Campbell #485906 v. Michigan Reformatory
Filing
9
OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:15-cv-957
v.
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
MICHIGAN REFORMATORY,
Defendant.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on grounds of
immunity and failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Robert Campbell presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC) at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI). RMI is the sole Defendant named in
Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations are limited to two brief statements. He contends that
unidentified RMI correctional officers have issued false misconduct tickets against him and against
prisoner Bruce and that the warden has not done anything about it. Plaintiff states that correctional
officers keep putting “stuff” in his room (Compl., docket #1, PageID #3) and then writing tickets
against him, presumably for possession of contraband. For relief, he seeks an injunction barring
future such conduct, together with compensatory damages.
Discussion
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
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550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff seeks damages solely from RMI, an administrative unit of the MDOC. An
express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a
“person” within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against RMI.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim against RMI is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). That amendment prohibits suits in federal court against
the state or any of its agencies or departments, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has
expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Haldermann, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782. A state’s Eleventh Amendment
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immunity is in the nature of a jurisdictional defense and may be raised on the court’s own motion.
Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court
squarely has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against state departments of
corrections. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); see also McCoy v. Michigan,
369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010). RMI therefore is immune from suit under § 1983.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on grounds of immunity and failure to state a
claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
October 5, 2015
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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