Camatic Proprietary Limited et al v. Irwin Seating Company
Filing
112
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ; signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker (Chief Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CAMATIC PROPRIETARY LIMITED
and CAMATIC SEATING, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 1:17-CV-492
v.
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
IRWIN SEATING COMPANY,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This is a patent infringement case. Camatic Proprietary Limited and Camatic Seating, Inc.
(collectively, “Camatic”) allege that Irwin Seating Company (“Irwin”) is infringing Camatic’s U.S.
Patent No. 7,073,858 (“the ‘858 Patent”). Irwin denies infringement and asserts that the ‘858 Patent
is invalid. Both companies work in the seating field. (ECF No. 39, PageID.1108-1109.) The patent
at issue in this case relates to seating systems used in sports stadiums, among other uses. (Id.)
Camatic submits one term of the ‘858 Patent for construction, and argues that plain and ordinary
meaning is enough for everything else. Irwin submits fourteen terms for construction. (ECF No.
58-1.) The terms Irwin identifies for construction fall within three categories: (1) terms Irwin asserts
invoke means-plus function under 35 U.S.C. § 112; (2) terms Irwin asserts call for construction
beyond the plain and ordinary meaning; and (3) phrases Irwin alleges are indefinite. (Id.) The Court
has heard oral argument on the parties proposed claims constructions. (ECF No. 94.) This Claims
Construction Memorandum contains the Court’s construction of the disputed terms.
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES
When the meaning of a claim’s language is disputed, the court must construe the claim as
a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), aff’d 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). Proper claim construction begins with the
language of the claims themselves. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996). “‘In construing claims, the analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the
language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that the patentee chose to use to particularly
point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention. 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.’” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (internal quotations omitted)). The Court must give claim terms the ordinary and customary
meaning ascribed to them by “a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention, i.e, as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
When interpreting a claim as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, the court first
examines the intrinsic evidence before it, which includes not only the claim language, but also the
written description and the prosecution history of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. Terms that
have a plain and ordinary meaning typically do not need to be construed, as their meaning is clear
from the term itself. See Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir.
2010). A court considers the written description “because it is relevant not only to aid in the claim
construction analysis, but also to determine if the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning
is rebutted.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC, 334 F.3d at 1298. In fact, the specification is usually “the
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single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. The prosecution
history may also be considered to “inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how
the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course
of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1317.
A court may also consider extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert or
inventor testimony, in construing patent claims. See id. Technical dictionaries may help a court
understand “the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention.” Id.
at 1318. Likewise, expert testimony may be useful for explaining the technology at issue and how
the particular invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of
the patent is consistent with that of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or to establish that a
particular claim in the patent or in prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field. See id.
While a court may consider both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, intrinsic evidence is
generally more reliable and thus generally entitled to greater weight when construing a claim term.
See id. at 1320-21. What ultimately controls, however, is the language of the claims themselves:
“[T]he court’s focus [must] remain[] on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art
would understand the claim terms.” Id. at 1323. Thus, “‘[t]he construction that stays true to the
claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in
the end, the correct construction.’” Id. at 1316 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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CLAIM ANALYSIS
1.
MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION
The Patent Act provides that “[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed
as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2017).
This provision strikes “a balance in allowing patentees to express a claim limitation by reciting a
function to be performed rather than by reciting structure for performing that function, while placing
specific constraints on how such a limitation is to be construed, namely, by restricting the scope of
coverage to only the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to
the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d. 1339,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In determining whether a particular limitation is a means-plus-function term,
“the essential inquiry is not merely the presence or absence of the word ‘means’ but whether the
words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite
meaning as the name for structure.” Id. at 1348. The presence or absence of the word “means” still
affects the analysis: when the claim uses the word “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that
§ 112(f) applies. Id. Conversely, when the word “means” does not appear, there is a rebuttable
presumption that § 112(f) does not apply. Id. “When a claim lacks the word ‘means,’ the
presumption can be overcome and § 112[f] will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim
term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient
structure for performing that function.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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Irwin identifies four claim terms as subject to a means-plus-function construction under
35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Camatic contends that section 112(f) does not apply to any of these terms. The
Court addresses the claim terms at issue in turn.
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
“connector”
(claims 13, 20, 22, 33, 36)
Camatic
35 U.S.C. § 112 (f) does not
apply, and no construction is
necessary. This term should
be interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “something that connects.”
Irwin
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) applies.
Function: connecting a
bracket, a beam, and a bolt.
Structure: an object, like
connector 30, that (i) is
shaped to be inserted into a
channel, (ii) includes an
upwardly facing recess to
receive the head of a bolt;
and (iii) includes an aperture
therethrough to receive the
shaft of the bolt.
The Court agrees with Camatic and finds that a means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f) does not apply to the term “connector.” The word “means” does not appear in the claim
recitations, and so there is a rebuttable presumption that section 112(f) does not apply. Williams,
792 F.3d at 1347. Irwin has not rebutted the presumption, because it has not demonstrated that the
claim term “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting
sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). A person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the term as used in the ‘858 patent to connote structure.
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The word in context connotes structure by describing connectors in relationship to other structures;
the word is not simply describing a function disembodied from structure. Claim 13 recites:
a plurality of connectors, each of the connectors being mountable to a respective
one of the brackets;
an elongate beam adapted to be mounted to the connectors in a general horizontal
orientation, the beam including a lower portion defining a channel, the channel being
shaped to slidably receive the connectors from an end of the beam . . . At least one
seat support, each seat support including a clamp portion adapted to be removably
mounted . . . so that the seat base can be mounted . . . free from interference with
connectors . . . .
(ECF No. 55-2, PageID.2768). In pertinent parts, Claim 20 recites “a first track portion configured
to be secured to a series of fixed connectors at any position along a length of the beam . . . ” (Id.);
Claim 22 recites “a channel . . . shaped to cooperatively receive the series of connectors[]” (Id.);
and Claim 33 recites “a first track portion configured to be secured to a series of fixed connectors
at any position along a length of the beam . . . .” (Id., PageID.2769.) Irwin’s proposed application
of section 112(f) would strip “connector” from its context in an effort to make it a purely functional
description, rather than one of several structural components that together form the claimed
invention. The claim term needs no construction beyond its plain and ordinary meaning of
“something that connects.”
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‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
“fastener”
(claims 13, 27, 28)
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) does not
apply, and no construction is
necessary. This term should
be interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “something that fastens.”
Irwin
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) applies.
Function: fastening a clamp
portion of a seat support to
the top and undercut surfaces
of an overhang of a beam.
Structure: an object, like
toggle fastener 72, that (i)
includes a threaded aperture
that receives a bolt, (ii) is
selectively moveable from a
position where it is free of the
beam to a position such that
the fastener fits under a nose
or overhang of the beam, and
(iii) rotates to lock the seat
into position.
The same basic analysis applies to the claim term “fastener” as to the claim term “connector.”
Irwin asserts that section 112(f) applies, but the language of the claim in context reflects otherwise.
The word “means” does not appear in the claims at issue. Irwin fails to rebut the presumption that
section 112(f) does not apply. As with “connector,” the claims recite sufficiently definite structure
and do not recite any function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. See
Williams, 792 F.3d at 1348. Claim 13 recites “the support further including movable fastener
mounted to return such that the fastener grips over the front overhang in contact with the front
undercut surface.” (ECF No. 55-2, PageID.2768.) Claim 27 recites “seating system of claim 20,
further including a fastener that is mounted to the clamp portion such that the fastener can
selectively secure under the overhang opposite the overhang engaged by the return portion.” (Id.)
Claim 28 recites “seating system of claim 27, wherein the overhang to be gripped by the fastener
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has an angular cross-sectional profile.” (Id.) To apply section 112(f) as Irwin suggests would strip
the term from its context. “Fastener” connotes sufficient structure in context to one of ordinary skill
in the art, and section 112(f) does not apply. No construction is needed beyond the plain and
ordinary meaning: “something that fastens.”
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
“seat pivot mechanism”
(claims 19, 31)
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) does not
apply, and no construction is
necessary. These terms
should be interpreted
according to their plain and
ordinary meanings as “a
mechanism that pivots a seat”
and “a mechanism that
rotates a seat,” respectively.
“seat rotation mechanism”
(claim 33)
Irwin
35 U.S.C. 112(f) applies.
Function: pivoting or rotating
a seat.
Structure: no corresponding
structure disclosed.
The Court also finds that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) does not apply to “seat pivot mechanism” and
“seat rotation mechanism,” again based on the plain language of the claims in context. The term
“means” does not appear, creating a rebuttable presumption that section 112(f) does not apply.
Claim 19 recites “wherein each of the supports includes a seat pivot mechanism, the seat portion
being mounted to the respective seat pivot mechanisms.” (ECF No. 55-2, PageID.2768.) Claim
31 recites “wherein each of the supports includes a seat pivot mechanism, the seat portion being
mounted to the respective seat pivot mechanisms.” (Id.) Claim 33 recites “each of the supports
having: (a) a clamp portion with a return portion shaped to cooperatively fit over the top of the beam
and under the rear overhang at any position along the length of the beam; (b) a seat rotation
mechanism; and (c) a support member . . .” (Id., PageID.2769.) In each instance, the claim recites
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sufficiently definite structure and does not recite any function without reciting sufficient structure
for performing that function. See Williams, 792 F.3d at 1348. The specification provides additional
disclosures about the structural components of each mechanism. No construction is needed beyond
the the plain and ordinary meanings of “a mechanism that pivots a seat” and “a mechanism that
rotates a seat.”
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
Irwin
“toggle”
(claim 35)
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) does not
apply. Camatic proposes that
“toggle” be construed to
mean “a piece or device for
holding or securing.” This
term is not indefinite.
Indefinite. Alternatively, 35
U.S.C. 112(f) applies.
Function: to lock the support
at a desired position along the
beam.
Structure: “an object, like
toggle fastener 72, that (i) is
selectively moveable from a
position where it is free of the
beam to a position such that
the fastener fits under a nose
or overhang of the beam, (ii)
includes a threaded aperture,
and (iii) rotates to lock the
seat into position.
The Court rejects Irwin’s argument offered in the alternative1 that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) applies
to “toggle” in claim 35. The word “means” does not appear, and Irwin has not rebutted the
presumption that section 112(f) does not apply. See Williams, 792 F.3d at 1348. “Toggle” is a
sufficiently definite structure and does not recite a function without referring to a sufficiently definite
1
The Court addresses Irwin’s principal argument about “toggle” in the section on
indefiniteness.
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structure. Claim 35 recites the seating system of claim 33, “wherein the beam further includes a
front overhang that extends generally along a front side of the beam, and wherein the clamp portion
includes a toggle that is movable under the front overhang to lock the support at a desired position
along a length of the beam.” (ECF No. 55-2, PageID. 2769.) “Toggle” appears as a structure in
relationship with other structures. Figure 8 illustrates the toggle structure. (ECF No. 55-2). The
prosecution history reflects that the Patent Office has twice cited the Merriam-Webster dictionary
definition of “toggle fastener” as a “piece or device for holding or securing; . . . a crosspiece
attached to the end of or to a loop in something usually to prevent slipping, to serve in twisting or
tightening, or to hold something attached.” (ECF No. 55-3, PageID.45, 51.) The Court construes the
term as Camatic proposes: “a piece or device for holding or securing.”
2.
PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING
“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to
clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the
determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical Corp.
v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Claim construction is required only “when
the meaning or scope of technical terms and words of art is unclear and in dispute and requires
resolution to determine” the issue before the Court. Id.; see also Eli Lilly and Co. v. Aradigm Corp.,
376 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Court of Federal Claims has found that “[i]t follows, a
fortiori, that if a claim element is clear on its face, or at least if the parties’ constructions would serve
to obfuscate or warp its meaning, then the court may decline to construe the element.” Hastings v.
United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 729, 733 (Fed. Cl. 2007). The Federal Circuit instructs that “[i]f the claim
language is clear on its face, then our consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted
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to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified.” Interactive Gift
Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
“When the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of [claims asserted to
be infringed], the court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.” O2 Micro International, Ltd. v.
Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “A determination the
a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate
when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on the terms ‘ordinary’ meaning
does not resolve the partes’ dispute.” Id. at 1361; see also Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring
Networks, 815 F.3d 1314 (2016). In Eon, the appellate court found that the trial court erred by
declining to construe the terms ‘portable’ and ‘mobile’ and instructing the jury to give the terms their
plain and ordinary meaning. Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318-1320. The appellate court emphasized that the
parties disputed the scope of the claim terms and that it was error for the district court to leave the
question of claim scope unanswered and for the jury to decide. Id. at 1319.
Irwin identifies five terms it contends need construction. Camatic argues that the plain and
ordinary meaning suffices in each case. The Court agrees with Camatic. In each case, the plain and
ordinary meaning of the term is sufficient. Moreover, the constructions that Irwin proposes would
in each instance add conditions that are not in the claim language, or impose limits that are not part
of the claim language.
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‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
“channel being shaped to
slidably receive connectors
from an end of the beam”
(claim 13)
Camatic
Camatic does not believe that
any construction is necessary.
This phrase should be
interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning.
Irwin
A channel with a cross
section shaped to slidably
accept and retain connectors
from the end of the beam.
The Court finds the plain and ordinary meaning sufficient. Moreover, Irwin’s proposed
construction “serves to obfuscate or warp its meaning” by adding conditions not present in the plain
and ordinary meaning of the phrase. Hastings v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 729, 733 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
In particular, Irwin adds a retention element that is not part of the claim and needlessly limits its
scope. No construction is needed beyond the plain and ordinary meaning.
‘858 Claim Term
(“Asserted Claims”
Camatic
Irwin
“undercut surface”
(claim 13)
Camatic does not believe that
any construction is necessary.
This term should be
interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “a surface formed by an
absence of material from the
lower part of something.”
A surface resulting from an
“undercut,” defined as “to cut
away material from so as to
leave a portion overhanging.”
The Court finds the plain and ordinary meaning sufficient. Irwin’s proposed construction
“serves to obfuscate or warp its meaning,” again imposing conditions not present in the plain and
ordinary meaning of the term. Hastings v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 729, 733 (Fed. Cl. 2007). In
particular, Irwin tries to limit the term to an “undercut surface” created in one particular process.
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Nothing in the claim language or specification supports this. No construction is needed beyond the
term’s plain and ordinary meaning as “a surface formed by an absence of material from the lower
part of something.”
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
“removably mounted . . . so
that the seat base can be
mounted at any position
along a length of the beam”
(claim 13)
Camatic
Irwin
Camatic does not believe that
any construction is necessary.
These phrases should be
interpreted according to their
respective plain and ordinary
meanings.
The term in claim 13 should
be construed consistently
with “removable . . . to
facilitate repositioning along
the beam after installation”
as:
Mounted such that the seats
may be loosened and moved
along the beam without
disconnecting from the beam.
“removable . . . to facilitate
repositioning along the beam
after installation” (claim 20)
The term in claim 20 should
be construed consistently
with “removably mounted . . .
so that the seat base can be
mounted at any position
along a length of the beam”
as:
Mounted such that the seats
may be loosened and moved
along the beam without
disconnecting from the beam.
The Court finds the plain and ordinary meaning sufficient. Irwin’s proposed construction
“serves to obfuscate or warp [the] meaning” of each of the phrases, again by narrowing the plain and
ordinary meaning of each phrase. Hastings v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 729, 733 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
There is nothing in the claim language to support limiting it to applications “without disconnecting.”
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Such a construction would certainly help Irwin’s non-infringement argument, but Camatic’s claim
is broad enough in its plain and ordinary meaning to cover removable mountings that disconnect
from a beam as well as those that don’t. No construction is needed beyond the plain and ordinary
meanings.
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
Irwin
“are unitarily formed”
(claim 21)
Camatic does not believe that
any construction is necessary.
This phrase should be
interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “formed of a unit.”
Are formed together, as one
piece.
The Court finds the plain and ordinary meaning of the term sufficient. Once again, Irwin
warps the meaning by introducing a more limiting concept than the claim allows. Nothing in the
claim language requires “one piece.” No construction is needed beyond the plain and ordinary
meaning of “formed of a unit.”
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
“selectively secure”
(claim 27)
Camatic does not believe that
any construction is necessary.
This term should be
interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “secure in a selective
manner.”
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Irwin
The fastener is structured so
that it can, but need not,
secure to the overhang.
The Court finds the plain and ordinary meaning of the term sufficient. There is no need to
construe the term. Irwin’s proposed construction “serves to obfuscate or warp its meaning” by
needlessly limiting the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. Hastings v. United States, 78 Fed.
Cl. 729, 733 (Fed. Cl. 2007). The claim language simply requires “selectively secur[ing] under the
overhang”; it says nothing one way or the other about how the securing occurs. The Court declines
to construe the term beyond its plain and ordinary meaning of “secure in a selective manner.”
3.
INDEFINITENESS
Under the Patent Act, a patent specification must “conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which inventor or joint inventor
regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2017). The Supreme Court has held that “a patent
is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and
the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
“The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute
precision is unattainable.” Id.
The principal cases on which Irwin relies to support its position differ markedly from this
case. Unlike the ‘858 patent, none of the patents in those cases pertain to a purely mechanical
apparatus. All involve more intangible inventions and concepts. The patents at issue in O2 Micro
Intern. Ltd. pertain to “inverter controllers,” which “convert low voltage direct current (“DC”) into
higher voltage alternating current (“AC”). O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology
Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1354 (2008). The patents-in-suit describe “a converter circuit that employs
a feedback control loop” to control power delivery. Id. The patents at issue in Every Penny Counts,
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Inc., involved a method for apportioning cash payments. Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. American
Express Co., 563 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (2009). The dispute centered on the meaning of “excess cash,”
an abstract concept. Id. In Eon Corp. IP Holdings, the patents-in-issue all related to “a two-way
interactive communication network system for enabling communications between local subscribers
and a base station.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1316 (2016).
The principles of indefiniteness still apply, of course. But as applied to the invention in this case,
no term is fatally indefinite.
Irwin challenges several claim terms as indefinite. The Court addresses these claims in turn.
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
“projects in a first direction”
(claim 13)
The phrases are not
indefinite. Camatic does not
believe that any construction
“generally opposite direction” is necessary. Each phrase
(claim 13)
should be interpreted in
accordance with its plain and
ordinary meaning.
Irwin
Indefinite.
Neither phrase is indefinite in context. The claim recites a “beam including an elongate
upper portion having a rear overhang with a rear undercut surface that projects in a first direction
and a front overhang having an undercut surface that extends in a generally opposite direction from
the rear overhang.” (ECF No. 55-2, PageID.2768.) The specification teaches the same thing. It
details “a rear overhang with a rear undercut surface that projects in a first direction and a front
overhang with an undercut surface that extends in a generally opposite direction from the rear
overhang.” (Id., PageID.2764.) The phrases are reciprocals of each other; each provides context for
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the other, particularly when coupled with the embedded references to a “rear” and “front” overhang.
With respect to the claimed invention here, the terms are sufficiently definite. The hypotheticals
Irwin provides ignore the overall context of the specification and claim language in which the
challenged terms are embedded.
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
Irwin
“[that is] cooperatively
shaped”
(claim 13)
None of the phrases are
indefinite. Camatic does not
believe that any construction
is necessary. “Cooperatively
shaped” should be
interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “having a shape that
corresponds.”
“Shaped to cooperatively fit”
should be interpreted
according to its plain and
ordinary meaning as “having
a shape that corresponds to
fit.”
“Shaped to cooperatively
receive” should be
interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning
as “having a shape that
corresponds to receive”
The phrases are indefinite.
“cooperatively shaped
[return portion]
(claim 29)
“shaped to cooperatively fit”
(claims 20, 33)
“shaped to cooperatively
receive”
(claim 22)
The phrases are not indefinite in context. Claim 13 recites “the clamp portion including a
return portion that is cooperatively shaped to fit against the upper portion and over the rear
overhang in contact with the undercut surface. . . .” (ECF No. 55-2, PageID.2768). Claim 29 recites
“the seating system of claim 27, wherein the overhang to be gripped by the cooperatively shaped
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return portion has a rounded cross-sectional profile.” (Id.) The phrase reasonably informs those
skilled in the art of what is claimed, again considering the overall context of the specification and
claim language. The phrase is sufficiently definite and needs no construction beyond its plain and
ordinary meaning as “having a shape that corresponds.” Similarly, claim 20 recites “a pair of
overhangs that extend outwardly along opposite elongate sides of the beam and the clamp portion
of the support includes a return portion shaped to cooperatively fit over one of the overhangs.”
(ECF No. 55-2, PageID.2768.) Claim 33 recites “a clamp portion with a return portion shaped to
cooperatively fit over a top of the beam. . . . .” (Id., PageID.2769.) This phrase also reasonably
informs those skilled in the art of what is claimed, considering the overall context of the
specification and claim language. The phrase is sufficiently definite and needs no construction
beyond its plain and ordinary meaning as “having a shape that corresponds to fit.”
The same
analysis applies to “shaped to cooperatively receive.” Claim 22 recites “[t]he seating system of
claim 20, wherein the first track portion forms a channel, the channel shaped to cooperatively
receive the series of connectors.” The phrase reasonably informs those skilled in the art of what is
claimed, considering the overall specification and claim language. The phrase is sufficiently definite
and needs no construction beyond its plain and ordinary meaning as “having a shape that corresponds
to receive.”
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‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
Irwin
“angular cross-sectional
profile”
(claim 28)
Neither term is indefinite.
Camatic does not believe that
any construction is necessary.
The terms should be
interpreted according to their
plain and ordinary meanings
as “a cross section that
includes an angle,” and “a
cross section that includes a
round or curved shape,”
respectively.
Indefinite.
“rounded cross-sectional
profile”
(claim 29)
Neither phrase is indefinite in context. Claim 28 recites the “seating system of claim 27,
wherein the overhang to be gripped by the fastener has an angular cross-sectional profile.” (ECF
No. 55-2, PageID.2768.) This term is easily understood, and even more so in view of Figure 5,
which offers a clear depiction. The same is true of Claim 29, which recites the “seating system of
claim 27, wherein the overhang to be gripped by the cooperatively shaped return portion has a
rounded cross-sectional profile.” (Id.) The phrases are sufficiently definite and require no
construction beyond their plain and ordinary meaning.
‘858 Claim Term
(Asserted Claims)
Camatic
Irwin
“toggle”
(claim 35)
This term is not indefinite.
Indefinite.
“Toggle” is not indefinite in context. Claim 35 recites “a front overhang that extends
generally along a front side of the beam, and wherein the clamp portion includes a toggle that is
movable under the front overhang to lock the support at a desired position along the length of the
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beam.” (Id., PageID.2769.) As already discussed, the claim, specification, and prosecution history
support the construction of “toggle” as “a piece or device for holding or securing.” The overall
context of the specification and claim language make the term sufficiently definite.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the only term from the ‘858 Patent that requires
construction is “toggle,” which the Court construes as detailed above. No construction beyond the
plain and ordinary meaning is needed for any of the other terms Irwin identifies for construction.
Section 112(f) does not apply to any of the terms Irwin identifies for construction, and all of the
terms Irwin challenges as indefinite are sufficiently definite.
Dated:
December 27, 2017
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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