Carson-Moore v. Martin et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAUN NICHOLAS CARSON-MOORE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:16-cv-470
v.
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
PAUL MARTIN et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Buchner, Bulk, and
Vanheukelum. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendant Martin.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is housed at the St. Joseph County Jail. On April 18, 2016, Plaintiff was walking
and talking with Defendant Deputy Paul Martin. During the conversation Plaintiff lifted his hands in a
surrendering motion. Defendant Martin then balled his fist and struck Plaintiff “full force.” Plaintiff sues
Defendant Martin in his official and personal capacities for compensation for the mental, emotional and
physical injuries he suffered. He also sues three additional Defendants1: Administrative Officer Kitty
Buchner, Sergeant (unknown) Vanheukelum, and Sheriff Brad Bulk. Plaintiff contends that these additional
Defendants are liable for the actions of Defendant Martin because they supervise him and did nothing in
response to his misconduct. In addition to damages, Plaintiff asks the Court to terminate Defendant
Martin’s employment and compel an apology.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
1
Plaintiff references all three additional Defendants in his statement of claims even though he mentions
Defendants Buchner and Bulk but not Defendant Vanheukelum in his list of Defendants. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2-3.)
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face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a
source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Although Plaintiff does not identify the constitutional violation upon which he bases his
claim, his allegations are focused on Defendant Martin’s use of excessive force. The use of excessive force
against a prisoner is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be
“barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman,
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452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment also
prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. Among unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain are
those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to state a claim
against Defendant Martin in his personal capacity.
Plaintiff’s allegations do not, however, suffice to state claims against the other defendants.
Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight,
532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts
of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act.
Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir.
2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor failed to act based
upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants
Buchner, Vanheukelum, or Bulk engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to
state a claim against them.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants Buchner, Vanheukelum, and Bulk will be dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve
the complaint against Defendant Martin.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 13, 2016
/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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