Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER granting the motion for attorney fees 27 ; payment in the amount of $6,651.25 shall be awarded to plaintiff's attorney; signed by Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green (Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green, jkw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JEFFRY S. JONES,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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COMMISSIONER OF
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SOCIAL SECURITY,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________)
Case No. 1:15-cv-01158
Honorable Phillip J. Green
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This was a social security action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
Plaintiff’s claims for disability insurance benefits (DIB). On November 17, 2016, this
Court entered a judgment vacating the Commissioner’s decision and remanding this
matter back to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further
administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 19). On August 2, 2017, this Court entered a
memorandum opinion and judgment denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 25, 26).
This matter is now before this Court on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 27). Defendant has not filed a response.
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted.
Facts
Plaintiff received a Notice of Award indicating that he is owed past-due
benefits. The Social Security Administration withheld a total of $12,651.25 to cover
potential awards of attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 27-1, PageID.1711). Plaintiff was
denied attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 25, 26).
Plaintiff’s attorney, James R. Rinck, spent a total of 32.85 hours representing
plaintiff in this lawsuit. (ECF No. 27, PageID.1708-09).
Discussion
Section 406 “deals with administrative and judicial review stages discretely:
§ 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; 406(b)
controls fees for representation in court.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794
(2002). “[E]ach tribunal may award fees only for the work done before it.” Horenstein
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 35 F.3d 261, 262 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
This court cannot award plaintiff’s attorney anything under section 406 for the work
he performed at the administrative level.
Attorney’s fees under section 406(b) can only be awarded out of the plaintiff’s
award of past-due benefits. “A prevailing claimant’s fees are payable only out of the
benefits recovered; in amount, such fees may not exceed 25 percent of past-due
benefits.”
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 792.
Section 406(b) “does not authorize the
prevailing party to recover fees from the losing party. Section 406(b) is of another
genre: It authorizes fees payable from the successful party’s recovery.” Gisbrecht,
535 U.S. at 802. Section 406(b)(1)(A) states that “[w]henever a court renders a
judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before
the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment
a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the
past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment[.]” 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
The Supreme Court has held that section 406(b) calls for court review of such
contingency fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield
reasonable results in particular cases. Congress has provided one boundary line:
Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25
percent of past-due benefits. Within the 25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the
successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services
rendered.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.
Courts that approach fee determinations by looking first to the
contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness, have
appropriately reduced the attorney’s recovery based on the character of
the representation and the results the representative achieved. . . . If
the attorney is responsible for delay, for example, a reduction is in order
so that the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits
during the pendency of the case in court. If the benefits are large in
comparison to the time counsel spent on the case, a downward
adjustment is similarly in order.
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (citations omitted).
Attorney Rinck asks for an award of $6,651.25 from the funds being withheld.
(ECF No. 27, PageID.1706). He did not receive an EAJA award. The attorney’s
request, in combination with the request for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a),
does not exceed statutory limits. An award in the amount of $6,651.25 would not
result in a windfall and would fairly compensate the attorney for the work he
performed in this matter. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 27) is
GRANTED. The Court approves payment from Plaintiff’s award of past due benefits
to Attorney Rinck in the amount of $6,651.25.
Dated: October 1, 2018
/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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