Dungey v. General Motors Corporation

Filing 13

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

NICOLE DUNGEY,
Plaintiff,
File No. 1:15-cv-378
v.
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant.
/
OPINION
This is a wrongful termination case brought by Plaintiff Nicole Dungey, a former
employee of Defendant General Motors LLC (General Motors).1 The matter is before the
Court on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff filed a response
(ECF No. 12), to which Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 11). For the reasons that follow,
Defendant’s motion will be granted.
I.
This matter involves Plaintiff Nicole Dungey’s termination from Defendant General
Motors. Plaintiff was an employee at General Motors beginning in April 1993. On or about
August 22, 2011, Plaintiff suffered an injury causing “prolonged and extended disability

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Plaintiff’s complaint identifies Defendant as “General Motors Corporation” and, as a result, the
case caption also identifies Defendant as General Motors Corporation. Defendant notes that the
correct identification of General Motors is “General Motors LLC.”
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from employment.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) On March 19, 2013, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment.
As an hourly employee of General Motors, Plaintiff was a member of and represented
by the United Automobile Workers (UAW) “with respect to the terms and conditions of her
. . . employment.” (Huber Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 7-1.) “The terms and conditions of UAW
represented hourly employees’ employment are governed by a series of collective bargaining
agreements as negotiated between [General Motors] and the UAW known as the GM-UAW
National Agreement.” (Id. ¶ 4.) The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provides that
employees who have been granted a leave of absence, but “who fail to report for work within
three working days after the date of expiration of the leave, shall be considered as having
voluntarily quit unless they have a satisfactory reason[.]” (CBA ¶ 111(b), ECF No. 7-1.)
Defendant states that Plaintiff was terminated pursuant to this provision of the CBA. (Huber
Aff. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff contends, however, that a contract outside of the collective bargaining
agreement was created through “express words, implications, or operation of law.” (Compl.
¶ 9, ECF No. 1-3.) Plaintiff states that she was led to believe that it was General Motors’
policy not to discharge employees while long-term disability benefits were in place and that
she would not be terminated except for good cause. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.) After Plaintiff was fired, she
filed this action on March 17, 2015, in Ingham County Circuit Court. Plaintiff raises two
claims under state law: (1) breach of constructive employment contract; and (2) discharge
against public policy. Defendant removed the case to federal court, alleging that jurisdiction
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in this Court is proper because Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by federal labor
law. (Notice of Removal ¶ 5, ECF No. 1.)
II.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the Court to grant summary judgment
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for
summary judgment the Court must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to
determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment this Court cannot weigh the evidence,
make credibility determinations, or resolve material factual disputes. Alman v. Reed, 703
F.3d 887, 895 (6th Cir. 2013); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
(stating that on a motion for summary judgment “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge”). “[T]he district court must construe the evidence and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir.
2007)). Nevertheless, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a nonmovant’s position is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 252. The proper inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

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could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.; see generally Street v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476–80 (6th Cir.1989).
III.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims of breach of
employment contract and discharge in violation of public policy. Defendant raises three
grounds for summary judgment: (1) Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA); (2) Plaintiff failed to comply with both
mandatory internal union remedies and the required grievance procedure set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement governing her employment with Defendant; and (3)
Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 2,
ECF No. 7.)
A. Section 301 Preemption
Defendant first argues that resolution of Plaintiff’s two state law claims will require
interpretation of and reference to the collective bargaining agreement and, accordingly, that
Section 301 of the LMRA preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Section 301 provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “[T]he Supreme Court has held that Section
301 preempts state law rules that substantially implicate the meaning of collective bargaining
agreement terms.” DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994). The
preemptive reach of Section 301 is not “boundless,” however. Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp.,
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914 F.2d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1990). If a plaintiff’s state law claim “can be resolved without
interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the CBA for § 301 preemption
purposes.” Lingle v. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 (1988). That said, the Sixth Circuit
has refused to
limit[] § 301 pre-emption to cases where the precise meaning of precise words
in the CBA is the crux of the state-based claim. Rather, we have found many
state-based claims pre-empted because they have implicated the federal
policies underlying federal labor law. In doing so, we have followed the
dictates of the [Supreme] Court in Allis-Chalmers [Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
201, 210-11 (1985)] that “[t]hese policies required that ‘the relationships
created by [a collective bargaining agreement] be defined by application of an
evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy,” and that
“state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private
agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of those
parties, are pre-empted,” id. at 213.
Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Sixth Circuit has developed a two-step approach to determine whether Section
301 preempts state-law claims.
First, the district court must examine whether proof of the state law claim
requires interpretation of the [CBA] terms . . . . Second, the court must
ascertain whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is created by the [CBA] or
by state law. If the right both is borne of state law and does not invoke contract
interpretation, then there is no pre-emption. However, if neither or only one
criterion is satisfied, section 301 pre-emption is warranted.
DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that her claims are not preempted by the LMRA because, contrary
to Defendant’s assertions, Plaintiff’s termination was not based on a provision of the
collective bargaining agreement. Rather, Plaintiff argues that her termination “was based on
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fabrications made through GM’s agents that Plaintiff relied on for her employment. GM
through its policies and agents, made representations and/or promises that termination would
only be for just cause.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 12.) In support of
her argument, Plaintiff cites Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 1980). In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a provision of an
employment contract providing that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause
“may become part of the contract either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result
of an employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in an employer’s policy statements.” Id.
at 885.
In Maushund v. Earl C. Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit
addressed an argument similar to Plaintiff’s. There, a truck driver alleged that his employer
breached an oral contract promising not to discharge the driver except for cause. Id. at 589.
The employer removed the case to federal district court because the complaint also alleged
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the Teamsters
Union, of which the truck driver was a member. Id. The truck driver argued that “his oral
contract rights under Toussaint are not preempted by federal law.” Id. at 590. The court
stated:
It is undisputed that a collective bargaining agreement is in existence between
the employer here and the Teamsters, that it covers employees and truck
drivers such as [the plaintiff], and that [the plaintiff] is a member of Local 339
of the Teamsters. Under such circumstances we conclude, as did the district
judge, that it is beyond question that [the plaintiff] must look to federal labor
law for any relief and that his sole remedy, if any, lies not in state law but in
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining
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process prohibits [the plaintiff] from engaging in separate negotiations with
the company and precludes any actions to enforce such an agreement
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has “unequivocally stated the implicit holding of Maushund:
employees covered by a CBA cannot rely upon the existence of a separate, individual
employment contract giving rise to state law claims.” Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d
795, 801 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 884 F.2d 936 (6th
Cir. 1989)); see also Jones, 939 F.2d at 383 (Ҥ 301 preempts state law when . . . employees
covered by a CBA . . . rely upon the existence of a separate, individual employment contract
giving rise to state law claims.”); Johnson v. Delphi Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (“The Maushund court specifically held that § 301 preempts claims recognized
in Toussaint . . . .”). One court explained the holding in Maushund as follows:
The rationale behind these cases is that the collective bargaining process
extinguishes an individual employee’s power to order her relations with her
employer and creates a power vested in the union to act in the interests of all
employees. Thus, once a plaintiff is covered by a CBA, “any contract would
necessarily involve interpretation of the CBA and is thus preempted.”
McCarty v. Reynolds Metals Co., 883 F. Supp. 356, 362 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citation omitted);
see also Jones, 939 F.2d at 383 (“[I]f the asserted right itself is not created directly by the
CBA, it would be the product of an individual contract for employment, which is itself
forbidden by the CBA.”). Plaintiff has not cited any case in which a court has allowed a
breach of contract claim based on a contract independent of a CBA brought by a plaintiff
who was covered by a CBA at the time the representations were made.
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Based on the above law, the Court finds that federal labor law preempts Plaintiff’s
state law claims. Plaintiff was a member of and represented by the UAW. The terms and
conditions of employment for UAW-represented employees “are governed by a series of
collective bargaining agreements as negotiated between GM and the UAW.” (Huber Aff. ¶
4, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff’s state law claims are based on the alleged breach of a contract that
was entered into independent of the collective bargaining agreement and while Plaintiff was
covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that it was
Defendant’s “policy not to discharge” employees when long-term disability benefits were in
place and that Plaintiff relied upon Defendant’s “policies, statements, and representations”
that she would only be terminated for just cause. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-9, ECF No. 1-3.)
The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that a Toussaint claim, such as the one Plaintiff
raises, is preempted by federal labor law. Maushund, 795 F.2d at 590. Moreover, Section 301
“preempts state law when . . . employees covered by a CBA . . . rely upon the existence of
a separate, individual employment contract giving rise to state law claims.” Jones, 939 F.2d
at 383. Because the existence of a CBA forecloses Plaintiff’s ability to separately negotiate
and enforce agreements with Defendant, Maushund, 795 F.2d at 590, an examination of
whether it was Defendant’s “policy” not to discharge employees while long-term disability
benefits are in place or except for good cause requires an interpretation of the CBA.
McCarty, 883 F. Supp. at 362. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the asserted right negotiated
is inconsistent with the CBA, this right would be the “product of an individual contract for
employment, which is itself forbidden by the CBA.” Jones, 939 F.2d at 383.
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B. Plaintiff Failed to Comply With the Grievance Process
Because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal labor law, the claims “then
actually present[] a hybrid § 301 suit for breach of a labor contract.” Simoneau v. General
Motors Corp., 85 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2003). A claim under Section 301 of the
LMRA must be brought within the six-month statute of limitations. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983). The statute of limitations begins to toll “when the
claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
acts constituting the alleged violation” of the CBA. Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 32 F.3d
997, 1000 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff was terminated
on March 19, 2013. (Compl. ¶ 5.) The complaint was filed on March 17, 2015. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claims are time barred.
Further, Plaintiff would not prevail even if she had filed a Section 301 claim within
the applicable statute of limitations period. “Ordinarily . . . an employee is required to
exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in the collective bargaining
agreement.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169. Plaintiff “never initiated a union grievance
challenging the separation of her employment from [General Motors] in March of 2013.”
(Huber Aff. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1-1.)

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IV.
For the reasons stated, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. Judgment will enter in accordance with this Opinion.

Dated: January 14, 2016

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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