Spurlock v. Fuller et al

Filing 14

OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CLARENCE EDWARD SPURLOCK,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:16-cv-1304

v.

Honorable Paul L. Maloney

RICHARD FULLER et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Unknown Part(y)(ies), Unknown Party #1,
and Unknown Party #2, because the claims against them were improperly joined. The Court will serve the
complaint against Defendants Fuller, Copeland and Hunt.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Clarence Edward Spurlock presently is a convicted prisoner held in the Kalamazoo
County Jail (KCJ). He sues the following KCJ officials: Sheriff Richard Fuller; Accountant (unknown)
Copeland; Doctor Jack Hunt; the unknown head classification staff and committee members (Unknown
Part(y)(ies)); the unknown head Chaplain (Unknown Party #1); and the unknown head supervisory staff
Sergeant (Unknown Party #2).
Plaintiff’s complaint appears to comprise all of his objections to his incarceration between
September 30, 2015 and October 29, 2016. His first set of allegations concern the alleged concerted
actions taken by Defendants Fuller, Copeland and Hunt to deprive him of his commissary funds to pay for
prescription drugs. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hunt has prescribed medications for Plaintiff and
ordered their delivery through KCJ’s Gull Road Pharmacy and that Defendants Fuller and Copeland have,
as a matter of policy, automatically taken payments from Plaintiff’s commissary fund and/or created
institutional debt, despite the fact that Plaintiff has been declared a severely indigent person. Because he
has not authorized the debt or received due process prior to the deprivations, Plaintiff claims that the actions
have deprived him of his property without due process of law. Plaintiff also complains that Defendants’
actions in forcing him to use a particular pharmacy amount to mail fraud and monopolistic behavior.
In his next set of allegations, Plaintiff alleges that, despite his repeated requests for special
handling the unknown supervisory staff sergeant (Unknown Party #2) and his employees have repeatedly
opened his legal mail outside of his presence. He also contends that numerous pages of legal mail from the
courts were not delivered to him.

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Plaintiff next alleges that the head classification staff and committee members (Unknown
Part(y)(ies) have kept him in the same restricted cell without permitting him to improve his security level.
He asserts that Defendant Unknown Part(y)(ies) based their decision to continue him in the same restrictive
cell because of disability discrimination, and he alleges that was not provided out-of-cell activities or
accommodations as a disabled person for the entire year of his incarceration.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that, during his incarceration at KCF, he was subjected to
discrimination on the basis of his Moorish American Moslem religion. He contends that he repeatedly
wrote to the Head Chaplain (Unknown Party #2), requesting that literature and religious services be
provided to him and to other Moorish American prisoners. Plaintiff alleges that Unknown Party #2 violated
his rights under the First Amendment and, arguably, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
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that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not
a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.

Defendants Fuller, Copeland & Hunt

Upon initial review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants
Fuller, Copeland and Hunt are sufficient to state at least one claim. The Court therefore will order service
of the complaint on Defendants Fuller, Copeland and Hunt.

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B.

Misjoinder

Plaintiff complaint contains four independent sets of allegations against different Defendants:
(1) a due process claim against Defendants Fuller, Copeland, and Hunt; (2) a claim concerning interference
with his legal mail against Defendant Unknown Party #2; (3) a disability-discrimination claim against
Defendant Unknown Part(y)(ies); and (4) a religious discrimination claim against Defendant Unknown Party
#1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties in single lawsuit, whereas
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims. Rule 20(a)(2) governs when multiple
defendants may be joined in one action: “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A)
any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Rule 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim
. . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.”
Courts have recognized that, where multiple parties are named, as in this case, the analysis
under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18:
Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more
than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of
claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving multiple defendants
Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18. . . .
Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single
action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out
of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all.

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7 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
CIVIL § 1655 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich.
2009), and Garcia v. Munoz, No. 08-1648, 2007 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2008); see also
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (joinder of defendants is not permitted by Rule 20 unless
both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied).
Therefore, “a civil plaintiff may not name more than one defendant in his original or
amended complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally related to the claim
against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact.” Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at
778. When determining if civil rights claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, a court may
consider a variety of factors, including, “the time period during which the alleged acts occurred; whether
the acts of . . . are related; whether more than one act . . . is alleged; whether the same supervisors were
involved, and whether the defendants were at different geographical locations.” Id. (quoting Nali v.
Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 2007 WL 4465247, *3 (E.D. Mich. December 18, 2007)).
Permitting the improper joinder in a prisoner civil rights action also undermines the purpose
of the PLRA, which was to reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits that were being filed in
the federal courts. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004). Under the PLRA, a prisoner
may not commence an action without prepayment of the filing fee in some form. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1). These “new fee provisions of the PLRA were designed to deter frivolous prisoner litigation
by making all prisoner litigants feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees.” Williams v.
Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1997). The PLRA also contains a “three-strikes” provision
requiring the collection of the entire filing fee after the dismissal for frivolousness, etc., of three actions or
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appeals brought by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, unless the statutory exception is satisfied. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). The “three strikes” provision was also an attempt by Congress to curb frivolous
prisoner litigation. See Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Seventh Circuit has explained that a prisoner like Plaintiff may not join in one complaint
all of the defendants against whom he may have a claim, unless the prisoner satisfies the dual requirements
of Rule 20(a)(2):
Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should
not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against
different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass that [a
multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit produced but also to ensure that prisoners pay the
required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous
suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) . . . .
A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person -- say, a suit
complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay
a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions -- should be rejected if
filed by a prisoner.
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Brown v. Blaine, 185 F. App’x 166,
168-69 (3rd Cir. 2006) (allowing an inmate to assert unrelated claims against new defendants based on
actions taken after the filing of his original complaint would have defeated the purpose of the three strikes
provision of PLRA);Patton v. Jefferson Correctional Center, 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1998);
Shephard v. Edwards, 2001 WL 1681145, * 1 (S.D. Ohio Aug[.] 30, 2001) (declining to consolidate
prisoner’s unrelated various actions so as to allow him to pay one filing fee, because it “would improperly
circumvent the express language and clear intent of the ‘three strikes’ provision”); Scott v. Kelly, 107 F.
Supp. 2d 706, 711 (E.D. Va. 2000) (denying prisoner’s request to add new, unrelated claims to an

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ongoing civil rights action as an improper attempt to circumvent the PLRA’s filing fee requirements and an
attempt to escape the possibility of obtaining a “strike” under the “three strikes” rule). Allowing a plaintiff
to proceed with improperly joined claims and defendants in a single action would permit him to circumvent
the PLRA’s filing fee provisions and allow him to avoid having to incur a “strike[,”] for purposes of by §
1915(g), should any of his claims turn out to be frivolous.
Defendant s Fuller, Copeland and Hunt are sued for their actions taken to deprive Plaintiff
of his commissary funds to pay for prescriptions. Plaintiff makes no allegations against any other Defendant
that are related to the alleged deprivation of his property. Moreover, he makes no allegations against
Defendants Fuller, Copeland and Hunt with respect to any of the other sets of allegations in the complaint.
As a result, no claim against any of the other Defendants is transactionally related to his claim against
Defendants Fuller, Copeland and Hunt.
Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissing an action.” Instead, Rule 21 provides two remedial options: (1) misjoined parties
may be dropped on such terms as are just; or (2) any claims against misjoined parties may be severed and
proceeded with separately. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006); Carney v.
Treadeau, No. 07-cv-83, 2008 WL 485204, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2008); Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2008); see
also Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Parties may be
dropped . . . by order of the court . . . of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just.”). “Because a district court’s decision to remedy misjoinder by dropping and dismissing a party,
rather than severing the relevant claim, may have important and potentially adverse statute-of-limitations
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consequences, the discretion delegated to the trial judge to dismiss under Rule 21 is restricted to what is
‘just.’” DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845.
At least three judicial circuits have interpreted “on such terms as are just” to mean without
“gratuitous harm to the parties.” Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also DirecTV, Inc., 467 F.3d at 845.
Such gratuitous harm exists if the dismissed parties lose the ability to prosecute an otherwise timely claim,
such as where the applicable statute of limitations has lapsed, or the dismissal is with prejudice.
Strandlund, 532 F.3d at 746; DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 846-47; Michaels Building Co., 848 F.2d at 682.
In this case, Plaintiff brings causes of action under 42 U .S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits
filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn,
No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Furthermore, “Michigan law provides for
tolling of the limitations period while an earlier action was pending which was later dismissed without
prejudice.” Kalasho v. City of Eastpointe, 66 F. App’x 610, 611 (6th Cir. 2003).
All of the actions about which Plaintiff complains occurred in 2015 and 2016, well within
the three-year period of limitations. Those claims are not at risk of being time-barred. Plaintiff therefore
will not suffer gratuitous harm if the improperly joined Defendants are dismissed. Accordingly, the Court
will exercise its discretion under Rule 21 and dismiss Defendants Unknown Part(y)(ies), Unknown Party
#1, and Unknown Party #2 without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by Plaintiff against
those Defendants. See Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350 (“In such a case, the court can generally dismiss all

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but the first named plaintiff without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by the dropped
plaintiffs”); Carney, 2008 WL 485204, at *3 (same).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants Unknown Part(y)(ies), Unknown Party #1, and Unknown Party #2 will be
dismissed without prejudice for improper joinder. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants
Fuller, Copeland and Hunt.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: December 13, 2016

/s/ Pual L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge

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