Murray #251234 v. Schooley et al
Filing
8
OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAJUAN MICHAELCHIMA MURRAY,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-cv-911
v.
Honorable Janet T. Neff
UNKNOWN SCHOOLEY et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff DaJuan Michaelchima Murray presently is incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) at Chippewa Correctional Facility, though the events about
which he complains occurred while he was incarcerated at Michigan Reformatory (RMI) and Oaks
Correctional Facility (ECF). Defendants are MDOC employees at these two facilities. The RMI
defendants are: Deputy Warden (unknown) Schooley, Resident Unit Manager (RUM) (unknown)
Prince, Grievance Coordinator K. Miller, and Resident Unit Officer (unknown) Williams. The ECF
defendants are: Warden (unknown) Gidley, Warden T. Mackie, and Grievance Coordinator T.
Bassett.1
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was housed at RMI on October 28, 2014, when
MDOC staff informed him that he was being moved to segregation for a major misconduct. Plaintiff
secured his property in a padlocked footlocker inside his cell. Officer Williams packed his property
and was the last person known to be in possession of Plaintiff’s music player, watch, hair dryer,
surge protector, and personal underwear, before these items were either lost or destroyed. Plaintiff
contends that he did not receive an inventory of his property from Williams for several days, in
violation of MDOC policy. Plaintiff sent a grievance regarding his property to Grievance
Coordinator Miller, along with a request for a “DMTB-1104 form,” which is used for submitting a
claim to the state administrative board for the loss or destruction of property by an MDOC
1
Bassett is named in an amendment to the complaint. (Mot. to Add T. Bassett to Def. List, ECF No. 4.)
Because Plaintiff is permitted to amend his complaint once as a matter of course before service on Defendants, the Court
will grant the motion.
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employee. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Plaintiff never received the form despite several
requests for it.
Plaintiff further contends that he was placed in segregation without receiving a
written statement of the reasons for his placement or a hearing or other opportunity to respond to
the misconduct that was the basis for his placement. A MDOC hearings handbook allegedly
provides that prisoners placed in segregation must be reviewed for a major misconduct within 24
hours. More than 24 hours after his placement, Plaintiff asked Defendant Prince if he could be
released. After two days in segregation, Plaintiff asked Defendant Schooley if he could be released.
Neither Schooley nor Prince released him. Schooley did nothing. Officer Prince allegedly lied to
an investigator about the issue, saying that the placement was valid.
Plaintiff also complains about the conditions of his confinement in segregation. He
contends that he was not given his Bible or his “daily bread” pamphlet, which prevented him from
engaging in his daily religious practices and studies. (Id.) He was not permitted to access books that
are designated for use by prisoners in segregation. He was subjected to a “smokey atmosphere” on
one occasion due to nearby construction, which was a problem for him because he has asthma. (Id.
at PageID.6.) In addition, Defendant Prince denied him recreation from October 28 to December
3, 2014, until Plaintiff was transferred to ECF.
Plaintiff asserts that all grievances filed by prisoners in segregation go through
Defendant Prince. Twice, Plaintiff attempted to file a grievance on Schooley and Prince regarding
his placement in segregation, but the grievances disappeared. Shortly after Plaintiff’s second
attempt, Schooley transferred Plaintiff to ECF, a “region one disciplinary facility.” (Id. at
PageID.7.)
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After Plaintiff filed a third grievance about the issue, Miller permitted Schooley to
respond to and reject the grievance, in violation of MDOC policy. Following Plaintiff’s transfer,
Warden Gidley and her successor, Warden Mackie, denied Plaintiff “rights and luxuries” given to
other prisoners, including “phone calls and day room after 8:45 pm, the purchase of an instrument,
a music room, movies, video games, lifer programs, and participation in any self betterment
programs.” (Id. at PageID.8.) Gidley denied Plaintiff movies and the purchase of an instrument;
Mackie allowed these, but refused to allow Plaintiff to purchase an electric guitar and amp, which
are allowed elsewhere.
In the motion to add Defendant Bassett (ECF No. 4), Plaintiff supplements his
complaint with allegations that Bassett improperly permitted ECF Warden Mackie to respond to a
grievance that was filed against Mackie.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
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the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A. Deputy Warden Schooley
1. Segregation
Plaintiff contends that Schooley refused to release him from segregation. Plaintiff
contends that he should have been released because a MDOC handbook requires that prisoners
placed in segregation are to receive a misconduct hearing within 24 hours. Schooley’s refusal to
release Plaintiff does not state a claim.
The Constitution does not require prison officials to provide notice or a hearing in
connection with a decision to place a prisoner in segregation. The Due Process Clause does not
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protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the
Court set forth the standard for determining when a prisoner’s loss of liberty implicates a federally
cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to Sandin, a prisoner
is entitled to the protections of due process only when a deprivation “will inevitably affect the
duration of his sentence” or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155
F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995).
Confinement in administrative segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should
reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
467-73 (1983). It is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme circumstances.” Joseph
v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and
duration of a stay in segregation to determine whether it imposes an “atypical and significant
hardship.” Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th. Cir. 2008).
In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that disciplinary segregation for 30 days did
not impose an atypical and significant hardship. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit has held that mere placement in administrative segregation, or confinement in segregation
for a relatively short period of time, do not require the protections of due process. Rimmer-Bey, 62
F.3d at 790-91; see Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (61 days in segregation
is not atypical and significant). Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that his placement was
atypical and significant. Consequently, the Constitution did not require prison officials to provide
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a hearing to Plaintiff, let alone a hearing within 24 hours of his placement in segregation. Likewise,
it did not require Schooley to release Plaintiff after he did not receive such a hearing.
Even assuming that Schooley’s actions conflicted with prison policy, Plaintiff does
not state a claim under § 1983. An alleged failure to comply with an administrative rule or policy
does not itself rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2
(6th Cir. 2007); Brody v. City of Mason, 250 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Freland, 954
F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1992); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1992);
McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-2347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (failure to follow
policy directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because policy directive does
not create a protectible liberty interest). Section 1983 is addressed to remedying violations of
federal law, not state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982); Laney, 501 F.3d
at 580-81.
2. Prison transfer
Plaintiff claims that Schooley transferred him to another prison facility shortly after
he filed a second grievance against him. Plaintiff contends that the transfer decision was retaliatory
because it was motivated by Plaintiff’s grievances. Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of
his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378,
394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff
must establish that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3)
the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff
must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor
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in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
The filing of a prison grievance is constitutionally protected conduct for which a
prisoner cannot be subjected to retaliation. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir.
2001). However, Plaintiff has not alleged an adverse action. “Since prisoners are expected to
endure more than the average citizen, and since transfers are common among prisons, ordinarily a
transfer would not deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected
conduct.” Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005); see also LaFountain v. Harry,
716 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (“As a general matter, a prison official’s decision to transfer a
prisoner from the general population of one prison to the general population of another is not
considered adverse.”); Hermansen v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 556 F. App’x 476, 477 (6th Cir. 2014)
(transfer from one prison to another is not adverse); see also Smith v. Yarrow, 78 F. App’x. 529, 543
(6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). If, however, a “foreseeable consequence” of a transfer would be
to substantially inhibit a prisoner’s ability to access the courts, then such a transfer could be
considered an adverse action. See Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 702 (holding that a transfer was an
adverse action, where it resulted in the plaintiff losing a high paying job that paid for his lawyer fees
and moved him further from the attorney). In addition, transfer to an area of the prison used to
house mentally-disturbed inmates, Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398, or transfer to more restrictive
housing, Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2010), could be sufficiently adverse to give rise
to a retaliation claim.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred from RMI to ECF, which Plaintiff
describes as a “region one disciplinary facility.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff does not
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allege any facts indicating that his confinement at ECF was more restrictive than his confinement
at RMI. Both RMI and ECF house prisoners classified to either security level II or security level
IV.2
Plaintiff contends that Schooley’s transfer decision has been “compounded” by poor
treatment that he has received from Defendants Gidley and Mackie at ECF. However, Plaintiff does
not allege that this treatment was a foreseeable consequence of Schooley’s decision. Consequently,
Plaintiff does not state a retaliation claim, or any other claim under § 1983 against Defendant
Schooley.
B. RUM Prince
1. Segregation
Defendant Prince also refused to release Plaintiff from segregation, which does not
state a claim for the reasons set forth with respect to Defendant Schooley.
2. Recreation
Plaintiff also contends that Prince denied him recreation for a little over a month,
while Plaintiff was confined in segregation. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional
limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be
“barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that
involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in
2
See description of Michigan Reformatory (RMI) on the MDOC’s website, at http://michigan.gov/corrections/
0,4551,7-119-68854_1381_1385-5369--,00.html (visited Nov. 12, 2015); see also description of Oaks Correctional
Facility (ECF) at http://michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-68854_1381_1385-55689--,00.html (visited Nov. 12,
2015).
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the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also
Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned
with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). “Not every unpleasant experience
a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). In addressing restrictions
on yard time, this court has noted:
Eighth Amendment standards entitle prisoners to exercise sufficient to
maintain reasonably good physical and mental health. See Walker v. Mintzes,
771 F.2d 920-27 (6th Cir. 1985). Thus, the Sixth Circuit has held that some
limitations on outdoor exercise may violate the Eighth Amendment. See
Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Walker, 771
F.2d at 927, and Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1983)). Yet,
the court has declined to find that minimum yard time is constitutionally
required in all circumstances. Rodgers, 43 F.3d at 1087-88. Instead, the
court has held that when yard time is extremely limited or denied altogether,
the prison may be required to provide a legitimate penological purpose for
the deprivation. Id. (citing Patterson, 717 F.2d at 289).
Grzelak v. Ballweg, No. 2:14–cv–31, 2014 WL 5101333, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2014) (quoting
Davis v. Berghuis, 2012 WL 3116360, *8 (W.D. Mich., July 31, 2012)).
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In a case similar to this one, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee stated:
Although “total or near total deprivation of exercise or recreational
opportunity, without penological justification violates the Eighth Amendment
guarantees[,]” Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983),
Plaintiff does not claim he was totally denied outdoor or indoor recreation as
he does not allege he was not taken “to the yard” at any time during this time
period or that he was prevented from running in place, doing push-ups,
sit-ups, or other exercises in his jail cell or elsewhere in the jail facility.
Rather, he simply states he had “loss of recreation” for over a month.
Deleon v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:12–CV–68, 2012 WL 3116280, *17 (E.D. Tenn.,
July 31, 2012). Like the plaintiff in Deleon, Plaintiff does not contend that he was denied
opportunity for exercise. Instead, he merely alleges that he was not permitted to attend “recreation”
for a little over a month. (Compl., PageID.6.) As in Deleon, this is insufficient to state a claim. See
2012 WL 3116280, at *11; see also Grzelak, 2014 WL 5101333, at *4 (allegation that prisoner was
allowed to exercise only six times in 12 months, without more, is insufficient to state a claim).
Plaintiff does not allege facts from which to infer that he was deprived of a minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities or subjected to a serious risk of harm, let alone that Defendant was
subjectively aware of this risk and ignored it.
3. Grievances
Defendant Miller allegedly lost or destroyed several of Plaintiff’s grievances.
Plaintiff has no due process right to obtain a response to his grievances. Courts repeatedly have held
that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance
procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F.
App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003).
Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona,
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461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001). Because
Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, Defendant’s interference with that process
did not deprive him of due process.
Moreover, Defendant’s actions did not prevent Plaintiff from pursuing his grievance.
When a prisoner does not receive a timely response to a grievance, he may file a Step II grievance
directly with the prison grievance coordinator. MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ T, BB
(effective July 9, 2007). In other words, Plaintiff could have pursued his grievance even if it was
destroyed by Prince. Thus, Prince’s actions did not implicate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
4. Other conditions
Plaintiff also complains that he was not permitted to use books or receive his personal
property while he was in segregation. He does not allege that Defendant Prince (or any of the other
defendants) were aware of or responsible for this condition, however. Consequently, Plaintiff does
not state a claim against Defendant Prince.
C. Grievance Coordinator Miller
Defendant Miller allegedly failed to send Plaintiff a form for filing a property-loss
claim. These facts do not state a claim. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to obtain forms
from prison officials for pursuing property-loss claims. Even if Miller was required to provide one
under MDOC policy, a failure to comply with prison policy does not state a claim under § 1983, as
indicated above with respect to Defendant Schooley.
Moreover, Defendant Miller’s failure to provide a form could not have prevented
Plaintiff from pursuing his claim, because MDOC policy provides that such a claim must be filed
“[w]ithin 7 calendar days after receiving the form.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.131 ¶ D
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(effective Oct. 21, 2013) (emphasis added). If Plaintiff properly requested a form but never received
one, then he has not lost the opportunity to file a timely claim.
Plaintiff also contends that Miller improperly allowed Schooley to respond to a
grievance. As Plaintiff has no right under the Constitution to a particular grievance procedure, and
cannot assert a § 1983 claim based solely on a violation of prison policy, these facts do not state a
claim. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff does not state a claim against Miller.
D. Officer Williams
Defendant Williams allegedly failed to complete an inventory of Plaintiff’s property
and then lost or destroyed that property. Plaintiff ostensibly claims that he was deprived of property
without due process. This claim is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Parratt, a person deprived
of property by a “random and unauthorized act” of a state employee has no federal due process claim
unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an adequate post-deprivation
remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not “without due process of law.” Parratt, 451 U.S.
at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional deprivation of property, as long as the
deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff’s claim is premised upon allegedly unauthorized acts
of a state official, he must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. See
Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th
Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a prisoner’s failure to sustain this burden requires
dismissal of his § 1983 due-process action. See Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Plaintiff has not alleged that state
post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Moreover, numerous state post-deprivation remedies are
available to him. First, a prisoner who incurs a loss through no fault of his own may petition the
institution’s Prisoner Benefit Fund for compensation. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Directive
04.07.112, ¶ B (effective Dec. 12, 2013). In addition, as Plaintiff is aware, aggrieved prisoners may
also submit claims for property loss of less than $1,000 to the State Administrative Board. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.6419; MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.131. Alternatively, Michigan law
authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting tort or contract claims “against the state and any
of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.” MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.6419(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit specifically has held that Michigan provides adequate postdeprivation remedies for deprivation of property. See Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff does not
allege any reason why a state remedy would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation, either
negligent or intentional, of his personal property.
E. Wardens Gidley, Mackie
After Plaintiff transferred to ECF, he contends that Defendant Gidley and/or her
successor, Defendant Mackie, denied him certain luxuries and opportunities available to other
prisoners, such as movies, games, the opportunity to make phone calls and/or spend time in the day
room after 8:45 pm, the ability to purchase an instrument, and certain forms of
educational/rehabilitative programming. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to any of the
foregoing. Indeed, the Eighth Amendment only guarantees access to the “minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities,” such as “food, medical care, or sanitation.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347-48 (1981). Games, instruments, educational programs, and phone calls are not necessities like
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food, medical care or sanitation, and their absence is not a condition that is “intolerable for prison
confinement.” Id.; cf. Coleman v. Gov. of Mich., 413 F. App’x 866, 875 (6th Cir. 2011) (no
constitutional right to access a television).
Plaintiff’s assertion that the foregoing luxuries and opportunities are available to
other prisoners impliedly raises an equal protection claim. The Equal Protection Clause commands
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A state practice generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes
with a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret.
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Plaintiff has not alleged that he is a member of a suspect class.
Nor has he alleged a deprivation of a fundamental right. Because neither a fundamental right nor
a suspect class is at issue, Plaintiff’s claim is reviewed under the rational basis standard. Club Italia
Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006). “Under
rational basis scrutiny, government action amounts to a constitutional violation only if it ‘is so
unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only
conclude that the government's actions were irrational.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. City of Athens, 411
F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005)). To prove his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate
“intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he “has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Plaintiff has not alleged that he has been intentionally treated differently from other,
similarly-situated prisoners. He merely alleges that other prisoners have received opportunities or
items which are not available to him. Prison officials undoubtedly provide different privileges and
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opportunities to different prisoners, depending on the circumstances. In the absence of any
allegations indicating that Plaintiff was similarly-situated with the other prisoners who were being
treated differently, his allegations are not sufficient to state an equal-protection claim.
F. Grievance Coordinator Bassett
Defendant Bassett allegedly permitted Warden Mackie to respond to a grievance that
had been filed by Plaintiff against Mackie, which was not permitted by MDOC policy. As indicated
with respect to Defendant Schooley, § 1983 is addressed to violations of the Constitution; it does
not provide redress for a violation of prison policy. Moreover, as indicated with respect to
Defendant Prince, the Constitution does not require prison officials to provide an effective grievance
procedure. Consequently, Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Bassett.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 4)
will be granted. In addition, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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An Order and Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: December 2, 2015
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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