Harris #585924 v. Bradley et al

Filing 8

OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRYANT D. HARRIS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:15-cv-1041

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

JAMES F. BRADLEY et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss for failure to state a claim
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Unknown Parties ## 2, 3, 4 and 8, Scheidler, Beckwith,
Corizon Healthcare, Earl, Branch County, Ovellette, Dominguez-Bem, Kimble, White,
Van Langevelde and Mack. The Court also will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s state-law
claims against the dismissed Defendants. The Court will order service of the complaint on

Defendants Bradley, Kline, Fisher, and Morrison. The Court also concludes that Plaintiff states a
claim against Unknown Parties ##1, 5, 6 and 7, though the Court lacks sufficient information at this
time to order service of these Unknown Parties.
Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff Bryant Deandre Harris a state prisoner incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) at Chippewa Correctional Facility, though the actions about
which he complains occurred while he was incarcerated at Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF).
He sues 23 Defendants, including Corizon Healthcare and the following MDOC employees at LCF:
a Resident Unit Manager (RUM) (“Unknown Party #1”); Assistant RUM James F. Bradley;
Correctional Officers (Unknown) Kline and (Unknown) Fisher; Inspector B. Morrison; the
Classification/Transfer Coordinator (“Unknown Party #2”); Supervisor (Unknown) Scheidler;
Deputy Warden (Unknown) Beckwith; Nurse Deana K. Earl; two unidentified correctional officers
working the first shift in F Unit on June 16, 2014 (“Unknown Party #3,” “Unknown Party #4”); two
unidentified correctional officers working the second shift in F Unit on June 16, 2014 (“Unknown
Party #5,” “Unknown Party #6”); a party identified as a white female store commissary worker
(“Unknown Party #7”); Physician Assistant (PA) Margaret Ovellete; Dr. Victor L. Dominguez-Bem;
and an unknown psychologist (“Unknown Party #8). Plaintiff also sues Branch County and the
following Branch County employees: Prosecuting Attorney Ralph W. Kimble, II; Chief Assistant
Prosecutor Valerie R. White; Assistant Prosecutor Aaron Van Langevelde; and Victim Rights
Coordinator Denile Mack.

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Plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2014, when he was housed in F Unit at LCF during
the first shift of the day, a violent prisoner, Omar DeAngelo Cowan, threatened to assault and
physically harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff notified Officers Kline and Fisher because the RUM and
Assistant RUM were not in the unit at the time.
During the second shift, Plaintiff notified two unidentified correctional officers,
Unknown Party #5 and Unknown Party #6, of the threats and asked to be placed in protective
custody. He also sent a prison kite to the RUM (Unknown Party #1) and Assistant RUM Bradley.
The next day, Plaintiff met with Bradley and requested protection. Bradley stated that
he could not put Plaintiff in protective custody or transfer him because he was not a problem.
Bradley also indicated that placement and transfer decisions are left to the classification director.
Over the next week, Plaintiff repeatedly informed, or attempted to inform, Bradley, Fisher, and the
second shift officers that he feared for his life.
On June 25, Plaintiff was called out of his cell by Fisher, Kline, and the commissary
worker to pick up items that he had ordered from the prison store. He picked up his items and
returned to his cell. Prisoner Cowan came to Plaintiff’s cell and attacked him, stabbing him
repeatedly in his neck, ear, chest, back, and arm. Plaintiff tried to defend himself and screamed for
help, hoping or expecting that Kline, Fisher, Bradley, the commissary worker, or the second-shift
officers (Unknown Party #5, Unknown Party #6) would hear him and come to his aid. They did not
come.
After the attack ended, Plaintiff left his cell and went to the control center for help.
He noticed that Kline, Fisher, and Bradley were not at their duty stations. Because Plaintiff was
bleeding and needed immediate medical assistance, he left the control center and went to the medical
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center. When he arrived, Nurse Earl cleaned and dressed his wounds. However, none of the medical
defendants, including PA Ovellette, Dr. Dominguez-Bem, and the unidentified psychologist
(Unknown Party #8), provided any “adequate” services or treatment for his “mental pain and
suffering” and “emotional distress.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.) Plaintiff also contends that
Corizon Health did not provide adequate mental health services to address his trauma, which affected
his ability to eat and sleep.
That same day, Plaintiff filed a grievance on Defendant Bradley. Plaintiff contends
that Bradley had a duty to contact Inspector Morrison when Plaintiff notified him of the threats
against Plaintiff.
On June 26, Inspector Morrison completed a “Request for Protection / Investigation
Report.” (Id. at PageID.22.) Plaintiff claims that this report should have been completed on June 16
or 17, when he requested protection. Defendants Scheidler and Beckwith allegedly acted in concert
with Morrison to cover up the failure to protect Plaintiff.
On June 27, Beckwith and Bradley completed a security classification review which
resulted in Plaintiff’s re-classification and transfer to another facility.
On August 21, 2014, Plaintiff received a letter Branch County Prosecuting Attorney
Kimble indicating that Cowan was charged with two counts of assault. In April the following year,
Plaintiff received a letter from Chief Assistant Prosecutor White that the case against Cowan was
dismissed and that the Branch County Prosecuting Attorney’s office would not be reissung criminal
charges. On July 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission
about the prosecuting attorneys.

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Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under state
a federal law. Specifically, he contends that Defendants: (1) failed to protect him; (2) provided
inadequate medical care; (3) engaged in selective prosecution; and/or (4) denied him access to the
courts by destroying evidence.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility

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standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A. Claim I: Failure to Protect
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the
Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged
“to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). To establish a violation of this right, Plaintiff must show that
Defendant was deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d
1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988). While a
prisoner does not need to prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal
safety claim, he must at least establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. County
of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden
of “showing a sufficient inferential connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence
to “justify a reasonable fear for personal safety.”).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to state an Eighth Amendment
claim against the Defendants who were either aware of Plaintiff’s requests for protection prior to the
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assault by prisoner Cowan, or of his cries for help while he was being assaulted: Defendants
Bradley, Kline, Fisher, the unidentified RUM (Unknown Party #1), the unidentified second-shift
officers (Unknown Party #5 and Unknown Party #6), and the unknown commissary worker
(Unknown Party #7).
Plaintiff also states a claim against Inspector Morrison. It is not entirely clear whether
Inspector Morrison was notified of the threats to Plaintiff and his requests for protection prior to the
assault. On the one hand, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bradley had a duty to notify Inspector
Morrison of Plaintiff’s request, which implies that Bradley never did so. On the other hand, Plaintiff
alleges that Morrison failed to conduct a proper investigation into the threat against Plaintiff, which
implies that Morrison was aware of the risk to Plaintiff’s safety but failed to act when he should
have. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court generously construes the complaint as alleging that
Inspector Morrison learned about Plaintiff’s need for protection and failed to act reasonably in
response to that need. Thus, the complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim against Morrison.
In addition, Plaintiff states a claim against the unidentified classification/transfer
coordinator (Unknown Party #1). Plaintiff does not allege that he notified this coordinator of the
threats or his need for protection, but he did notify Defendant Bradley, and the following day,
Bradley told Plaintiff that he could not be transferred and that the decision was up to the transfer
coordinator. Construing the complaint generously, these allegations imply that Bradley spoke with
the transfer coordinator about Plaintiff’s request.
In contrast, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the first-shift
officers (Unknown Party #2 and Unknown Party #3). There is no allegation that they were aware
of any threats toward Plaintiff, let alone that they were deliberately indifferent to his need for
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protection. The fact that they were on duty when Plaintiff was threatened, or when Plaintiff
informed other officers of those threats, is not sufficient to state a claim, under the Eighth
Amendment or otherwise. Consequently, they will be dismissed.
B. Claim II: Denial of Adequate Medical Care
Plaintiff contends that the medical defendants, including Defendants Earl, Ovellette,
Dr. Dominguez-Bem, the unidentified psychologist (Unknown Party #8), and Corizon Health, failed
to provide adequate care for his injuries or his mental pain and suffering and emotional distress.
The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to
incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is
violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner.
Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the
plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness
of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s
failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or
non-obvious,” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff must
“place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in
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medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Plaintiff’s allegations are wholly conclusory. He contends that he did not receive
adequate care, but he does not allege any facts indicating that his care was inadequate, or that he had
an objectively serious medical need that Defendants were aware of but failed to treat. He contends
that Defendants should have referred him for mental health treatment or provided follow-up care to
assess his need for treatment. However, he does not allege an objectively serious need for mental
health care. Nor does he allege that Defendants were subjectively aware of a serious need but were
deliberately indifferent to it. Thus, he does not state an Eighth Amendment claim against these
defendants.
Plaintiff cites a number of prison policies concerning medical care and mental health
treatment. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to follow prison policies, he
does not state a claim under § 1983. An alleged failure to comply with an administrative rule or
policy does not itself rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577,
581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); Brody v. City of Mason, 250 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2001); Smith v.
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Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1992); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 240 (6th Cir.
1992); McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-23347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (failure
to follow policy directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because policy
directive does not create a protectible liberty interest). Section 1983 is addressed to remedying
violations of federal law, not state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982);
Laney, 501 F.3d at 580-81.
C. Claim III: Discrimination in Prosecution
Plaintiff alleges that the prosecuting attorneys for Branch County, including
Defendants Kimble, White, and Van Langevelde, acting in concert with the County and Victim’s
Rights Coordinator Mack, decided not to prosecute prisoner Cowan for racially discriminatory
reasons. Plaintiff claims that he is black, and that Cowan would have been prosecuted if Plaintiff
was white. Plaintiff also claims that Branch County has a policy or practice of selectively treating
black victims of crime different from white victims. These allegations are wholly conclusory.
Plaintiff alleges no facts indicating that Branch County has a racially discriminatory policy or
practice, or that the decision not to prosecute prisoner Cowan was in any way influenced by race.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to state a claim because, as a private citizen, Plaintiff “lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54, 64 (1986). Members of the general public (even if they claim to be witnesses or victims to a
crime) lack standing to enforce the criminal laws or to compel a criminal prosecution. See
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Consequently, even assuming that Defendants
decided not to prosecute prisoner Cowan for improper reasons, their action or inaction does not
involve any legal right of Plaintiff. Furthermore, the prosecutor is absolutely immune from damage
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actions arising from his decision to initiate or not initiate a criminal prosecution. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). Consequently,
Plaintiff does not state a claim with respect to the failure to prosecute prisoner Cowan.
D. Claim IV: Access to the Courts / Spoliation of Evidence
Plaintiff also claims that he was denied access to the courts because Defendants
“engaged in a Conspiracy, Cover-up, and Spoliation of Evidence,” to prevent him from pursuing the
claims in this action. (See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1, Page ID.38.)1 It is well established that
prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821
(1977). The principal issue in Bounds was whether the states must protect the right of access to the
courts by providing law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for prisoners. Id. at 817.
The Court further noted that in addition to law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge,
the states must provide indigent inmates with “paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial
services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824-25. The right of access to
the courts also prohibits prison officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate’s access
to the courts. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff’s allegations are wholly conclusory. He does not identify any evidence that
was covered up or destroyed, or any specific action by any particular Defendant that has impeded
his access to the courts. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of denial of access to the courts,
or any other federal claim related to the destruction or “spoliation” of evidence.

1

This claim is repeated several times in the complaint against different groups of Defendants, with minor
variations depending on the underlying claim asserted against that particular group (i.e., failure to protect, inadequate
medical care, etc.).

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III.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Court has determined that Plaintiff does not state a federal constitutional claim
against Defendants Unknown Parties ## 2 to 4 and 8, Scheidler, Beckwith, Corizon Healthcare, Earl,
Branch County, Ovellette, Dominguez-Bem, Kimble, White, Van Langevelde and Mack. To the
extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim against these defendants under state law, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised
jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims
are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Id. Dismissal,
however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639
(2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850
(6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims, if any, against the
foregoing Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c),
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Unknown Parties ## 2 to 4 and 8, Scheidler, Beckwith,
Corizon Healthcare, Earl, Branch County, Ovellette, Dominguez-Bem, Kimble, White,
Van Langevelde and Mack will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court also will dismiss
any state-law claims against the dismissed Defendants for failure to state a claim. The Court will
serve the complaint against Defendants Bradley, Kline, Fisher, and Morrison. The Court also

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concludes that Plaintiff states a claim against Defendants Unknown Parties ##1, 5, 6, and 7, though
the Court lacks sufficient information at this time to order service upon these Unknown Parties.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

January 25, 2016

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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