Bennett #630082 v. Burt et al
OPINION dismissing this action for failure to state a claim; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, rmw)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
DAVID TODD BENNETT, SR.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-1203
Honorable Janet T. Neff
S. L. BURT et al.,
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is
required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff David Todd Bennett, Sr. is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections at the Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF) in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. Plaintiff
sues four defendants in their official and personal capacities: MCF Warden S. L. Burt; MCF
Classifications Director R. Kitchens; MCF Food Service Director R. Eckert; and former MCF Food
Service shift supervisor (unknown) Mosley.
Plaintiff raises only one claim against these
Defendants. He alleges that they violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion
when they removed him from a kitchen work detail because he refused to work on Saturdays, his
sabbath day of rest. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ actions violated his First
Amendment rights as well as compensatory and punitive damages from each Defendant.
Plaintiff’s allegations are concise:
On [Wednesday] 3/30/16 Plaintiff recieved [sic] a callout/itinarary [sic] for
a work detail in the chow hall. Immediatly [sic] upon reporting for work Plaintiff
spoke with Ms. Mosley about the days of work for this detail. Ms. Mosley informed
Plaintiff his scheduled days for work were Saturday-Wednesday. Plaintiff then
stated to Ms. Mosley that he would not be able to work on Saturday as that day is his
religious sabbath day for rest, and it would be a violation of his First Amendment
right to freedom of religion to be forced to work. Ms. Mosley then stated that per
policy Plaintiff would need to get a religious release from the chaplain.
At the end of Plaintiff”s work shift on Wednesday 3/30/16, after returning to
his housing unit, the unit officer instructed Plaintiff to the L.T.A. building and speak
with Defendant R. Kitchens, Plaintiff then was directed to the chow hall to speak
with Food Service Director Eckert, in an attempt to get Plaintiff to reconsider his
position, to no avail, at which time Eckert sent Plaintiff back to classifications to
speak with R. Kitchens again, who informed Plaintiff that there was nothing he could
do other than remove Plaintiff from the callout.
On [Thursday] 3/31/16, after not recieving [sic] a callout for work, Plaintiff
wrote a kite to warden S. Burt explaining the situation and the attempt to violate
Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. As of the filing of this complaint there has not
been any response from warden Burt on this matter.
On [Monday] 4/4/16 after not recieving [sic] any response from warden Burt
Plaintiff filed a Step I grievance.
On [Thursday] 4/07/16 after filing the grievance Plaintiff was reinstated back
to work in the chow hall dinning [sic] room.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7, 8.) Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for
violation of his First Amendment rights.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringed his First Amendment right to freely exercise his
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
The First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend I. The
right to freely exercise one’s religion falls within the fundamental concept of liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Accordingly, state
legislatures and those acting on behalf of a state are “as incompetent as Congress” to interfere with
the right. Id.
While “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights,” inmates clearly retain the First Amendment protection to freely exercise
their religion. See O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). To establish
that this right has been violated, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) the belief or practice he seeks to
protect is religious within his own “scheme of things,” (2) that his belief is sincerely held, and
(3) Defendant’s behavior infringes upon this practice or belief. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220,
1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (same);
Bakr v. Johnson, No. 95-2348,1997 WL 428903, at *2 (6th Cir. July 30, 1997) (noting that
“sincerely held religious beliefs require accommodation by prison officials”).
Sincere religious belief
“A prisoner alleging that the actions of prison officials violate his religious beliefs
must show that ‘the belief or practice asserted is religious in the person’s own scheme of things’ and
is ‘sincerely held.’ ” Flagner, 241 F.3d at 481 (quoting Kent, 821 F.2d at 1224). Purely secular
views or personal preferences will not support a Free Exercise Clause claim. Frazee v. Ill. Emp’t
Sec. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989). “Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause . . . .” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
“A religious belief which is not sincerely held or a belief which is purely secular does not require
the prison to consider accommodation.” Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1526 (10th Cir.1991)
(citing Johnson v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921, 923 (9th Cir.1991)); see also Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d
316, 320 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that prison officials may inquire into the sincerity of an inmate
requesting kosher meals); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that prison
authorities may deny insincere requests for religious meals). In the absence of such an inquiry into
the sincerity of the religious beliefs, prisoners would be free to assert false religious claims that are
actually attempts to gain special privileges or to disrupt prison life. Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293,
296 (8th Cir.1996).
When inquiring into the sincerity of an inmate’s religious beliefs, prison officials
should not attempt to evaluate the truth or validity of the beliefs. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 184–85 (1965).
“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
Accordingly, the inquiry should focus on whether the beliefs are “truly held” and whether they are
“religious in nature.” Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1526 (quoting Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1504
(11th Cir.1987)). But it is beyond dispute that “[d]efendants have the right to ensure that each
prisoner is sincere in his belief . . . .” Perkins v. Booker, No. 2:08-cv-97, 2009 WL 2058780, at *7
(W.D. Mich. May 29, 2009); see also McQuiter v. Burnett, No. 2:07-cv-100, 2008 WL4534110, at
*10 (W.D. Mich. July 30, 2008).
Only if the prisoner makes this threshold showing of a sincerely held religious belief
will the Court consider “whether the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes on the
religious belief . . . .” Kent, 821 F.2d at 1224–25. A practice will not be considered to infringe on
a prisoner’s free exercise unless it “places[s] a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice . . . .” Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); see also Welch v.
Spaulding, 627 F. App’x 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (“To violate the First
Amendment, the diet must impose a substantial burden on the inmate’s exercise of religion.”).
“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the ‘substantial burden’ hurdle is high.” Living Water of
Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2007). “[A]
‘substantial burden’ is a difficult threshold to cross.” Id. at 736. “‘[A] ‘substantial burden’ must
place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.’” Id. at 739 (quoting Midrash Sephardi,
Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.2004)). A particular government action will
not be considered a substantial burden merely because it “may make [the] religious exercise more
expensive or difficult . . . .” Living Water, 258 F. App’x at 739.
A substantial burden stands in contrast to a de minimis burden on the free exercise
of religion. Burdens that are less than substantial or isolated are not of constitutional dimension.
See Brown v. Graham, 470 F. App’x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2012); Norwood v. Strata, 249 F. App’x 269,
272 (3d Cir. 2007); Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1980);
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293 (6th Cir. 2010); Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1999); White v. Glantz, No. 92-5169, 1993 WL 53098 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1993); Greenburg v.
Hill, No. 2:07-CV-1076, 2009 WL 890521, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2009); Al-Amin v. TDOC
Comm’r, No. 3:12-cv-00249, 2012 WL 1231737, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012); Crump v. Best,
No. 09-14323, 2010 WL 940037, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2010).
Substantial burdens on sincere religious belief can be justified by
legitimate penological objectives
Even if the government action imposes a substantial burden, it may still pass
constitutional muster if “the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers some legitimate
penological objective.” Kent, 821 F.2d at 1224–25. While inmates retain First Amendment rights
to the free exercise of religion, prison officials may impinge on these constitutional rights where
their actions are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Flagner, 241 F.3d at
483 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). To determine whether a prison official’s
actions are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the Court must assess the official’s
actions by reference to the following factors:
does there exist a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;
are there alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
whether there are ready alternatives available that fully accommodate the
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Flagner, 241 F.3d at 484 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91).
Failure to satisfy the first factor renders the regulation or action infirm, without
regard to the remaining three factors. Id. (“[A] regulation cannot be sustained where the logical
connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary
or irrational”). If the first factor is satisfied, the remaining three factors are considered and balanced
together; however, they are “not necessarily weighed evenly,” but instead represent “guidelines” by
which the court can assess whether the policy or action at issue is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. Id. (citations omitted). It should further be noted that the Turner standard is
“not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test” requiring prison officials “to set up and then shoot down
every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.”
Instead, the issue is simply whether the policy or action at issue is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. Id.
Plaintiff’s belief regarding Sabbath observance
Supreme Court decisions regarding Sabbath observance demonstrate what Justice
Ginsburg described as the “conflicting pressures” caused by the “Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). The Supreme Court has concluded,
on the one hand, that the Free Exercise Clause precludes the state from penalizing a person who
refused employment that would require her to work on her Sabbath. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136
(1987). But, the Supreme Court has concluded, on the other hand, that the Establishment Clause
precludes the state from providing Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to
work on their Sabbath. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
In an attempt to navigate the “‘room for play in the joints’ between the Clauses,”
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970)), the MDOC has promulgated a policy directive regarding the religious beliefs and practices
of Michigan prisoners. See MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 (effective Jan. 22. 2015). The
directive is premised on the following statement of policy: “Prisoners shall be permitted to exercise
their religious beliefs with the constraints necessary for the safety, security and good order of the
facility.” Id. The policy directive provides:
Each prisoner shall be allowed to identify his/her religious affiliation, but will not be
recognized as belonging to, or allowed to participate in the services or activities of,
more than one religious group at any given time. Prisoners may change their
religious affiliation no more often than twice a year and must provide written notice
of the change to the institutional Chaplain. The Declaration of Religious Preference
form (CSJ-177) shall be used to identify and change religious affiliation. The form
shall not be retained in any of the prisoner's commitment files, unless requested in
writing by the prisoner. Except in SAI, the Warden shall ensure that the prisoner’s
religious affiliation as identified on the Declaration of Religious Preference form is
entered on the Department’s computerized database within five business days after
receipt of the form by the Chaplain.
Id., ¶R. With regard to “holy day” observance, the policy directive states:
Prisoners may be released from work or school assignments to attend group religious
services and approved holy day observances. However, prisoners shall not be
released to attend other religious activities. A prisoner must submit a written request
to the Warden or designee to be released from his/her work or school assignment at
least 15 calendar days prior to the service or holy day observance. Prisoners released
from a work or school assignment to attend group religious services or holy day
observances will not be paid for their absence from the assignment. Prisoners shall
not return to the assignment at the conclusion of the group religious service or holy
day observance unless specifically requested to do so by the work or school
Plaintiff’s religious belief
The scope and nature of Plaintiff’s religious belief, beyond the statement that
“Saturday . . . is his religious sabbath day for rest,” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7), is not apparent
from his complaint. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Mosley, Eckert, or Kitchens, the
MDOC personnel he spoke with about his religious belief on March 30 were responsible for
assessing the sincerity of his religious belief or granting accommodations based on that belief.
Plaintiff fails to indicate whether he had made his religious belief known to the MDOC by
completing the Declaration of Religious Preference form, as required by MDOC policy directive
05.03.150, when he transferred to MCF during the fall of 2015. Plaintiff also fails to indicate
whether he submitted a written request for release from Saturday work to the Warden or designee,2
a prerequisite to obtaining the accommodation under the MDOC policy directive.
This Court has concluded that the policy directive at issue, or its virtually identical predecessor, "is not
unconstitutional on its face." Porter v. Caruso, 479 F. Supp. 2d 687, 700 (W.D. Mich. 2007). The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has considered an earlier and more restrictive policy directive provision
regarding release from work for religious services and holy day observances, and concluded the provision was
constitutional. Totten v. Caldwell, No. 11-12485, 2012 WL 3965045, at *12-13 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2012) report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3964989 (Sep. 11, 2012). The “religious work release” policy directive at issue in
Totten was more restrictive in that it provided that prisoners shall not be released from work or school assignments to
attend services or observances. Id.; see also MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 (effective Sep. 20, 2007).
Based on Defendant Mosley’s response to Plaintiff’s statement that he could not work on Saturdays for
religious reasons, it appears that the “designee” may have been the Chaplain. Whether or not the Chaplain is the
designated recipient of such requests, it appears the request must, at some point, pass through the hands of the Chaplain
because the policy directive places responsibility for recording religious preferences in the Chaplain’s hands.
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Critically, simply requesting a religious accommodation is not enough. See Crump
v. Prelesnik, No. 1:10-cv-353, 2013 WL 1338027, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2013) (“[A] request
to attend group religious services is not sufficient without providing the chaplain with evidence of
religious preference.”); Snyder v. Trudell, No. 08-10047, 2009 WL 37183, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
6, 2009) (“Prison officials are not required to accept a prisoner’s bald assertion of religious faith.”);
Moffat v. Michigan, No. 2:06-cv-300, 2007 WL 2904041, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 2007) (“Until
the prison recognizes that plaintiff’s faith is sincerely Judaism, plaintiff cannot receive a Kosher
meal. The prison has set forth a policy for granting Kosher meal requests. A prisoner is not simply
entitled to a Kosher meal upon request.”); Adams v. Burnett, No. 2:06-cv-72, 2007 WL 329992, at
*5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2007) (“Prisoners are not automatically entitled to specific religious
accommodations just by claiming an entitlement. The prison must maintain some aspect of control
in accommodating prisoners[’] needs.”). Where Plaintiff alleges nothing more than “a bald assertion
of religious faith” and “ just . . . claim[s] an entitlement[,]” it is questionable whether his statement
of a sincere religious belief is sufficient. In this instance, however, the Court need not rely on the
insufficiency of Plaintiff’s statement of his sincere religious belief to dismiss his claims because he
has failed to allege that his belief, sincere or not, was substantially burdened.
The burden on Plaintiff’s belief
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the burden he suffered because he was religiously
precluded from working on Saturdays was, at most, the loss of four days of work. He alleges he was
initially called upon to work Saturday through Wednesday. He worked Wednesday, March 30, and
then, because he was unwilling to work Saturdays, was removed from that work assignment. He
then began a new work assignment the following Thursday, April 7. Apparently, since that time,
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he has been working a schedule that does not conflict with his religious belief. Had he been
permitted to work his intial schedule, with the exception of Saturday, April 2, he would have worked
Sunday, April 3, through Wednesday, April 6: four days.
Such a brief delay is far short of the fifteen-day delay contemplated by MDOC policy
directive 05.03.150, ¶AA. Indeed, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, it appears that once he
complained that he could not work a Saturday-Wednesday assignment for religious reasons, he was
relieved of that assignment and, the next week, he received an assignment that did not run afoul of
his religious beliefs. He was never compelled to work on his Sabbath, as was the plaintiff in Jordan
v. Caruso, No. 2:08-cv-261, 2010 WL 3220143, at *7 (W. D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2010) (holding that
ninety-day period of that included Saturday work, before plaintiff could request a schedule change,
stated a claim that survived summary judgment). And he was never punished for failing to work on
his Sabbath, as was the plaintiff in Snyder, 2009 WL 37183, at *5-9 (court concluded that two major
misconduct citations for failing to work on Saturday, as ordered, might constitute substantial
burden). The burden Plaintiff suffered was even less than the plaintiff suffered in Crump v. Winn,
No. 11-10409, 2012 WL 1033663 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2012) (concluding that change in prayer time,
and almost immediate change back, that resulted in prisoner missing Friday prayer on two occasions
was not a substantial burden) and Crump v. Best, No. 09-14323, 2010 WL 940037, at *3 (E.D.
Mich., Feb. 4, 2010) (“[O]nce Plaintiff reported the problem, Deputy Warden Winn worked, within
days, to remedy the issue . . . [; t]hus, the burden on Plaintiff’s practice of religion was de minimis,
at best.”). At most, application of MDOC policy directive 05.03.150 resulted in a short delay. That
delay, less than a week, made the practice of Plaintiff’s beliefs a little more expensive. That is not
a substantial burden of constitutional concern. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1995)
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(concluding that there was no substantial burden on an individual’s free exercise of religion where
the law merely “operate[d] so as to make the practice of [the individual’s] religious beliefs more
expensive”); see also Living Water, 258 F. App’x at 729.
The justification for the regulation
Even if Plaintiff had adequately stated his sincere religious belief and even if missing
four days of work were a substantial burden, the justification for a brief delay between asserting a
right to rest on the Sabbath and recognition of the sincerity of that right is apparent and compelling.
Some delay is simply inherent in the process of assessing the sincerity of a religious belief and the
propriety of a request for accommodation in light of that sincere religious belief.
The MDOC has adopted the Declaration of Religious Preference form as its principal
tool in assessing the sincerity of a claimed religious belief. Requiring such a declaration is
constitutionally permissible and serves important purposes:
Registration eliminates speculation and guesswork on the part of prison officials and
makes it less likely that a prisoner will manipulate the system by asserting various
religions at different times. Registration also allows prison officials to gauge the
interest in any particular religion on the part of the inmate population and thus decide
whether a “congregation” should be allowed. Registration puts the institution on
notice that certain religious accommodations will likely be sought and thereby
provides the institution with time to consider if and how to implement them. This,
in turn, makes such accommodations more likely and thereby reduces the
circumstances in which judicial intervention will be needed. In short, registration
places, at most, a slight burden on an inmate’s right to religious freedom while
serving as an important and beneficial “bright line” that enables prison officials to
ascertain the seriousness of the inmate's religious commitment and respond
Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1097 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Resnick v. Adams, 348
F.3d 763, 768-71 (9th Cir. 2003) (reviewing Turner factors and holding that requiring a prisoner to
submit an application for a religious meal accommodation cannot be said to abridge First
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Amendment rights). Maintaining that “bright line,” and measuring requests for accommodation
against it, inevitably takes some time. The policy contemplates two weeks. Here, the process took
less than a week. The delay inherent in the policy directive is justified by “[t]he prison[’s need to]
maintain some aspect of control in accommodating prisoners[’]s needs.” Adams, 2007 WL 329992,
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: December 2, 2016
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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