Mederos-Burgos v. United States of America

Filing 6

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ESTEBAN MEDEROS-BURGOS,
Movant,
Case No. 1:16-cv-843
v.
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
/
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Movant’s “motion for resentencing pursuant
to Johnson v. U.S.”, which this Court has construed as a motion to vacate, set aside or correct
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 1.) On August 22, 2016, the Government filed
a response in opposition. (ECF No. 4.) For the reasons that follow, Movant’s § 2255 motion
is denied.
I.
On February 29, 2012, Movant pleaded guilty to aggravated felon reentry, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2), and 1101(a)(43)(B). This Court sentenced Movant to 60
months in custody. Movant filed a direct appeal, arguing that the sentence was substantively
unreasonable. On April 24, 2015, the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed his sentence.

Subsequently, Movant filed this motion raising a claim of improper sentence enhancement
based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
II.
A prisoner who moves to vacate his sentence under § 2255 must show that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, that the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or that it is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. To prevail on a § 2255 motion “‘a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of an
error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
on the guilty plea or the jury’s verdict.’” Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Non-constitutional errors are generally outside the scope of § 2255 relief. United
States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2000). A petitioner can prevail on a § 2255
motion alleging non-constitutional error only by establishing a “fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, or, an error so egregious that it
amounts to a violation of due process.” Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir.
1999) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal
quotations omitted)).
As a general rule, claims not raised on direct appeal are procedurally defaulted and
may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows either (1) “cause” and

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“actual prejudice” or (2) “actual innocence.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504
(2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621–22 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982).
III.
Movant argues that the Court erroneously enhanced his sentence by construing prior
convictions as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA, § 924(e),
was unconstitutional. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The Government argues that Johnson is
not relevant to Movant’s sentence, and the Court agrees. Movant was not convicted of a
violation of § 922(g), and he was not sentenced under any provision of § 924, including its
residual clause. Rather, he was convicted of being present in the United States after removal
for an aggravated felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).
Movant’s predicate aggravated felony was a California conviction of possession for
sale of cocaine.1 (United States v. Mederos-Burgos, No. 1:14-cr-1, PSR ¶ 34, ECF No. 20,
PageID.52.) Movant received a 16-level enhancement for this prior drug-trafficking offense.
(Id. at ¶ 18, PageID.50.) At sentencing, his attorney mistakenly stated that the 16-level
enhancement was for a crime of violence. (Mederos-Burgos, No. 1:14-cr-1, Sent. Tr. 4, ECF
No. 26, PageID.99.) But the Court relied upon Movant’s drug trafficking offense for the
enhancement, not any crimes of violence. (Id. at PageID.105-06.) Further, the aggravated
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Movant was sentenced to 3 years for this offense, which was to be served concurrently with
additional offenses of possession of controlled substance/ firearm, and possession of firearm by a felon.

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felony relied upon by the government and cited in the indictment was § 1101(a)(43)(B),
which applies to illicit trafficking of a controlled substance, including a drug-trafficking
crime. This Court did not enhance Movant’s sentence under the residual clause of the
ACCA, so Johnson is inapposite, and Movant’s claim is without merit.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, Movant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the
sentence imposed upon him by this Court will be denied. Because the Court finds that the
“motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled
to no relief,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), no evidentiary hearing is required.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court must also assess whether to issue a
certificate of appealability. To warrant the grant of a certificate of appealability, Movant
“must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Sixth Circuit has disapproved of the issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of
appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must
“engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is
warranted.” Id. at 467. Because Movant cannot make a substantial showing of the denial of
a federal constitutional right with respect to his claim, a certificate of appealability will be
denied. A judgment and order will enter in accordance with this opinion.

Dated: November 28, 2016

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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