VanderHoff v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 15

OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALISA VANDERHOFF,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:16-CV-156

v.
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Defendant,
/
OPINION
This is a social security action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial
review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner). Plaintiff Alisa VanderHoff seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision denying
her claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether
there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo
review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the

facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they
are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See
Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir.
1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on
the record as a whole and take into account whatever evidence in the record fairly detracts from its
weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The
substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker
can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545
(6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker
considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be
reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998
F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was fifty-two years of age on the date of the ALJ’s decision. (PageID.44,
70.) She completed the tenth grade, and was previously employed as a laundry counter clerk.
(PageID.72, 97.) Plaintiff filed for benefits on July 2, 2012, alleging that she had been disabled since
April 1, 2012, due to problems associated with her liver and pancreas, kidney stones, short term
memory problems, and frequent urinary tract infections. (PageID.106, 122, 186–197.) Plaintiff’s
applications were denied on January 15, 2013, after which time she sought a hearing before an ALJ.
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(PageID.141–148, 152–153.) On June 25, 2014, Plaintiff appeared with her counsel for an
administrative hearing before ALJ Nicholas Ohanesian at which both Plaintiff and a vocational
expert (VE) testified. (PageID.64–104.) On August 28, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision
finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.44–63.) On December 16, 2015, the Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it the Commissioner’s final decision in the matter.
(PageID.29–34.) Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a
nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

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1.

An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be
“disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b));

2.

An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c));

3.

If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration
requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of
Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration of vocational factors
(20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));

4.

If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of “not
disabled” must be made (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));

5.

If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors
including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered
to determine if other work can be performed. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)).

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Plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused
by her impairments and that she is precluded from performing past relevant work through step four.
Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). At step five, it is the
Commissioner’s burden “to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile.” Id.
ALJ Ohanesian determined Plaintiff’s claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her
alleged disability onset date. (PageID.49.) At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: (1) alcohol induced cirrhosis with associated pancreatitis; (2) chronic
thrombocytopenia and diarrhea; (3) gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD); (4) pyelonephritis with
recurrent urinary tract infections; (5) hypertension; (6) degenerative joint disease of the left knee; (7)
migraine headaches; (8) obesity; (9) anxiety disorder; (10) dysthymic disorder; (11) borderline
personality disorder; and (12) alcohol abuse in recent remission. (PageID.59.) At the third step, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments. (PageID.50–51.) At the fourth step, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC based on all the impairments:
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she
cannot balance, [stoop], kneel, crouch, crawl, or climb stairs/ramps
more than occasionally; she cannot work with more than frequent
exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous machinery; she cannot
perform more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks; and she cannot
maintain contact with the general public or more than occasional
contact with co-workers and supervisors.

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(PageID.52.) Continuing with the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to
perform any of her past relevant work. (PageID.57.) At the fifth step, the ALJ questioned the VE
to determine whether a significant number of jobs exist in the economy that Plaintiff could perform
given her limitations. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. The VE testified that Plaintiff could
perform the following work: cleaner / housekeeping (8,000 Michigan jobs), assembler (10,000
Michigan jobs), and inspector / packager (9,000 Michigan jobs). (PageID.99–100). Based on this
record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (PageID.58.)
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from April 1, 2012,
through August 28, 2014, the date of decision. (PageID.58.)
DISCUSSION
1.

The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments.

As noted above, at step two of the sequential evaluation the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had several severe mental impairments and later, at step four, included several mental limitations in
the RFC. (PageID.52.) For a variety of reasons, however, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in
evaluating these impairments.
A.

The ALJ Was Not Required to Order a Consultative Examination.

On January 5, 2013, Plaintiff underwent a consultative examination with Ms. Allison
Bush, an agency consultant. After conducting several tests, Ms. Bush assigned Plaintiff a fair to
guarded prognosis, noting that Plaintiff was able to understand, retain and follow through on simple
instructions, but that she doubted Plaintiff could do so with complicated instructions. She also
recommended that Plaintiff undergo a neurological examination to establish a baseline of her
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cognitive functioning. (PageID.484.) Plaintiff first claims the ALJ should have ordered such an
examination. (PageID.865.)
It was Plaintiff’s burden to present evidence establishing her disability. Casey v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). The Social Security
regulations grant the ALJ the authority to order a consultative examination if a claimant’s medical
sources cannot give sufficient information about a claimant’s impairments to enable the ALJ to
determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, 416.917. However, “the
regulations do not require an ALJ to refer a claimant to a consultative specialist.” Landsaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1986). Rather, “[a]n ALJ has discretion to
determine whether further evidence, such as additional testing or expert testimony, is necessary.”
Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2001); see Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d
269, 275 (6th Cir. 2010). The ALJ did not abuse his discretion in declining to order a consultative
examination.
B.

The ALJ Did Not Violate SSR 96–8p When He Limited Plaintiff to Only
Simple, Routine, Repetitive Tasks.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to complete a function-by-function analysis
of Plaintiff’s RFC as required by SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).2 RFC
is a medical assessment of what an individual can do in a work setting in spite of functional
limitations and environmental restrictions imposed by all of her medically determinable impairments.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. RFC is defined as “the maximum degree to which the individual
retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs” on a

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SSR’s “are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration” and “represent precedent final
opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” adopted by the agency. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1).

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regular and continuing basis. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(c); see Cohen, 964 F.2d
at 530. SSR 96–8p states that “[t]he RFC assessment must address both the remaining exertional and
nonexertional capacities of the individual.” SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *5. Each exertional
function (sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing and pulling) must be considered
separately. Id. Nonexertional capacity considers all work-related limitations and restrictions that do
not depend on an individual’s physical strength such as: postural (e.g., stooping and climbing);
manipulative (e.g., reaching and handling); visual; communicative (hearing and speaking); mental
(e.g., understanding and remembering instructions and responding appropriately to supervision); and
the ability to tolerate environmental factors (e.g ., tolerance of temperature extremes). Id. at *5–*6.
“Although a function-by-function analysis is desirable, SSR 96–8p does not require
ALJs to produce such a detailed statement in writing . . . the ALJ need only articulate how the
evidence in the record supports the RFC determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform
sustained work-related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in the record.”
Delgado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App’x 542, at 547–548 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).

Here, the ALJ met the requirements for articulating the RFC

determination as discussed in Delgado by reviewing Plaintiff’s medical history and functional
limitations with respect to her physical and mental impairments, resulting in his RFC determination
that Plaintiff could perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks due to her mental impairments.
(PageID.52.) Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by failing to perform a function-by-function analysis
of Plaintiff’s RFC.

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C.

Plaintiff Has Not Shown the ALJ Erred in Giving “Great Weight” to the
Opinion of the Dr. William Schirado.

On January 14, 2013, Dr. William Schirado reviewed Plaintiff’s records and
completed an assessment regarding Plaintiff’s mental RFC. The assessment asked the doctor to rate
the severity of Plaintiff’s limitations in several areas. Plaintiff focuses on the doctor’s opinion that
Plaintiff would be moderately limited in “[t]he ability to complete a normal workday and workweek
without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” (PageID.118.) In explaining this
limitation as part of the larger category of concentration and persistence limitations, Dr. Schirado
wrote that Plaintiff “has not experienced substantial loss completing daily activities or the ability to
sustain simple instructions independently.” (PageID.118.) The ALJ stated he was giving great
weight to the opinion. (PageID.56.) Plaintiff claims, however, that although the ALJ purported to
adopt the opinion, he failed to specifically include the doctor’s moderate limitation in completing
a workday and workweek when finding Plaintiff could perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.
(PageID.865.) Plaintiff cites to Ealy v. Commissioner of Social Security, 594 F.3d 504 (6th Cir.
2010) for support. (PageID.865–866.) While Plaintiff apparently believes the facts of the instant
case and Ealy are similar, the Court is not convinced.
In Ealy, the ALJ purported to adopt a specific restriction that limited the claimant to
“simple repetitive tasks” in “[two-hour] segments over an eight-hour day where speed was not
critical” but then only included in the hypothetical RFC to the expert a limitation for “simple,
repetitive tasks and instructions in non-public work settings.” Ealy, 594 F.3d at 516. The Sixth
Circuit found that the ALJ had not “fully conveyed” the claimant’s limitations. Id. Consequently,
the case stands only for the long-held notion that if an ALJ relies on an expert’s response to a
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hypothetical question, such question must accurately portray the claimant’s limitations and be
consistent with the ALJ’s express findings. See Clayton v. Astrue, 2013 WL 427407 at *7 (S.D.
Ohio, Feb. 1, 2013); Steed v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1097003 at *9 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 20, 2012); Alonso
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 4526676 at *11 (W.D. Mich., Aug. 8, 2011); McGaha v. Astrue,
2012 WL 762176 at *5 (E.D. Ky., Mar. 7, 2012). Here, the specificity that was present in Ealy is
lacking. Indeed, the vague conclusion that Plaintiff is “moderately” limited in the abovementioned
area is not, on its face, inconsistent with the RFC’s limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks.
It is patent that the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from severe mental impairments, assigned great
weight to opinion of the agency reviewer, and included limitations in the RFC to account for
Plaintiff’s impairments. “[A]n ALJ is not required to adopt verbatim the opinion of a physician or
psychologist.” Woods v. Astrue, No. 4:11-CV-2306, 2012 WL 5415327, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5,
2012) report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:11 CV 2306, 2012 WL 5457475 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 5, 2012). “The Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ—not a physician—ultimately
determines a claimant’s RFC.” Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App'x 435, 439 (6th Cir.
2010). That is what the ALJ has done in this case, and the Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the
limitations contained in the RFC are inconsistent with Dr. Schirado’s opinion. Accordingly, this
argument fails.
2.

The ALJ’s Determination that Plaintiff was Able to Perform a Limited
Range of Light Work is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ’s determination she can perform a limited range of
light work is unsupported by substantial evidence. She claims, for example, that the “medical
evidence taken as a whole suggests someone who would be incapable of light work.” (PageID.867.)
She proceeds to cite several medical records documenting various complaints and diagnoses
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including fatigue, urinary tract infections, chronic pain, headaches, nausea, weakness, and memory
loss. (PageID.867.) The bare fact that Plaintiff was diagnosed with various impairments, however,
does not establish the extent of limitations, if any, caused by those conditions. See McKenzie v.
Comm’r of Soc Sec., No. 99–3400, 2000 WL 687680, at *5 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000) (“the mere
diagnosis of an impairment does not render an individual disabled nor does it reveal anything about
the limitations, if any, it imposes upon an individual”) (citing Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 488, 489
(6th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff had the burden of showing specifically how these impairments limited her
ability to a degree inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination. It is not the Court’s role, here,
to conduct a de novo review of the case. See Garner, 745 F.2d at 387. As all Plaintiff has done is
to list various impairments and then claim she is disabled because of them, the Court finds Plaintiff
has failed to satisfy her burden here.
Plaintiff also claims that it is “unexplained in the decision how the ALJ determined
Plaintiff could only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, or climb; but Plaintiff
would be able to stand for the majority of the workday.” (PageID.867.) But it is clear that the ALJ
adopted the opinion of Dr. Dinesh Tanna, M.D., an agency consultant who opined on January 1,
2013, that Plaintiff could stand or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight hour workday, and
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (PageID.115–116.)
In giving the opinion “great weight,” the ALJ explained that the opinion was consistent with the
record, including mild diagnostic findings and Plaintiff’s daily activities. (PageID.56.) The ALJ was
free to consider the consultant’s opinion and determine what weight, if any, it should be given.
“Social Security regulations recognize that opinions from non-examining state agency consultants
may be entitled to significant weight, because these individuals are ‘highly qualified’ and are

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‘experts in Social Security disability evaluation.’” Cobb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12–cv–2219,
2013 WL 5467172, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i),
416.927(e)(2)(i)); see Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court finds no error
here.
3.

The ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Credibility.

At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was impaired to an extent
far greater than that recognized by the ALJ. She testified, for example, that she could only sit or
stand for twenty minutes at any one time. (PageID.89.) She felt that lifting a gallon of milk was “a
bit heavy.” (PageID.90.) She experienced anxiety attacks when she had to fill out paper work, or
answer questions.

(PageID.88.)

The ALJ found that these statements were not credible.

(PageID.53.) Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in doing so.
As the Sixth Circuit has long recognized, “pain alone, if the result of a medical
impairment, may be severe enough to constitute disability.” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th
Cir. 1984); see also Grecol v. Halter, 46 F. App’x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2002). As the relevant Social
Security regulations make clear, however, a claimant’s “statements about [her] pain or other
symptoms will not alone establish that [she is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a); see
also Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(a)); Hash v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 309 F. App’x 981, 989 (6th Cir. 2009). Instead, a
claimant’s assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated under the following standard:
First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1)
whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively
established medical condition is of such a severity that it can
reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.
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Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citations omitted). This standard is often referred to as the Duncan
standard. See Workman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, “subjective complaints may support a finding of disability only where
objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged symptoms.” Id. (citing Blankenship
v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989)). However, where the objective medical evidence
fails to confirm the severity of a claimant’s subjective allegations, the ALJ “has the power and
discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to resolve the significant conflicts in the administrative
record.” Id. (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 531).
In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s credibility assessment “must be
accorded great weight and deference.” Id. (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 531); see also Heston v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[i]t is for the [Commissioner] and his
examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and weigh and evaluate
their testimony”). It is not for this Court to reevaluate such evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must stand. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s
subjective allegations to not be fully credible, a finding that should not be lightly disregarded. See
Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1987). In fact, as the Sixth
Circuit has stated, “[w]e have held that an administrative law judge’s credibility findings are virtually
unchallengeable.” Ritchie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 540 F. App’x 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, it is clear the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s
subjective allegations and applied the factors set forth in 20 CFR §§ 404.1529 and 416.929.
(PageID.52) (“I considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be
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accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based upon the
requirements of 20 CFR 404.1529 and 416.929 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p.”). While the ALJ could
have better specified his reasons for finding Plaintiff not to be credible, the ALJ listed several
reasons throughout his decision–including her refusal to follow prescribed treatment and her daily
activities. (PageID.55.) The ALJ also noted the mild findings in the January 2013 consultative
examination. (PageID.56.) Moreover, Plaintiff seemingly concedes that her testimony was not
credible. (PageID.868) (“Plaintiff acknowledges the lack of credibility”).
Plaintiff’s argument however, appears to be that it is reversible error for an ALJ to
mention activities of daily living in the credibility context.

(PageID.868.)

In Rogers v.

Commissioner of Social Security, 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit noted that
“somewhat minimal daily functions are not comparable to typical work activities.” However, as the
regulations and case law make clear, a claimant’s daily activities may be used in evaluating the
severity of the Plaintiff’s complaints. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Cruse v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007); Walters, 127 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“An ALJ may also consider household and social activities engaged in by the claimant in evaluating
a claimant’s assertions of pain or ailments.”); Blacha v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d
228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990) (“As a matter of law, an ALJ may consider household and social activities
in evaluating complaints of disabling pain.”). Here, the ALJ did not impermissibly translate
Plaintiff’s daily activities into an ability to perform substantial gainful activity, but rather noted that
her activities were inconsistent with the severity of her complaints. On her function report, Plaintiff
reported attending church, and was able to get along with family. While she stated she had no
friends, she was able to visit with neighbors. She also reported being able to finish what she started,

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such as doing chores, reading, or watching a movie. (PageID.240–241.) Similarly, she reported to
the agency examiner that she kept in regular contact with her sister and daughter. (PageID.482.) She
was able to cook, clean, and take care of her personal needs. (PageID.482.) The ALJ reasonably
found these activities to be inconsistent with the severity of her complaints.
Accordingly, this claim of error is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.
A separate judgment shall issue.

Dated:

October 25, 2016

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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