Beard et al v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc.

Filing 23

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES J. BEARD,
MICHELLE L. BEARD,
Plaintiffs,
File No. 1:15-CV-1232
v.
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
/
OPINION
This is an action for: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) breach of contract; (3) fraudulent
misrepresentation; (4) slander of title; (5) declaratory relief to bar a foreclosure under the
doctrine of unclean hands; and (6) equitable conversion to a judicial foreclosure. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1.) This action was filed in state court on October 30, 2015, and removed to this
Court on November 25, 2015. On December 14, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request
for a preliminary injunction. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 13).
I.
The standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d
718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

“‘construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,’” but it “‘need not accept
as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.’” Hunter v. Sec’y of U.S. Army,
565 F.3d 986, 992 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559
(6th Cir. 2008)). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing how the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this
statement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must include more
than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must allege facts that “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face,” and that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678.
“A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”

-2-

Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1583 (2012).
Generally, when reviewing a Rule 12(c) or Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a
district court may not consider matters beyond the complaint.” Winget v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d
633, 643 (6th Cir. 2001)). “[I]t may consider the [c]omplaint and any exhibits attached
thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to
defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are
central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d
426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
II.
Plaintiffs Charles J. and Michelle L. Beard claim an interest in real property located
in Three Rivers, Michigan, at 16622 Lovers Lane (the “Property”). Defendant HSBC
Mortgage Services, Inc. (“HSBC”) was the holder of the mortgage on the Property and
purchased the Property at a sheriff’s sale on April 16, 2015, after Plaintiffs defaulted on their
mortgage obligations. This action was filed in St. Joseph County Circuit Court on October
30, 2015. On November 2, 2015 the state court granted an ex parte motion for a temporary
restraining order staying the expiration of the redemption period and barring HSBC from
evicting Plaintiffs from the Property until a hearing on the motion that was scheduled for

-3-

December 1, 2015. HSBC removed the action to this Court on November 25, 2015. After
a hearing in this Court, the Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
A. Wrongful Foreclosure
In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant wrongfully foreclosed on
the property in violation of state law, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3201 et seq., and federal law,
i.e., the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2605 et seq., and the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. Among other things, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant (1) failed to provide notice of the default before accelerating the mortgage;
(2) commenced foreclosure when Defendants were being considered for a loan modification;
and (3) failed to notify Plaintiffs that the mortgage and servicing rights were transferred to
a third party.
Under Michigan law, a mortgagor may redeem a property within six months of the
foreclosure sale by paying the requisite amount. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3240. “If a
mortgagor fails to avail him or herself of the right of redemption, all of the mortgagor’s
rights in and to the property are extinguished.” Bryan v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 848
N.W.2d 482, 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Piotrowski v. State Land Office Bd., 4
N.W.2d 514 (Mich. 1942)); see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3236 (providing that, unless a
property is redeemed within the redemption period, “all the right, title, and interest” of the
mortgagor is vested in the deed of sale).

-4-

In this case, the redemption period expired on October 16, 2016, six months after the
foreclosure sale. Because the redemption period has expired, Plaintiffs’ ability to challenge
the foreclosure is limited. See Bryan, 848 N.W.2d at 485; see also Conlin v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 714 F.3d 355, 359-60 (6th Cir. 2013); El–Seblani v. IndyMac Mortg.
Servs., 510 F. App’x 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A strict reading of the statute suggests that
once the redemption period expires, the homeowner has no legal interest in the property that
litigation might vindicate.”). To challenge the foreclosure, Plaintiffs must make a “clear
showing of fraud or irregularity.” Hamood v. Comerica Bank, No. 322833, 2016 WL
155756, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing Bryan, 848 N.W.2d at 485). This is a
“high standard” for Plaintiffs to meet. Conlin, 714 F.3d at 360. “[N]ot just any type of fraud
[or irregularity] will suffice.” Id. Rather, it must relate to the foreclosure proceeding itself.
Id. In addition, Plaintiffs must show that they were prejudiced. In other words, “they must
show that they would have been in a better position to preserve their interest in the property
absent defendant’s noncompliance with the statute.” Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 825
N.W.2d 329, 337 (Mich. 2012).
1. Irregularity
As to “irregularity” or non-compliance with the foreclosure statute, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant failed to notify them of their default. Plaintiffs assert that they were not
aware of the foreclosure sale because they never saw a notice of sale posted on the Property.
Michigan law does not require the holder of the mortgage to notify the mortgagor of default.

-5-

It requires the mortgagee to provide notice that the mortgage will be foreclosed by a sale of
the property. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3208. To satisfy the notice requirement, a notice must
be published in the local newspaper once a week for four weeks prior to the sale. Id. In
addition, a copy of the notice must be posted in a “conspicuous place” upon the premises.
Id. Exhibits to Plaintiffs’ complaint indicate that Defendant complied with this requirement.
Those exhibits include a sheriff’s deed which attests that notice of foreclosure for the
Property was posted in the county newspaper and in a conspicuous place on the Property.
(Sheriff’s Deed, ECF No. 1, PageID.58.) Another exhibit indicates that the notice was
affixed to the door frame of Plaintiffs’ home. (Affidavit of Posting, ECF No. 1, PageID.60.)
Under Michigan law, such documentation is “presumptive evidence of the facts therein
contained.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3264. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant failed
to provide the notice required by the statute. The fact that Plaintiffs did not see these notices
does not mean that the foreclosure was invalid. The statute does not require “actual notice.”
See Whitfield v. OCWEN Berkeley Federal Bank & Trust, No. 221248, 2001 WL 1699782,
at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (rejecting claim that foreclosure was invalid where
plaintiff did not have actual notice of the sale).
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant did not properly calculate the amount due on
the date of the notice of foreclosure. (Compl. ¶ 73.) Under Michigan law, the notice of
foreclosure must contain the “amount claimed to be due on the mortgage on the date of the

-6-

notice.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3212(c). Plaintiffs do not allege any prejudice as a result
of this error, however.
Plaintiffs further contend that Defendant did not comply with federal law. 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.41, known as “Regulation X,” provides that the servicer of a loan may not refer a
mortgage for foreclosure proceedings in certain circumstances. For instance, before
reviewing a loss mitigation application, the servicer may not begin foreclosure proceedings
unless a loan obligation is more than 120 days delinquent. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1). If a
borrower submits a complete application for a loss mitigation application, the servicer may
not refer the mortgage for foreclosure until notifying the borrower that the borrower is not
eligible for a loss mitigation option. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(2). In addition, if a borrower
submits a complete loss mitigation application after the first notice of foreclosure, but more
than 37 days before the foreclosure sale, the servicer may not move for an order of sale
before notifying the borrower that the borrower is not eligible for any loss mitigation option.
12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g)(1).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant posted a notice of sale for the Property while they
were still being considered for loss mitigation options. These allegations do not permit a
challenge to the foreclosure, however, because they involve non-compliance with the
process for providing a loan modification. “An alleged irregularity in the loan modification
process . . . does not constitute an irregularity in the foreclosure proceeding.” Campbell v.
Nationstar Mortg., 611 F. App’x 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2015).

-7-

Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant did not comply with TILA, which provides that
within 30 days after a mortgage loan is sold or transferred to another party, the new owner
of the mortgage must notify the borrower of the transfer. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1). Similarly,
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant did not comply with a requirement in RESPA that the
servicer of a federally regulated mortgage loan notify the borrower in writing of any
assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the loan to any other person. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(b). The foregoing defects are not irregularities in the foreclosure process. Moreover,
Plaintiffs do not allege that any lack of notice prejudiced them. Thus, any alleged failure to
notify Plaintiffs of the transfer from one mortgage holder to another, or of the transfer from
one servicer to another, does not permit a challenge to the foreclosure sale. Thus, Plaintiffs
have not alleged an irregularity that would warrant an equitable extension of the redemption
period.
2. Fraud
As to fraud, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant told them that “it would not begin
foreclosure proceedings while the parties were actively pursuing loan modification or other
financial assistance options.” (Compl. ¶ 90.) This allegation does not suffice to permit an
equitable extension of the redemption period because the fraud alleged does not concern
fraud in the foreclosure proceeding itself. See Williams v. Pledged Property II, LLC, 508 F.
App’x 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting claim of fraud based on oral assurance to delay
the foreclosure sale). “[T]he fraud or irregularity must be in ‘conducting the legal

-8-

measures.’” Id. (quoting Heimerdinger v. Heimerdinger, 299 N.W. 844, 846 (Mich. 1941)).
Any representation made by Defendant to delay the foreclosure proceedings would have
taken place prior to the foreclosure proceedings. It was not a fraud in “the legal measures”
of the foreclosure process. Id.
In short, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim of fraud or irregularity to justify a challenge
to the foreclosure. Consequently, Plaintiffs do not state a claim for wrongful foreclosure
under state law.
On the other hand, Defendant does not address Plaintiffs’ federal claims under
RESPA and TILA. Although these claims are asserted under the general umbrella of
“wrongful foreclosure” in Count I, they are separate claims. RESPA, for instance, permits
“a private right of action against lenders who evaluate a loss mitigation application while
at the same time pursuing foreclosure.” Houle v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 14-CV14654, 2015 WL 1867526, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2015). Plaintiffs cannot undo the
foreclosure sale, but they may be entitled to damages for Defendant’s alleged failure to
comply with RESPA and/or TILA. Consequently, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion
as to the claim for wrongful foreclosure under Michigan law, but will deny the motion as to
Plaintiffs’ claims under RESPA and TILA.
B. Breach of Contract & Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith
In Count II of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached the mortgage

-9-

agreement by failing to provide notice of default containing all the elements required by
Paragraph 22 of the mortgage agreement, which provides:
Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to
acceleration following Borrower’s breach of any covenant or agreement in
this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration under Section 18 unless
Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default;
(b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days
from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be
cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified
in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security
Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower
of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action
to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to
acceleration and sale. . . .
(Ex. 2 to Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.48.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to send the notice of
default, by negotiating loss-mitigation assistance with Plaintiffs, and by misleading Plaintiffs
about “approval and extension of loss mitigation assistance as an alternative to foreclosure.”
(Compl. ¶ 88.)
1. Breach of Contract
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for breach of contract based on
Defendant’s failure to provide an adequate notice of default because Plaintiffs acknowledge
that they were the first ones to breach the contract when they defaulted on their payment
obligations. “‘The rule in Michigan is that one who first breaches a contract cannot maintain
an action against the other contracting party for his subsequent breach or failure to
perform.’” Michaels v. Amway Corp., 522 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
-10-

Flamm v. Scherer, 198 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)). But this rule “only applies
when the initial breach is substantial.” Id. In this instance, Plaintiffs’ failure to make its
mortgage payments was not a substantial breach. In the mortgage agreement, the parties
expressly contemplated that if a default occurred, Defendant would provide notice prior to
acceleration. “A ‘substantial breach’ is one ‘where the breach effects such a change in the
operation of the contract that further performance by the other party is rendered ineffective
or impossible, such as the causing of a complete failure of consideration or the prevention
of further performance by the other party.’” Jawad v. Hudson City Savings Bank, No.
15-1047 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2016) (citing McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 127 N.W.2d
340, 343 (Mich. 1964)). Plaintiffs’ failure to pay did not render notice of acceleration
ineffective or impossible. Indeed, “[a] breach contemplated by the language of the contract,”
as in this case, “is unlikely to render performance impossible, especially when the contract
provides for a contingency in the event of that breach.” Id. (emphasis added). Consequently,
Defendant’s argument is without merit.1
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant breached an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing when Defendant failed to send the notice of default and pursued foreclosure
while negotiating a loan modification. Defendant notes that “Michigan does not recognize
1

The Court acknowledges that, when responding to the motion for a preliminary injunction,
Defendant offered evidence that it sent a notice of default to Plaintiffs and, thus, did not breach the
mortgage agreement. This evidence is not properly before the Court on a motion under Rule
12(b)(6). The Court declines to convert the motion into one under Rule 56.
-11-

a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Fodale
v. Waste Mgmt. of Mich., Inc., 718 N.W.2d 827, 841 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Belle Isle
Grill Corp. v. Detroit, 666 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)).
Plaintiffs argue that there is an exception to this rule, which arises “when the parties
have agreed to defer decision on a particular term of the contract.” Stephenson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs contend that approval of a loan
modification application is a matter left to Defendant’s discretion. That may be true, but loan
modification is not a “term” of the mortgage agreement. The mortgage agreement does not
require Defendant to even consider a modification to the mortgage, let alone provide that
the parties will defer a decision on a modification to Defendant. Plaintiffs and Defendant did
not agree on the manner in which the mortgage could be modified. See Cheesewright v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 639135, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2013) (noting that the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not apply where the parties have
“unmistakably expressed their respective rights” in a mortgage and note). Thus, Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In Count III, Plaintiffs assert a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant falsely represented that it would not begin foreclosure proceedings while the
parties were negotiating a loan modification. This claim is barred by the statute of frauds,
which states that “[a]n action shall not be brought against a financial institution to enforce

-12-

[a promise or commitment to waive a provision of a loan or make any other financial
accommodation] unless the promise or commitment is in writing and signed.” Mich. Comp.
Laws § 566.132(2).
Defendant’s representation amounts to a promise to delay the foreclosure
proceedings. “[T]he Michigan Court of Appeals has clearly interpreted § 566.132(2) to
include promises to delay foreclosure sales . . . .” Williams, 508 F. App’x at 469 (citing FEI
Co. v. Republic Bank, S.E., No. 268700, 2006 WL 2313612, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 10,
2006)). Consequently, Defendant’s representation must have been in writing and signed in
order for it to be legally enforceable. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant made an “oral
agreement” to delay the proceedings. (Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 21,
PageID.330.) Such an agreement does not satisfy the statute of frauds.
Plaintiffs argue that the statute of frauds does not apply if their claim is construed as
a claim of promissory estoppel rather than a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Michigan
courts have indicated that “[p]romissory estoppel, if established, can be invoked to defeat
the defense of the Statute of Frauds.” McMath v. Ford Motor Co., 259 N.W.2d 140, 142
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977). But the statute of frauds in Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2) is a
“broad ban” on claims against financial institutions based on oral agreements and
representations; it “plainly states that a party is precluded from bringing a claim–no matter
its label–against a financial institution to enforce the terms of an oral promise to waive a
loan provision.” Crown Tech. Park v. D&N Bank, FSB, 619 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Mich. Ct. App.

-13-

2000). The Michigan Court of Appeals has expressly considered and rejected the argument
that a party can avoid the statute of frauds in Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2) by pleading
a claim for promissory estoppel. Id. at 72-73. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ argument is without
merit. Defendant’s motion will be granted as to Count III.
D. Slander of Title
In Count IV, Plaintiffs assert a claim of slander of title under common law and under
Mich. Comp. Laws § 565.108, because Defendant recorded a deed transferring the Property.
“To prove slander of title under the common law, a claimant ‘must show falsity, malice, and
special damages, i.e., that the defendant maliciously published false statements that
disparaged a plaintiff’s right in property, causing special damages.’” Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n
v. Lagoons Forest Condo. Ass’n, 852 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Mich Ct. App. 2014) (quoting B
& B Inv. Group v. Gitler, 581 N.W.2d 17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)). “The same three elements
are required in slander of title actions brought under MCL 565.108 . . . .” Id. “[T]he crucial
element is malice.” Gehrke v. Janowitz, 223 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
“A plaintiff may not prevail on a slander-of-title claim if the defendant’s ‘claim under
the mortgage [or lien] was asserted in good faith upon probable cause or was prompted by
a reasonable belief that [the defendant] had rights in the real estate in question.’” Fed. Nat’l
Morg. Ass’n, 852 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Glieberman v. Fine, 226 N.W. 669, 670 (Mich.
1929)). In this case, there is no question that Defendant had a good faith basis to assert rights
in the Property. Defendant was the holder of the mortgage on the Property. (Compl. ¶ 12.)

-14-

Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage obligations. There are no allegations supporting a
plausible inference of malice. Consequently, Plaintiffs do not state a slander-of-title claim.
E. Declaratory Relief
Count V of the complaint seeks a declaration that foreclosure on the Property is
barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant acted
in bad faith when processing their application for a modification of the mortgage loan. As
indicated in the previous sections, however, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support a plausible
inference of bad faith in the foreclosure process. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged a
sufficient basis for challenging the foreclosure sale.
Furthermore, the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply. It is a defense to an action
in equity, not an independent cause of action to undo a foreclosure by advertisement. See
Durr v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 12-11840, 2013 WL 6050140, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 15,
2013) (“[T]he doctrine of unclean hands cannot be applied against Defendants because
foreclosure by advertisement is not an equitable action.”). A judicial foreclosure is an
equitable action. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3180. In contrast, the foreclosure by
advertisement undertaken by Defendant was a legal action, not an equitable one. Mission of
Love v. Evangelist Hutchinson Ministries, No. 266219, 2007 WL 1094424, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Apr. 12, 2007) (unclean hands doctrine held inapplicable because “defendants were
not seeking relief in equity. Their title obtained through the mortgage foreclosure was based
in law”). Accordingly, the motion will be granted as to Count V.

-15-

F. Preliminary Injunction
Count VI seeks preliminary injunctive relief, which this Court has already denied.
Thus, Count VI is moot.
G. Conversion to Judicial Foreclosure
Count VII seeks to convert the foreclosure on the Property to a judicial foreclosure
pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205c(8). As noted by Plaintiffs, this statute was
repealed effective June 30, 2014. (Compl. ¶ 121.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs ask the Court to
impose an equitable mortgage on the Property, because they no longer have any recourse
under the foregoing statute. Plaintiffs assert that an equitable mortgage would give them a
means to contest the wrongful foreclosure.
The Court is aware of no authority that would permit an equitable mortgage in these
circumstances. As discussed with respect to Count I, Plaintiffs’ rights, title, and interest in
the Property have been extinguished. Plaintiffs do not state a valid basis for challenging the
foreclosure or claiming an interest in the Property. Thus, the Court will grant Defendant’s
motion as to Count VII.
III.
In summary, Defendant’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court
enter partial judgment in Defendant’s favor as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims, except the RESPA
and TILA claims in Count I and the breach-of-contract claim in Count II.
An order will be entered that is consistent with this opinion.

Dated: May 31, 2016

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-16-