sharing a meal with another prisoner in the past does not fall within the exception to the
three-strikes rule. See Rittner, 290 F. App’x at 797-98 (past danger does not satisfy the imminent-4-
danger exception). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that any deficiencies in his vegan meals place
him in danger of a serious physical injury. Even if Plaintiff has suffered weight loss, which he does
not allege, the fact that a plaintiff has lost some weight, standing alone, falls short of establishing
serious physical injury. See Sims v. Caruso, No. 1:11-cv-92, 2011 WL 672232, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 18, 2011) (finding weight loss, standing alone, falls short of establishing serious physical
injury); Hernandez v. Ventura Cnty., No. CV 09-7838 GHK (JC), 2010 WL 3603491, at **5-6
(C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (finding that allegation of weight loss due to smaller portion sizes of food
did not constitute “imminent danger of serious physical injury”); Sayre v. Waid, No. 1:08cv142,
2009 WL 249982, at *3 (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 2, 2009) (claim that food provided by prison caused
inmate to lose 30 pounds insufficient to demonstrate “serious physical injury” under § 1915(g):
“[W]eight loss, in and of itself, is not indicative of a serious physical injury [for purposes of section
1915(g) ].”). Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that he is in real and proximate danger
of serious physical injury, he cannot invoke the exception to the three-strikes rule.
In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding in forma
pauperis in this action. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to
pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is $400.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court
will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff
fails to pay the filing fee within the 28-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but
he will continue to be responsible for payment of the $400.00 filing fee.
Dated: April 13, 2015
/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:
Clerk, U.S. District Court
399 Federal Building
110 Michigan Street, NW
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.”
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