Powell #484234 v. Heyns et al

Filing 7

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL LEON POWELL,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:16-cv-95

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

DANIEL HEYNS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Michael Leon Powell presently is incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility, though the actions about
which he complains occurred while he was housed at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI). He sues
former MDOC Director Daniel Heyns and the following RMI employees: Warden Carmen Palmer;
Deputy Wardens Anthony Stewart and S. Schooley; Inspector C. Smith; Hearing Investigator
(unknown) Chaney; Sergeants B. Simmons and (unknown) Burns; Correctional Officer (unknown)
Grinnell; and other unnamed Defendants identified as Unknown Part(y)(ies).
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 25, 2013, he was subjected to a patdown search by
Defendant Grinnell and another officer. He subsequently was handcuffed and taken to segregation.
That afternoon, both Officer Gay and an unnamed lieutenant told Plaintiff that he was in segregation
for possession of drugs. Plaintiff denied possessing drugs. On January 28, 2013, Plaintiff
complained to Defendant Chaney that he had not been reviewed on a ticket and had not received
written notice of the reason he had been placed in segregation. At 2:00 p.m. on January 29,
Defendant Simmons came to Plaintiff’s segregation cell to inform him that he had been issued a
misconduct ticket by Defendant Chaney. Plaintiff read the ticket and noted that the date of the ticket
was January 29, rather than January 25, 2013, the date Plaintiff had been placed in segregation.
Plaintiff complained that the notice was improper and demanded all documents related to the
situation. On February 6, 2013, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Schooley about the delayed
ticket. Defendant Schooley informed Plaintiff that he could place a prisoner in segregation for up
to seven days without written notice. Schooley informed Plaintiff that he would remain in
segregation until the lab results came back.

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Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Chaney on February 5, 2013 and another
against Defendant Schooley on February 6, 2013. Plaintiff was released from segregation on
February 13, 2013, and he was informed that he was being transferred to a different facility.
According to the misconduct report and grievance response attached to the complaint, while
searching Plaintiff, Officer Grinnell found suspected heroin in the finger of a plastic glove located
in Plaintiff’s back pocket. Plaintiff was placed in segregation while lab tests were conducted.
Because the misconduct charge was not promptly issued and heard, the ticket was dismissed. (ECF
No. 1-1, PageID.14, 18.)
Plaintiff alleges that his placement in segregation without a timely hearing violated
due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. He seeks declaratory relief,
together with compensatory and punitive damages.
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
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the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).

A.

Due Process

Plaintiff contends that he was deprived of due process when he was placed in
segregation between January 25 and February 13, 2013, without receiving proper notice and a
hearing on the misconduct charge. “The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from
deprivation of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Bazetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d
795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation,
a plaintiff must show that one of these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221
(2005). Analysis of a procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether
there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second
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examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”
Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every
change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Court set forth the
standard for determining when a prisoner’s loss of liberty implicates a federally cognizable liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the Sandin Court, a prisoner is entitled
to the protections of due process only when a deprivation “will inevitably affect the duration of his
sentence” or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812
(6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995). Confinement in
administrative segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate
receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-73 (1983).
Thus, it is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme circumstances.” Joseph v. Curtin,
410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and duration of
a stay in segregation to determine whether it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship.”
Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th. Cir. 2008).
In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that the segregation at issue in that case
(disciplinary segregation for 30 days) did not impose an atypical and significant hardship. Sandin,
515 U.S. at 484. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that mere placement in administrative
segregation, and placement for a relatively short period of time, do not require the protections of due
process. Rimmer-Bey, 62 F.3d at 790-91; see Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir.
2010) (61 days in segregation is not atypical and significant). The Sixth Circuit has also held, in
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specific circumstances, that confinement in segregation for a relatively long period of time does not
implicate a liberty interest. See, e.g., Baker, 155 F.3d at 812-23 (two years of segregation while the
inmate was investigated for the murder of a prison guard in a riot); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460
(6th Cir.1997) (one year of segregation following convictions for possession of illegal contraband
and assault, including a 117-day delay in reclassification due to prison crowding). But cf. Selby v.
Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (13 years of segregation implicates a liberty interest);
Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795 (remanding to the district court to consider whether the plaintiff's
allegedly “indefinite” period of segregation, i.e., three years without an explanation from prison
officials, implicates a liberty interest); Harris v. Caruso, 465 F. App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012)
(eight years of segregation implicates a liberty interest).
Here, Plaintiff clearly has failed to suggest that his segregation at imposes an atypical
and significant hardship. Plaintiff was placed in segregation for only three weeks, less than the
plaintiff in the Sandin case. Moreover, Plaintiff utterly fails to allege that segregation at RMI was
atypical in any sense. As a consequence, Plaintiff had no liberty interest protected by due process.
B.

Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff also alleges that his three-week placement in segregation violated the Eighth
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are not only physically barbaric,
but also those which are incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,” or which “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-103(1976). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, the
prisoner must show that he was deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Limitations that are restrictive or even harsh, but

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are not cruel and unusual under contemporary standards, are not unconstitutional. Id. Thus, federal
courts may not intervene to remedy conditions that are merely unpleasant or undesirable.
Placement in segregation is a routine discomfort that is “‘part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Jones v. Waller, No. 98-5739, 1999
WL 313893, at *2 (6th Cir. May 4, 1999). Although it is clear that Plaintiff was denied certain
privileges as a result of his administrative segregation, he does not allege or show that he was denied
basic human needs and requirements. The Sixth Circuit has held that without a showing that basic
human needs were not met, the denial of privileges as a result of administrative segregation cannot
establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Evans v. Vinson, 427 F. App’x 437, 443 (6th Cir.
2011); Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot bring
an Eighth Amendment claim for emotional or mental damages because he does not allege a physical
injury. See 42 U. S.C. §1997e(e); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5; Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795.
As a result, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
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Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 1, 2016

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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