Steel #193624 v. Kelly et al

Filing 8

OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SAMUEL STEEL, III,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:15-cv-1094

v.

Honorable Janet T. Neff

MICHAEL KELLY et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Samuel Steel, III, is a state prisoner incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections, though the events about which he complains occurred prior to his
incarceration. He sues the following officials who work for the Kalamazoo Department of Public

Safety: Detective Matt Schemenover, Detective (Unknown) Ghiringhelli, Sergeant Michael Kelly,
Eric Shaffer, Derrick Turner, Daniel Smith, Michael Skurski, Justin Wonders, and Officer Daniel
Guids.
Plaintiff alleges that, on November 10, 2011, Defendant Shaffer arrested Plaintiff and
his wife for no reason, and used excessive force by “placing guns in their faces[.]” (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.5.) Officer Shaffer then took Plaintiff and his wife to their home and kept them under
arrest. Defendants Kelly, Ghiringhelli, Guids, Skurski, Smith, Turner, Wonders, and Schemenover
failed to correct the foregoing conduct, and further violated Plaintiff’s rights by executing a search
warrant at Plaintiff’s residence that was not supported by probable cause. Defendants also allegedly
exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching Plaintiff and his wife, their vehicle, and her purse.
Plaintiff subsequently pleaded guilty to distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(C). See United States v. Steel, No. 1:12-cr-236 (W.D. Mich.). As relief, Plaintiff seeks
punitive and compensatory damages for the alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Discussion
I. Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff sues Defendants for illegally arresting him, illegally searching his person, his
vehicle, his home, and his wife’s purse, and for using excessive force in the course of the arrest.1
Some of these claims appear to be barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994), which held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

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Plaintiff also claims that Defendants illegally searched his wife. This allegation does not give rise to a claim
because Fourth Amendment rights are personal to the individual. The search of Plaintiff’s wife does not implicate
Plaintiff’s rights, and Plaintiff does not have standing to assert the rights of his wife. See Newsom v Norris, 888 F.2d
371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989); Raines v. Goedde, No. 92-3120, 1992 WL 188120, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 1992). Moreover,
as a layman, Plaintiff may only represent himself with respect to his own claims; he may not act on behalf of others.
See O’Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973). Thus, the search of his wife does not state a claim.

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imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
[overturned].” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (emphasis in original). Under Heck,
a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for “harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the
conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The
holding in Heck has been extended to actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards,
520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998)
(claim for injunctive relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035,
1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief).
1. Illegal Searches
Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to several illegal searches, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The searches ostensibly resulted in the discovery of heroin in Plaintiff’s
possession. (Ex. 1 to Compl., Incident/Investigation Report, ECF No. 1, Page ID.20.) An illegalsearch claim can undermine the validity of a conviction if it “produced the only evidence supporting
the conviction and no legal doctrine could save the evidence from exclusion.” Harper v. Jackson,
293 F. App’x 389, 392 (6th Cir. 2008). At this stage of the proceedings, it is not clear whether and
how this evidence was used to establish Plaintiff’s conviction, or whether any legal doctrine would
have saved it from exclusion despite a Fourth Amendment violation. However, Plaintiff does not
allege any compensable injury resulting from these searches. Indeed, the only conceivable injury

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resulting from the search and seizure of the heroin evidence is Plaintiff’s conviction. Plaintiff is not
entitled to compensation for such injury until his conviction has been overturned. Heck, 512 U.S.
at 487 n.7. Consequently, any claims based on the illegal search and seizure of evidence appear to
be barred by Heck. See Hunt v. Michigan, 482 F. App’x 20, 22 (6th Cir. 2012) (illegal-search claim
barred by Heck because a conviction resulting from the seizure of incriminating evidence is not a
compensable injury).
2. Illegal Arrest
Plaintiff also claims that he was arrested without justification. A claim of arrest
without probable cause is generally barred by Heck when (1) the damages sought are based on the
conviction or imprisonment thereon, or (2) success on the Fourth Amendment claim would “negate
an element of the offense of which [Plaintiff] has been convicted.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.6.
Construing the complaint generously, Plaintiff ostensibly seeks damages for the brief period during
which he was arrested and detained prior to being prosecuted for his drug offense, rather than
damages for his conviction and subsequent confinement. Moreover, Plaintiff’s conviction for
distribution of heroin is not dependent upon the legality of his arrest. Success on the arrest claim
would not negate an element of his offense or otherwise undermine the validity of his conviction.
Consequently, this claim does not appear to be barred by Heck.
3. Excessive Force
Plaintiff also claims that certain Defendants used excessive force on him during the
course of the arrest. Such a claim has no bearing on the validity of his conviction. Thus, it is not
barred by the rule in Heck.

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In short, some of Plaintiff’s claims, particularly his claims regarding the illegal
searches which led to the discovery of heroin, appear to be barred by the rule in Heck. Other claims
are not so barred. Nevertheless, as explained in the next section, any claims that are not barred by
Heck are subject to dismissal because they are untimely.
II. Statute of Limitations
State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness
of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For
civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the
claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.
1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins to run
when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.
Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.2 However, claims that are barred by Heck do not accrue until the state
conviction has been overturned. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90; D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378,
384 (6th Cir. 2014). Claims that are not so barred do not benefit from this rule.
Plaintiff asserts claims arising from conduct occurring in November of 2011.
Plaintiff had reason to know of the “harms” done to him as a result of the arrests and searches at the
time they occurred. Hence, any claims that are not barred by Heck accrued in November 2011.

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28 U.S.C. § 1658 created a “catch-all” limitations period of four years for civil actions arising under federal
statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.
369 (2004), which applied this federal four-year limitations period to a suit alleging racial discrimination under § 1981
does not apply to prisoner claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because, while § 1983 was amended in 1996, prisoner civil
rights actions under § 1983 were not “made possible” by the amended statute. Id. at 382.

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However, he did not file his complaint until September 2015, well past Michigan’s three-year limit.
Michigan law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff is incarcerated.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5851(9). Further, it is well established that ignorance of the law does
not warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations. See Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th
Cir. 1991); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991); Mason v. Dep’t of
Justice, No. 01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at *2 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that when a meritorious affirmative defense
based upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from the face of the complaint, sua sponte
dismissal of the complaint is appropriate. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 757 F.3d 508, 511 (6th
Cir. 2001); Watson v. Wayne Cnty., 90 F. App’x 814, 815 (6th Cir. 2004); Beach v. Ohio, No. 033187, 2003 WL 22416912, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action will be
dismissed. Cf. Hunt, 482 F. App’x at 22 (dismissing complaint as Heck-barred, or as untimely to
the extent that Heck does not apply).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b). To the extent that Defendants searched Plaintiff’s wife, Plaintiff does not state a claim.
The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are either barred by the rule in Heck or barred by the statute of
limitations applicable to § 1983.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no

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good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: December 14, 2015

/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge

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