Yates #773390 v. Palmer
Filing
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OPINION; Judgment and Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANTHONY LADELL YATES,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 1:16-cv-338
Honorable Janet T. Neff
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be
summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court
has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4
includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual
allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must
be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Factual Allegations
Petitioner Anthony Ladell Yates presently is incarcerated at the Michigan
Reformatory. Following his February 3, 2014 guilty plea in Berrien County Circuit Court, Petitioner
was convicted of armed robbery in violation of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529. The conviction was
a “subsequent felony” under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.10. On March 24, 2014, he was sentenced
to a prison term of 240 to 360 months
Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal his sentence to the Michigan Court
of Appeals raising only one issue. Petitioner challenged the scoring of Offense Variable (OV) 10.
According to Petitioner the scoring on that variable was incorrect; it should have been scored at 0.
In an unpublished opinion issued on October 29, 2014, the court of appeals denied the application
for lack of merit in the grounds presented. Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court, which denied leave to appeal on March 31, 2015.
In his habeas application, filed on or about March 19, 2016, Petitioner raises only the
one ground for relief: the scoring of OV 10 was wrong, it should have been scored at 0 points. In
further support of that position, Petitioner notes that if OV 10 had been properly scored, it would
have changed his sentencing guidelines minimum sentence from a range of 135 to 281 months to
a range of 126 to 262 months.
Discussion
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001).
The AEDPA “prevents federal habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions are given
effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). The AEDPA
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has “drastically changed” the nature of habeas review. Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th
Cir. 2001). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated
pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v.
Donald, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A] federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v.
Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). A habeas petition must “state
facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75
n.7 (1977) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS
CASES). The federal courts have no power to intervene on the basis of a perceived error of state law.
Wilson, 131 S. Ct. at 14; Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
67-68 (1991); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). Claims concerning the improper application
of sentencing guidelines are state-law claims and typically are not cognizable in habeas corpus
proceedings. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1982) (federal courts normally do not review
a sentence for a term of years that falls within the limits prescribed by the state legislature); Austin
v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 301-02 (6th Cir. 2000) (alleged violation of state law with respect to
sentencing is not subject to federal habeas relief).
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Although state law errors generally are not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding,
an alleged violation of state law “could, potentially, ‘be sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial
of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Bowling
v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 521 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50). A sentence may
violate due process if it is based upon material “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980)); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). To prevail on such a claim, the petitioner
must show (1) that the information before the sentencing court was materially false, and (2) that the
court relied on the false information in imposing the sentence. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447;United
States v. Polselli, 747 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1984). A sentencing court demonstrates actual
reliance on misinformation when the court gives “explicit attention” to it, “found[s]” its sentence
“at least in part” on it, or gives “specific consideration” to the information before imposing sentence.
Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447.
Petitioner fails even to argue that the facts found by the court at sentencing were
either materially false or based on false information. Id. Instead, Petitioner states only that the
scoring of OV 10 was wrong and should have been 0. Even accepting Petitioner’s position as true,
his minimum sentence still fell within the sentencing guidelines range. Such a claim clearly falls far
short of the sort of egregious circumstances implicating due process. Moreover, the Michigan Court
of Appeals concluded that Petitioner’s position with regard to the calculation of OV 10 lacked merit.
The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized “‘that a state court’s interpretation of
state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal
court sitting in habeas corpus.’” Stumpf v. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 746 n.6 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
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Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76). As Petitioner has framed the issue, it simply cannot be said that the state
court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner’s application
pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court’s
dismissal of Petitioner’s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination
that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly
unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that
an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit
that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat
anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v.
Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under
Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm’r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir.
1989) (it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant
service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing
certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of
a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the
district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a
certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Id. Consequently, this Court has
examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, to warrant a grant of
the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 529 U.S. at 484. “A petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its
examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal
of Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability.
A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: April 12, 2016
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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