Schultz v. Wyoming, City of et al

Filing 38

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL J. SCHULTZ,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF WYOMING, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

Case No. 1:15-cv-940
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell

OPINION
This is a civil action brought by a pro se plaintiff.

The cases arises out of a

ticket that plaintiff received for trespassing on March 15, 2014. The incident occurred
on South Division Avenue in Wyoming, Michigan, at a now closed restaurant known
as G’s Grill.
On September 15, 2015, plaintiff filed his complaint. He named the City of
Wyoming; Mayor Jack Poll; City Council Members William VerHurst, Richard Pastoor,
Joanne Vorhees, Sam Bolt, Dan Burrill, and Kent Vanderwood; City Manager Curtis
Holt; the Wyoming Police Department; Officer Stephen Rellinger; Captain Kim Koster;
Lieutenant Scoot Gardner; Director of Police and Fire Services (Police Chief) James
Carmody; Wyoming City Attorney Jack Sluiter; the 62-A District Court; the Honorable
Steven M. Timmers; the Honorable Pablo Cortes; the former owner of G’s Grill, Joseph
VanHorn; and the former cook at G’s Grill, Ryan Wade. Plaintiff seeks an award of
damages. (Complaint ¶¶ 39-40, ECF No. 1, PageID.5-6). In addition, he seeks

injunctive relief compelling the 62-A District Court to expunge its records regarding
persons convicted of trespassing since 1990, and to force the City of Wyoming to
implement training sessions for officers and supervisory personnel. (Complaint ¶¶ 3738). Plaintiff also wants Officer Rellinger, Mr. VanHorn, and Mr. Wade “to face State
charges.” (Complaint ¶ 41).
The matter is now before the Court on a Rule 12(c) motion by all defendants
other than defendants Van Horn and Wade.1 (ECF No. 35). Defendants’ motion has
been pending since January 18, 2016. Plaintiff elected not to file a response.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant’s motion will be granted and all
plaintiff’s claims against the moving defendants will be dismissed. All plaintiff’s
claims against defendants Van Horn and Wade will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to the statutory authority provided
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2

The Court has ignored the inaccurate labeling of defendants’ motion as a motion
for “summary judgment.” Defendants seek “entry of the judgment on the pleadings
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).” (Defendants’ Motion at 2, ECF No. 35, PageID.113; see
also Defendants’ Brief at 3-4, ECF No. 35-1, PageID.120-21). Further, the exhibit
attached to defendants’ brief (ECF No. 35-2, PageID.128-34) is excluded from
consideration. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). Defendants offer no argument or supporting
legal authority that permits the Court to consider the proffered evidence in the
Rule 12(c) context without committing error. Id.; see also Tranter v. Orick, 460
F. App’x 513, 515 (6th Cir. 2012).
1

The Court granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5).
Under the provisions of federal law, the Court is required to dismiss any action brought
in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Davis-Bey v. Michigan, No. 14-12167, 2014 WL
2746086, at * 1 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2014).
2

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Rule 12(c) Standards
“Motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) are analyzed under the same de novo standard as motions to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295
(6th Cir. 2008). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Under
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide “ ‘a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order
to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading
standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, it does require more than
labels and the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Generally, when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accept the plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in plaintiff’s
favor. See Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). “[C]ourts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
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U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009); Albrecht v. Treon, 617
F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts are not required to conjure up unpleaded
allegations, nor accept unwarranted factual inferences. See Total Benefits Planning,
552 F.3d at 434. “To survive a motion to dismiss, [plaintiff] must allege ‘enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Traverse Bay Area Intermediate
Sch. Dist. v. Michigan Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 435 (6th
Cir. 2012).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by licensed attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even the lenient treatment generally given pro se
pleadings has its limits, however. See Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.
1991). “A plaintiff must ‘plead [ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ”
Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 893 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A plaintiff falls short if []
he pleads facts ‘merely consistent with the defendant’s liability’ or if the alleged facts
do not ‘permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]’ ”
Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 893 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).
In deciding motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is generally
limited to examination of the complaint alone. Nevertheless, the Court may also take
into account exhibits to the complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), as well as documents
referred to in the complaint but not attached, and matters of public record. See Winget
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v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, the Court
may refer to documents attached to, or referred in, plaintiff’s amended complaint, as
well as the matters of public record. See Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502
(6th Cir. 2001) (publicly filed records); Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507,
514 (6th Cir. 1999) (document referred to but not attached to complaint); QQC v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 258 F. Supp.2d 718, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same).
Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. G’s Grill is now closed, but on March 15,
2014, it was located on South Division Avenue, Wyoming, Michigan. (Complaint ¶¶ 6,
18). Joseph VanHorn is the former owner and Ryan Wade was a cook at G’s Grill. (Id.
¶¶ 7, 33).
On March 15, 2014, at approximately 1:00 p.m., plaintiff entered G’s Grill and
sat down at the table provided for handicapped customers. Plaintiff states that there
were no other customers in the restaurant. Plaintiff had his service dog with him and
states that he placed an order with a waitress for food and drink. Plaintiff indicates
that he is a diabetic. “It being late in the day for [him] to eat, he was feeling the effects
of low blood sugar” and “sat quietly with his eyes closed.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-19).
Plaintiff states that he is “very hard of hearing.” (Id. ¶ 18). He alleges that he
“saw the cook over in the kitchen area ta[l]king to another employee. . . . [H]e could not
hear or understand what the conversation was about. The only thing [plaintiff] did
hear was someone saying lo[u]d enough [so] he could understand[,] ‘I’m going to call
the owner.’ ” (Id.).
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Despite his hearing difficulties, plaintiff states: “After a time [he] heard the
sound of the back door opening[.] [H]e opened his eyes [and] turned to see Office[r]
Rellinger coming in.” Plaintiff indicates that Officer Rellinger ordered him to come
outside.

The officer requested plaintiff’s driver’s licence and his service dog’s

identification. Plaintiff supplied the officer with the requested information and card
entitled “You have just committed a crime.” (Id. ¶ 21). At approximately 1:56 p.m.,
plaintiff received ticket No. 1620 for trespassing. Plaintiff’s hearing was scheduled for
9:00 a.m. on March 24, 2014. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID.8). On April 29, 2014, the
Honorable Pablo Cortes of the 62-A District Court issued an order indicating that a
condition of plaintiff’s bond was having no contact with G’s Grill. (ECF. No. 1-3,
PageID.9).

Plaintiff states that the trespassing charge was later dismissed.

(Complaint ¶ 23).
Plaintiff had filed a complaint with the Wyoming Police Department regarding
Officer Rellinger’s actions before the trespassing charge was resolved. He received a
phone call from Captain Kim Koster. She referred the matter to Lieutenant Scoot
Gardner. Lt. Gardner informed plaintiff that he would have to file a new complaint
after the charge against him was resolved. Plaintiff states that he called Lt. Gardner
after the case was resolved and that Gardner failed to return the phone call. (Id. ¶ 23).
Plaintiff made a complaint to Captain Koster and she found that “nothing wrong was
done.” Plaintiff sent a message requesting a meeting with Mayor Jack Poll, which the
mayor declined after he had been informed by “the Police Director, City Manager, and
Prosecutor” that “nothing wrong was done.” Plaintiff then sent messages to the City
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Council Members and the City Manager, and they declined to talk to plaintiff. (Id. ¶
24).
Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36). He criticizes City Attorney
Jack Slutier’s knowledge of the laws governing trespassing charges and states that he
gave the City Attorney copies of State laws and ADA laws, and that three times the
City Attorney laid them back on the table and tried to walk away. (Id. ¶ 32). Plaintiff
believes that the 62-A District Court is no better because the judges refused to read the
law that he handed to them and issued “boiler plate restraining orders that state
things that have nothing to do with ‘trespassing[.]’ ” (Id.).
Discussion
I.

Judicial, and Prosecutorial Immunity
A.

Judicial Immunity

State judges enjoy absolute immunity from federal damage suits for acts
performed in their judicial capacities, except for acts done in the clear absence of
jurisdiction. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Alkire v. Irving, 305 F.3d
456, 469 (6th Cir. 2002). A claim that the state court judge acted “maliciously or
corruptly” and in excess of his jurisdiction is insufficient to overcome judicial
immunity. See Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2001).
“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This
immunity applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover for
alleged deprivation of civil rights. See Pierson v. Ray, 3 86 U.S. 547,
554–55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The Supreme Court
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explained: “If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the
resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would
provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely
to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or
control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial
adjudication .... Most judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction
through ordinary mechanisms of review, which are largely free of the
harmful side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges to
personal liability.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226–27, 108 S.Ct.
538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).
Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d at 606.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that absolute judicial immunity is
overcome “in only two sets of circumstances.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
First, a judge is not immune for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in a judicial
capacity. Id. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, although judicial in nature,
done in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. In determining whether certain
conduct is judicial in nature, the court must adopt a functional approach, asking
whether the act is one normally performed by a judge. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 362 (1978); see Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2004).
In this case, all the challenged actions were manifestly judicial in nature, and
they were within the jurisdiction of the 62-A district court. Accordingly, Judges Steven
Timmers and Pablo Cortes are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Bright v.
Gallia County, Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2014); Rogers v. O’Donnell, 737
F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Village of Johnstown Ohio, 534 F. App’x
431, 441 (6th Cir. 2013).
B.

Prosecutorial Immunity
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Plaintiff seeks to hold the City Attorney responsible for initiating the trespass
charge against him. This claim is barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
Under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, prosecutors are immune from damage
suits for their decision to initiate or maintain such a prosecution. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 774-75 (6th Cir.
2000) (en banc); accord Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 948 (6th Cir. 2000) (prosecutor
entitled to absolute immunity for decisions to file public nuisance and civil forfeiture
complaints). Consequently, City Attorney Sluiter is immune from suit for his role in
initiating and prosecuting the trespass charge against plaintiff.
II.

62-A District Court
Eleventh Amendment immunity generally bars plaintiff’s claims against the 62-

A District Court. See Abick v. State of Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986).
The district court is part of Michigan’s “one court of justice” and is a branch of the state
government. See Varner v. Schrock, No. 1:14-cv-999, 2014 WL 5441807, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 24, 2014) (collecting cases); see also Sleighter v. Kent County Correctional
Facility Administration, No. 1:13-cv-697, 2014 WL 794367, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27,
2014) (“The district courts of the State of Michigan are clearly arms of the state and
are therefore immune from suit.”).
The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against a state and its
departments or agencies unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or
unequivocally consented to be sued. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Complaint ¶ 2). The
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State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. See Johnson
v. Dellatifia, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004).
In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), the Supreme Court held that
Title II of the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity insofar as it creates a private
cause of action for damages against the states “for conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 882. The Supreme Court instructed lower courts to
“to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the
State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also
violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated
Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported
abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”
The Sixth Circuit has instructed lower courts that they should reach the constitutional
question of whether there has been a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity “only after finding a viable claim under Title II.” Zibbell v. Michigan Dep’t
of Human Servs., 313 F. App’x 843, 847-48 (6th Cir. 2009). If the complaint fails to
allege a viable Title II claim, the district court must decline to consider the remaining
prongs of the Georgia analysis. Id.
Plaintiff’s only factual allegations against the 62-A District Court are found in
paragraph 32 of the complaint where plaintiff claims that the court issued a boiler
plate restraining order that had nothing to do with trespassing. (Complaint ¶ 32).
This falls well short of what is necessary to allege a viable claim for violation of Title
II of the ADA. See Barksdale v. Ohio, No. 1:10-cv-1437, 2011 WL 2144552, at *2 (N.D.
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Ohio May 31, 2011); Bouillion v. Ross County Prosecutor’s Office, No. C-2-00-159, 2001
WL 242568, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2001).
III.

Individual Capacity Claims
Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual

capacities under the ADA . The proper defendant to a suit under Title II of the ADA
is the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity. Everson v. Leis, 556
F.3d 484, 501 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009); Carter v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:13-cv-37, 2013
WL 3270909, at *5 (W.D. Mich. June 27, 2013) (same). “Title II of the ADA does not,
however, provide for suit against a public official in his individual capacity.” Everson,
556 F.3d at 501 n.7; see also Williams v. McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1, 8 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he ADA does not provide for personal liability for defendants sued in their
individual capacities.... We have held repeatedly that the ADA does not permit public
employees or supervisors to be sued in their individual capacities.”); Quillan v.
Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:13-cv-160, 2015 WL 542178, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 10,
2015) (“Title II of ADA does not impose liability on public officials acting in their
individual capacities.”).
IV.

Official Capacity Claims
A.

City/Police Officials

Plaintiff’s complaint against Mayor Poll, City Manager Holt, the five named City
Council members, Police Chief Carmody, Captain Koster, and Lt. Gardner is that they
ignored his messages and failed to meet with him. (Complaint ¶¶ 23-24). Plaintiff
does not identify a statutory cause of action regarding these allegations; nor does he
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suggest how these actions constitute a violation of the ADA. His complaint falls well
short of that required to state a viable claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Traverse
Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. V. Michigan Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d at 627.
B.

Officer Rellinger

Plaintiff accuses Officer Rellinger of violating various state criminal statutes.
“Officer Rellinger depriv[ed] Mr. Schultz of his rights or privileges of a citizen[] of the
United States by failing to observe his legal rights under the laws of Michigan,
MCL 750.552, MCL 750.502(c), and ADA civil rights laws of the United States . . . . By
doing so he also violated MCL 750.50(a), 750.370, 752.11, and 764.1(e), False Arrest,
Grand Larceny and Aiding and [abetting] a crime.” Complaint ¶ 21.
Criminal statutes generally do not provide a private right of action. See People
v. Herrick, 550 N.W.2d 541, 544 ( Mich. Ct. App. 1996); see also Am. Postal Workers
Union, AFL-CIO v. Indep. Postal Sys. of Am., Inc., 481 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1973)
(noting that “the general rule is that a private right of action is not maintainable under
a criminal statute”). Although Michigan courts have held that, in certain situations,
a private remedy for damages may be inferred from a criminal statute, see Lash v. City
of Traverse City, 735 N.W.2d 628, 636-37 (Mich. 2007) (citing Gardner v. Wood, 429
Mich. 290, 414 N.W.2d 706 (Mich. 1987)), plaintiff “cites no case holding that a private
right of action may be inferred from any of the criminal statutes on which [he] relies.
Moreover, [p]laintiff offers no argument or analysis to support inferring a private right
of action from any of those statutes.” Ssayed v. Western Mich. Univ., No. 1:12-cv-797,
2013 WL 3277139, at *3 (W.D. Mich. June 27, 2013). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims of
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purported violations of Michigan criminal statutes will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
V.

City of Wyoming
Plaintiff alleges that the City of Wyoming has failed to appoint an ADA

Coordinator. (Complaint ¶ 12). The requirement to appoint an ADA Coordinator is not
found in the statute, but rather, in the regulations implementing the statute. See 28
C.F.R. § 35.107.3 Even assuming the truth of his allegation,4 plaintiff’s claim fails on
its face as he has not identified any actual injury he allegedly suffered as a result of the
city’s failure to have an ADA Coordinator; much less does he demonstrate a causal
connection between the purported injury and the failure to have a coordinator. Cf.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see Stone v. New Jersey
Admin. Office of the Courts, 557 F. App’x 151, 154 (3rd Cir. 2014) (Affirming dismissal
of plaintiff’s claim regarding failure to be notified of ADA rights due to failure to allege
an actual injury resulting from the purported violation.). Plaintiff’s suggestion that an
ADA Coordinator “could have possibly addressed this problem, and this case would not
be here today,” (Complaint ¶ 12), suffers from at least two disabilities – it fails to

“A public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall designate at least one
employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities
under this part, including any investigation of any complaint communicated to it
alleging its non-compliance with this part or alleging any actions that would be
prohibited by this part.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.107.
3

The city’s website indicates that it does have an ADA Coordinator, and it
outlines the procedures for filing a complaint.
See
http://wyomingmi.gov/hr/employmentpolicies.asp. (last accessed December 23, 2016).
4

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identify the purported “problem” and it fails to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
VI.

Wyoming Police Department
The Wyoming Police Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued. See

Howard v. Wayne County Sheriff’s Office, 417 F. App’x 465, 467-68 (6th Cir. 2011);
Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Garland
v. Smigielski, No. 1:14-cv-865, 2015 WL 5432770 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2015); Reid v.
West, No. 2:14-cv-334, 2015 WL 268980, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan.21, 2015) (collecting
cases). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against the Wyoming Police Department will be
dismissed.
VII.

Joseph VanHorn and Ryan Wade
Plaintiff did not allege enough facts against defendants Joseph VanHorn and

Ryan Wade to support a claim for relief. The only fact alleged against Mr. VanHorn
is that he owned G’s Grill. Mr. Wade is alleged to have been a cook at G’s Grill. He
may or may not have been the individual plaintiff alleges he overheard expressing an
intent to contact the owner about something.

Plaintiff’s claims against these

individuals will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to the statutory authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Cf.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. V. Michigan Dep’t
of Educ., 615 F.3d at 627.
Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion will be granted and all
plaintiff’s claims against the moving defendants will be dismissed. All plaintiff’s
claims against defendants Van Horn and Wade will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to the statutory authority provided
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Dated: December 30, 2016

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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