LaFountain v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
15
OPINION vacating the Commissioner's decision and remanding the matter for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); signed by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody (Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody, jal)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROXANNE LAFOUNTAIN,
Plaintiff,
Hon. Ellen S. Carmody
v.
Case No. 1:16-CV-1021
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
OPINION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim
for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties
subsequently agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final
judgment. (ECF No. 11). Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record
and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be
conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
Act. For the reasons articulated herein, the Commissioner’s decision is vacated and this matter
remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and
of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security
case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in
making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that
decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.
1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for
disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v.
Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the
Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 735
F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984).
As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the
existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial
interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This
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standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a
decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would
have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was 50 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.190). She
possesses a ninth-grade education and worked previously as a furniture assembler and panel maker.
(PageID.57, 239). Plaintiff applied for benefits on January 15, 2014, alleging that she had been
disabled since March 15, 2013, due to a back injury, nerve damage, and lower back arthritis.
(PageID.190-92, 238). Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.63-188). On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff appeared
before ALJ Richard Guida with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert.
(PageID.43-61). In a written decision dated May 20, 2015, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was
not disabled. (PageID.78-84). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision,
rendering it the Commissioner’s final decision in the matter. (PageID.28-32). Plaintiff subsequently
initiated this pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
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ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a
nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
her residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders,
and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable
to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC)
is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be “disabled”
regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b));
2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),
416.920(c));
3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and
which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled”
will be made without consideration of vocational factors. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));
4. If an individual is capable of performing her past relevant work, a finding of “not disabled” must be made (20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));
5. If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age,
education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can
be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)).
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127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears
the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc disease, a severe
impairment that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy
the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R.,
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.80-81). With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work subject to the
following limitations: (1) she can frequently balance and crawl; and (2) she can occasionally stoop,
kneel, crouch, and climb ramps and stairs. (PageID.81). Based on the testimony of a vocational
expert, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a panel maker.
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.
I.
The ALJ’s Credibility Assessment is not Supported by Substantial Evidence
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was far more limited than
the ALJ determined in his RFC assessment. (PageID.45-57). Plaintiff also submitted a function
report that likewise indicated that she was far more limited than the ALJ recognized. (PageID.24653). The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff to be “not entirely credible.” (PageID.81). Plaintiff argues
that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s rationale for discounting her testimony and subjective
allegations is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court agrees.
As the Sixth Circuit has long recognized, “pain alone, if the result of a medical
impairment, may be severe enough to constitute disability.” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); see also, Grecol v. Halter, 46 Fed. Appx. 773, 775 (6th Cir., Aug. 29,
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2002) (same). As the relevant Social Security regulations make clear, however, a claimant’s
“statements about [his] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that [he is] disabled.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir. 1997) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)) Hash v. Commissioner of Social Security, 309 Fed.
Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009). Instead, as the Sixth Circuit has established, a claimant’s
assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated pursuant to the following standard:
First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1)
whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively
established medical condition is of such a severity that it can
reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.
Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citations omitted). This standard is often referred to as the Duncan
standard. See Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801 (6th Cir., July
29, 2004).
Accordingly, as the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held, “subjective complaints may
support a finding of disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged symptoms.” Id. (citing Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989)).
However, where the objective medical evidence fails to confirm the severity of a claimant’s
subjective allegations, the ALJ “has the power and discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to
resolve the significant conflicts in the administrative record.” Workman, 105 Fed. Appx. at 801
(citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 531).
In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s credibility assessment “must be
accorded great weight and deference.” Workman, 105 Fed. Appx. at 801 (citing Walters, 127 F.3d
at 531); see also, Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[i]t
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is for the [Commissioner] and his examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses and weigh and evaluate their testimony”). It is not for this Court to reevaluate such
evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must
stand. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective allegations to not be fully credible, a finding that should
not be lightly disregarded. See Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777, 780
(6th Cir. 1987). As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “[w]e have held that an administrative law judge’s
credibility findings are virtually unchallengeable.” Ritchie v. Commissioner of Social Security, 540
Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, the ALJ is not permitted to make credibility determinations based upon
“an intangible or intuitive notion about an individual’s credibility.” Rogers v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). Instead, the ALJ’s rationale for discrediting a
claimant’s testimony “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons
for that weight.” Id. at 248. Accordingly, “blanket assertions that the claimant is not believable will
not pass muster, nor will explanations as to credibility which are not consistent with the entire record
and the weight of the relevant evidence.” Id.
In support of his decision to discount Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated in
conclusory fashion that Plaintiff’s statements “are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in
this decision.” (PageID.81). A review of the ALJ’s decision, however, fails to illuminate “the
reasons” upon which his credibility assessment is based. The ALJ very briefly discussed certain
select portions of the medical record, but failed to articulate if this medical evidence formed the basis
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for his credibility decision or how such evidence supported his credibility assessment. (PageID.8182). The ALJ concluded his analysis with the following circular and unilluminating observation:
At the hearing, the claimant’s testimony and demeanor were
observed, and the residual functional capacity reflects, in
combination with the other evidence, the credibility impression
created by the claimant’s testimony and demeanor.
(PageID.82).
Defendant’s attempts to articulate post hoc justifications for the ALJ’s credibility
determination are not well taken, as the Court is limited to reviewing the ALJ’s rationale and
determining if such is supported by substantial evidence. In this case, however, the Court cannot
perform this task because the Court simply cannot discern the ALJ’s rationale for discounting
Plaintiff’s credibility. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence.
II.
Remand is Appropriate
While the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision fails to comply with the relevant legal
standards, Plaintiff can be awarded benefits only if “all essential factual issues have been resolved”
and “the record adequately establishes [her] entitlement to benefits.” Faucher v. Secretary of Health
and Human Serv’s, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also, Brooks v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 644 (6th Cir., Aug. 6, 2013). This latter requirement is satisfied
“where the proof of disability is overwhelming or where proof of disability is strong and evidence
to the contrary is lacking.” Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also, Brooks, 531 Fed. Appx. at 644.
Evaluation of Plaintiff’s claim requires the resolution of certain factual disputes which this Court
is neither competent nor authorized to undertake in the first instance. Moreover, there does not exist
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compelling evidence that Plaintiff is disabled. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for
further administrative action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is vacated and the
matter remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.
Date: June 13, 2017
/s/ Ellen S. Carmody
ELLEN S. CARMODY
United States Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROXANNE LAFOUNTAIN,
Plaintiff,
Hon. Ellen S. Carmody
v.
Case No. 1:16-cv-1021
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion entered this date:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and
this matter remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Date: June 13, 2017
/s/ Ellen S. Carmody
ELLEN S. CARMODY
United States Magistrate Judge
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