LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bureau et al

Filing 8

OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PETER JOSHUA LaBRECK,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:16-cv-1160

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

MID-MICH CREDIT BUREAU et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil action brought by a state prisoner under the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Peter Joshua LaBreck presently is incarcerated at the St. Clair County Jail.
He sues Mid-Michigan Credit Bureau and its unknown CEO or owner (Unknown Party).
Plaintiff’s allegations are extremely limited. He contends that Mid-Michigan Credit
Bureau, which appears to be a debt collection agency, reported untrue information to consumer credit
reporting agencies, causing that information to appear on Plaintiff’s credit report. Specifically, he
asserts that Defendants Mid-Michigan Credit Bureau and its owner or CEO reported an account with
University Surgeons as delinquent and in collections. Plaintiff contends that the reported debt does
not belong to him and that, as a result of the erroneous report, he was unable to secure any type of
credit, which prevents him from pursuing his profession as a real estate investor. Plaintiff broadly
claims that Defendants’ actions violated the FCRA, though he does not specify the provision under
which he brings his claim.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks $6,504,000.00 in damages.
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
The FCRA regulates the field of consumer reporting and governs the collection and
use of consumer credit information. The purpose of the Act is “to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit,
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). The Act covers three main actors: (1) credit reporting agencies;
(2) users of consumer reports; and (3) furnishers of information to credit reporting agencies.
Ruggiero v. Kavlich, 411 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2005). It appears from the allegations
that Plaintiff considers Defendants to be “furnishers of information” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2(a). While § 1681s-2 does not define “furnisher,” courts have defined the term as “any
entitty which transmits information concerning a particular debt owed by a particular customer to

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consumer reporting agencies.” Carney v. Experion Information Solutions, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 496,
501 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
The FCRA imposes two general duties on furnishers of information to a credit
reporting agency: (1) a duty to provide accurate information, § 1681s-2(a); and (2) a duty to
undertake an investigation upon receipt of notice of dispute from a consumer reporting agency,
§ 1681s-2(b). Plaintiff’s allegations appear to invoke only § 1681s-2(a).
There exists no private cause of action for consumers against furnishers of
information for failure to comply with § 1681s-2(a). See Sanders v. Mountain America Fed. Credit
Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1147 (10th Cir. 2012); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 34 (3d
Cir. 2011); Nelson v. Chase Manhatten Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2002);
Elsady v. Rapid Global Business Solutions, Inc., No. 09–11659, 2010 WL 2740154, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Jul.12, 2010); Ruggiero, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 736; Carney, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 502. Enforcement
of the duty to provide accurate information is expressly limited by the statute to specific federal
agencies and officials. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(d). Therefore, Plaintiff may not sue Defendants for
allegedly furnishing inaccurate information.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state
a claim.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
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good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

November 28, 2016

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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