Titan Insurance Company v. United States of America

Filing 20

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
__________________________

TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:15-CV-521

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

HON. GORDON J. QUIST

Defendant.
_______________________________/

OPINION
This case arises from an accident involving a snowmobile and a federally owned vehicle.
Because the driver of the snowmobile was uninsured, his claim was assigned to Plaintiff, Titan
Insurance Company. Apparently seeking a way to shift liability to a different insurer, Plaintiff filed
a complaint in state court against Roni Etheridge, the federal employee who was operating the
vehicle involved in the accident. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment forcing Etheridge to
disclose the name of her personal insurance company. The United States subsequently certified that
Etheridge was a federal employee acting within the scope of her employment, substituted itself for
Etheridge, removed the case to this Court, and moved to dismiss it. Because Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for relief, the Court will dismiss the action
Background
On February 9, 2014, Nathan Moore was driving a snowmobile in the Huron Manistee
National Forest. (Dkt. #1-1 at Page ID#8, ¶¶ 4-5.) Moore lost control of the snowmobile and struck
a federally owned vehicle operated by Etheridge. (Id.) Because Moore did not have insurance of
his own, he sought benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, which assigned the claim

to Plaintiff. (Id. at Page ID#9, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff is deemed to be an insurer of last resort. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
At some point, Plaintiff learned that Etheridge owned a vehicle registered in her name at her
primary address. (Id. at ¶ 13.) After Etheridge refused Plaintiff’s request to disclose the insurer of
her vehicle, Plaintiff filed an action against Etheridge in state court seeking a declaratory judgment
ordering Etheridge to disclose the name of the insurer of any vehicle she owned. (Id. at Page ID##910.) Plaintiff’s complaint did not allege that Etheridge had any legal obligation to Plaintiff, but
simply stated that “without the Court’s power to provide declaratory relief,” Plaintiff would be
without a remedy because it could not seek benefits from Etheridge’s insurer. (Dkt. #1-1 at Page
ID#9.)
Thereafter, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Michigan signed a
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) stating that Etheridge was acting within the scope
of her duties as a federal law enforcement officer at the time of the accident. (Dkt. #1-2 at Page
ID#12-13, ¶ 4.) The Government subsequently removed the case to this Court, asserting jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), known as the federal officer removal statute, as well as 28 U.S.C. §
2679(d)(2) and § 1441. (Dkt. #1 at Page ID#2, ¶ 5.) The Court then entered an Order substituting
the United States as the Defendant. (Dkt. #10.)
Discussion
Defendant argues that it is immune from suit and that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Because the Court is without power to rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim if it lacks
jurisdiction, it will address that issue first.
The case was removed from state court pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28
U.S.C. 1442(a). The Supreme Court has explained that the federal officer removal statute is a “pure
jurisdictional statute” that grants federal district courts authority over cases in which a federal officer

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is a defendant. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136, 109 S. Ct. 959, 968 (1989). The statute
does not “independently support Art. III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction,” but rather “serves to overcome
the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule which would otherwise preclude removal even if a federal defense
were alleged.” Id. In other words, under the federal officer removal statute, federal jurisdiction is
proper so long as there is a federal defense asserted. Because Defendant has asserted a federal
defense in this case—namely, sovereign immunity—there is federal question jurisdiction.
Moving to the question of immunity, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not immune because
there is no tort at issue. Plaintiff stresses that Etheridge is not liable for the accident, and that it
seeks to recover nothing from Etheridge (or the Government) except the name of Etheridge’s
insurer. Plaintiff argues that because it is not seeking to hold Etheridge liable for a tort, the issue
of immunity does not come into play.
Accepting Plaintiff’s characterization of its complaint, it fails to state a claim for relief in the
most basic sense. Plaintiff asserts that it cannot recover the information it seeks without court
intervention, but never even suggests why it is legally entitled to such information. Plaintiff has not
alleged that Etheridge violated the law or breached a legal duty. Rather, Plaintiff simply asserts that
Etheridge has information that Plaintiff wants, that she refuses to give it up, and that the Court must
therefore step in—all without providing a legal basis for forcing Etheridge to provide such
information.
Plaintiff’s failure to assert that Etheridge has violated any legal duty appears to be an attempt
to evade the barriers of sovereign immunity. See Premo v. United States, 599 F.3d 540, 545 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“Sovereign immunity prevents suit against the United States without its consent.”). If
Plaintiff alleged that Etheridge violated the law or breached a duty, the suit would likely be barred
by sovereign immunity. See id. at 548 (concluding that the United States’ waiver of sovereign

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immunity does “not extend to claims grounded in strict liability”). Thus, Plaintiff is careful to point
out that it is not asserting that Etheridge is liable in any way. What it does not explain, however,
is how Etheridge can be forced to take action if she did not run afoul of the law or breach a duty.
Plaintiff has failed to state any legal basis for its claim that Etheridge should be forced to
disclose the name of her insurer. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for a
declaratory judgment, and dismiss this action.
An order consistent with this Opinion will follow.

Dated: September 11, 2015

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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