Ledford v. Cass, County of et al
Filing
7
OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER LEDFORD,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:16-cv-347
v.
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
COUNTY OF CASS et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Christopher Ledford presently is jailed in the Cass County Correctional
Facility. He sues Cass County and Officer (unknown) Appoloni.
The allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint are minimal. Plaintiff states that, one week
prior to filing his complaint, he sought to obtain medical attention for an unspecified problem by
knocking on his cell window.1 Defendant Appoloni told Plaintiff that, if he did not “lock down,”
he would not receive medical attention. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff refused to obey
the order. Defendant Appoloni called for back-up, which Plaintiff claims was unnecessary.
Defendant Appoloni then pushed Plaintiff into his cell.
Thereafter, Plaintiff sent three kites (apparently to the medical provider) without
receiving a response. He also requested a grievance from Officer Sharp, who is not a defendant in
this action. Sharp refused to provide a grievance form, because the nurse was not part of the jail staff
and therefore not subject to the grievance process. Plaintiff also was denied a grievance form to
complain about Defendant Appoloni’s conduct.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he asked for a “motion to discontinue sex offender
registration through the law library request form.” (Id.) Sergeant Jackson told Plaintiff that he had
“never heard of such a thing and denied to process [Plaintiff’s] request with the Clerk of Court . . . .”
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Jackson, who is not named as a defendant, thereby denied
Plaintiff his right to access the courts. Plaintiff also alleges that Cass County has a policy of not
providing grievance forms.
1
Toward the end of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has psoriasis, which he believes may have been
prevented from getting worse, had he been provided unspecified medical care. He does not, however, specify the
symptoms with which he was suffering at the time of the incident.
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For relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring the establishment of a law library
containing all necessary civil and criminal state-court forms. He also seeks damages for Appoloni’s
“assault,” as well as payment by the county of all of his medical costs.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
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standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The courts repeatedly
have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison
grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir.
2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No.
99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d
1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).
Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf,
No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty
interest in the grievance process, Sergeant Jackson’s denial of grievance forms did not deprive
Plaintiff of due process.
For the same reason, Defendant Cass County is not liable for Plaintiff’s inability to
obtain a grievance form. A municipality may only be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom
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causes a injury, regardless of the form of relief sought by the plaintiff. Los Angeles Cnty. v.
Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 453-54 (2010) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1974)). In a municipal liability claim, the finding of a policy or custom is the initial determination
to be made. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). The policy or custom must
be the moving force behind the constitutional injury, and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect
the policy to the governmental entity and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the
execution of that policy. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v.
Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe, 103 F.3d at 508-509. Even assuming that Cass
County has a policy of not providing grievance forms, because Plaintiff has no constitutional right
to a grievance process, he suffered no constitutional deprivation from the county policy.
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege an access-to-the-courts claim. It is well established
that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821
(1977). The principal issue in Bounds was whether the states must protect the right of access to the
courts by providing law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for prisoners. Id. at 817.
The Court further noted that in addition to law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge,
the states must provide indigent inmates with “paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial
services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824-25. The right of access to
the courts also prohibits prison officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate’s access
to the courts. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).
An indigent prisoner’s constitutional right to legal resources and materials is not,
however, without limit. In order to state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts,
a plaintiff must show “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Talley-Bey
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v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. In other words, a plaintiff must
plead and demonstrate that the shortcomings in the prison legal assistance program or lack of legal
materials have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). The
Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual injury:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to
slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates
need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences
of conviction and incarceration.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Thus, a prisoner’s right to access the courts extends to direct appeals,
habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391
(6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Moreover, the underlying action must have asserted a non-frivolous claim.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353; accord Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (Lewis changed
actual injury to include requirement that action be non-frivolous). In addition, the Supreme Court
squarely has held that “the underlying cause of action . . . is an element that must be described in the
complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). “Like any
other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be
addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at 416.
Plaintiff’s allegations wholly fail to demonstrate the requisite actual injury. It is
apparent from Plaintiff’s prisoner trust account statement and from the filing of the instant complaint
that Plaintiff regularly has been provided paper, pens, and envelopes for mailing. He does not allege
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that he made any attempt to draft any document for filing in any court that was not mailed. The mere
fact that the jail did not maintain a standard form on which Plaintiff could request a change to his
sex-offender registration in no way demonstrates that Plaintiff has been prevented from requesting
such a change or that he has otherwise suffered actual injury. He therefore fails to state an access-tothe-courts claim.
Plaintiff also has failed to demonstrate a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments based on the denial of medical care or Defendant Appoloni’s limited use of force to
push Plaintiff into his cell.2 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment
obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide
such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the
plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
2
Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is housed in the jail as a convicted inmate or as a pre-trial detainee.
Although the Eighth Amendment’s protections apply specifically to post-conviction inmates, see Barber v. City of Salem,
Ohio, 953 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1992), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to guarantee
those same protections to pretrial detainees as well. See Richko v. Wayne Cty., __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 1533997 (6th Cir.
Apr. 15, 2016); Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Molton v. City of
Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that alleged violation of pretrial detainee’s Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights is governed by the “deliberate indifference” standard).
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Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness
of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s
failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or
non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in
the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison
Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Even assuming that Plaintiff told Defendant Appoloni that he needed treatment
specifically for psoriasis, Plaintiff wholly fails to allege either that his medical need was sufficiently
serious at the time of his request and that the seriousness would have been apparent to a lay person.
He therefore fails to allege facts supporting the objective component of the test. Id. at 835. Plaintiff
also fails to allege facts showing that Defendant Appoloni acted with a sufficiently culpable mental
state in failing to immediately respond to the request.
In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that Appoloni violated the Eighth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendments by pushing Plaintiff into his cell. The Eighth Amendment
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embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime.
Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of
decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not
physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
346. Among unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain are those that are “totally without
penological justification.” Id.
Plaintiff’s claim that Appoloni pushed him must be analyzed under the Supreme
Court authority limiting the use of force against prisoners. This analysis must be made in the context
of the constant admonitions by the Supreme Court regarding the deference that courts must accord
to prison or jail officials as they attempt to maintain order and discipline within dangerous
institutional settings. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986). Generally,
restrictions and even harsh conditions of confinement are not necessarily cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 347. The Supreme Court has
held that “whenever guards use force to keep order,” the standards enunciated in Whitley, 475 U.S.
312, should be applied. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130
S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010). Under Whitley, the core judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. In determining whether the use of force is
wanton and unnecessary, the court should evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship
between that need and the amount of force used, the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials,” and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S.
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at 6-7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); accord Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953-54 (6th Cir.
2010); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990).
By his own admission, Plaintiff refused to follow Appoloni’s order. When Plaintiff
refused to lock down, Appoloni merely pushed Plaintiff into his cell. Plaintiff does not allege that
Appoloni used any significant force or that Plaintiff experienced an injury. On the facts alleged, the
force was reasonable and applied in good faith.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
May 16, 2016
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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