Humboldt B.V. et al v. Lornic Design, Inc.

Filing 42

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OPINION and ORDER; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HUMBOLDT B.V. and MPS NORTH
AMERICA, INC.
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Case No. 1:17-cv-983
HON. JANET T. NEFF

LORNIC DESIGN, INC.,
Defendant/Counter-Claimant.

____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a patent infringement case. Plaintiff Humboldt B.V. (Humboldt) owns U.S. Patent
No. 9,433,225 (“the '225 patent”), which describes and claims a “detachable brush element for
processing carcasses of slaughtered animals” (Ex. A to Compl., ECF No.1-1 at PageID.18).
Plaintiff MPS North America (MPS) is Humboldt’s exclusive licensee in the United States.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant Lornic Design, Inc. (Lornic), alleging that
Defendant is infringing on the '225 patent by selling carcass-processing brushes/whips that are
knock-offs of those sold by MPS. Defendant Lornic filed a counterclaim, asking for a declaratory
judgment that Lornic has not infringed, and is not infringing, the '225 patent. The matter is
presently before the Court for claim construction pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The parties filed a Joint Comprehensive Chart of Claim Constructive
Issues (ECF No. 35) and claim construction briefs (ECF Nos. 37-40). Further, the parties made

presentations and offered arguments to the Court at a hearing on July 25, 2018. 1 The Court now
issues this Opinion and Order to resolve the claim construction issues the parties identified.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has “exclusive jurisdiction—
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court ... in any civil action arising under ... any
Act of Congress relating to patents....” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). “Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s
rulings on substantive patent law are controlling authority on this Court.” Scholle Custom
Packaging, Inc. v. Grayling Indus., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-93, 2010 WL 2232273, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
June 3, 2010) (citing authorities therein).
“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
2004)). Hence, “[a]n infringement analysis entails two steps.” Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The first step,
commonly known as claim construction or interpretation, is “determining the meaning and scope
of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Id. The second step is “comparing the properly
construed claims to the device accused of infringing.” Id. The inquiry required by the first step
“is a matter of law exclusively for the court.” Id. at 970-71. A claim construction order, in turn,
dictates “how the court will instruct the jury regarding a claim’s scope.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v.
Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Federal Circuit summarized the basic principles of claim construction in Vitronics

1

Neither party indicated that expert testimony was required for the Court to resolve any of the
claim construction issues (ECF No. 37 at PageID.406; ECF No. 40 at PageID.1244).
2

Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), as follows:
In determining the proper construction of a claim, the court has numerous sources
that it may properly utilize for guidance. These sources have been detailed in our
previous opinions, as discussed below, and include both intrinsic evidence (e.g., the
patent specification and file history) and extrinsic evidence (e.g., expert testimony).
It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first
to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the
specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Such intrinsic evidence
is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim
language. First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and
nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention. Although words in a
claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, a patentee may
choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their
ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in
the patent specification or file history.
Thus, second, it is always necessary to review the specification to determine
whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their
ordinary meaning. The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines
terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication. As we have
repeatedly stated, “[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they
are a part.” The specification contains a written description of the invention which
must be clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to
make and use it. Thus, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term.
Third, the court may also consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in
evidence. This history contains the complete record of all the proceedings before
the Patent and Trademark Office, including any express representations made by
the applicant regarding the scope of the claims. As such, the record before the
Patent and Trademark Office is often of critical significance in determining the
meaning of the claims. Included within an analysis of the file history may be an
examination of the prior art cited therein. In most situations, an analysis of the
intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In
such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 1582-83 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The task of comprehending the words of a claim is not always a difficult one. Acumed
LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “In some cases, the ordinary meaning
of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay
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judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely
accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“reaffirm[ing] the
“basic principles of claim construction outlined” in several cases, including Vitronics and
Innova/Pure Water). The inquiry therefore typically “begins and ends with the intrinsic evidence.”
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1318). “‘The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with
the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.’” Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The '225 patent in this case describes and claims a detachable brush/whip element for
processing the carcasses of slaughtered animals, as seen below:

FIG. 1B
11

11

FIG.2A
4

(Ex. A to Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.11, 14). “Figure 1B shows a side view of the brush
element” (id. at PageID.18). “Figure 2A shows one exemplary embodiment of an assembly of a
brush …with a rotatable body” (id.). “Such brush elements are driven by a rotating shaft which is
mounted in a brushing device and is used to remove hair from, clean and/or beat carcasses dry”
(id. at PageID.16). There are ten claim terms in dispute, as set forth in the parties’ chart (ECF No.
35). As counsel acknowledged at the Markman hearing, the terms are somewhat intertwined.
1.

“integrated with” (claims 1 & 19)
The first term in dispute is “integrated with,” which appears in claims 1 and 19. Claims 1

and 19 state, in pertinent part: “[a] detachable brush element for processing carcasses of
slaughtered animals, comprising: a) at least one female coupling member; and b) at least one
substantially elongated flexible whip extending from and integrated with [the] at least one female
coupling member” (Ex. A. to Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.18, 20). 2
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the term “integrated with” is “joined with so as not to
be separable from in normal use” (ECF No. 35-1 at PageID.2). Defendant’s proposed construction
is “[t]he whip and the coupling member are formed together” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that the plain meaning of “integrated” includes “joined,” “combined,” and
“united,” concepts that are broader than Defendant’s proposed construction of “formed together”
(ECF No. 37 at PageID.395). Further, Plaintiffs point out that in the prosecution history, the
patentee used “integrated” to distinguish a configuration in which parts are separated during
normal use (id.).
Defendant points out that the phrase “integrated with” never appears in the specification

2

Claim 19 includes the bracketed word “the,” whereas Claim 1 does not.
5

(ECF No. 38 at PageID.723; ECF No. 40 at PageID.1255). Defendant argues that the plain
meaning of “integrated” is instead supportive of its construction of “formed together” (ECF No.
38 at PageID.723). Defendant argues that the prosecution history, which differentiated the prior
art based on the prior art’s bracket and fingers being separate members, also supports its
construction (ECF No. 38 at PageID.723-724; ECF No. 40 at PageID.1256).
In response, Plaintiffs persuasively argue that under Defendant’s proposed construction, if
the two parts are formed separately then “combined,” they would not be “integrated” (ECF No. 39
at PageID.1237). And Plaintiffs assert that their construction is “fully consistent with prosecution
history using that term to distinguish ‘separate members’” (id. at PageID.1237-1238). Plaintiffs
opine that there is no need to use a narrow interpretation of “integrated with” in order to give effect
to the prosecution history (id. at PageID.1238). Last, as Plaintiffs pointed out at the Markman
hearing, Defendant’s construction is impliedly limited to parts that are formed “at the same time.”
For these reasons, the Court is persuaded that the term “integrated with” is properly construed as
“joined with so as not to be separable from in normal use.”
2.

“female receiving space” (claims 1, 13, 19 & 20)
The second term in dispute is “female receiving space,” which appears in claims 1, 13, 19

and 20. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction is “a space within the female coupling member that is
designed to receive a male counter-coupling member during use of the brush element” (ECF No.
35-1 at PageID.2). Defendant’s proposed construction is “[t]he entire space of the female coupling
member into which the male counter coupling member could fit without biasing the female
coupling member” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that nothing in the intrinsic evidence supports or defines the “receiving

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space” to be the “entire space” that could be occupied “without biasing” the coupling member
(ECF No. 37 at PageID.396). Indeed, Plaintiffs assert that the opposite is true: when the coupling
member engages a rod within the receiving space, it can be under bias (id.). Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant’s definition should also be rejected because the construction does not specify the size
of the rod to be used and provides different results depending on the size (id. at PageID.397).
Defendant points out that because the specification does not use the term “female,” the
term “female receiving space” has no direct support in the specification (ECF No. 38 at
PageID.714). Defendant argues that its construction accounts for the following two attributes
described in the specification: (1) the “receiving space” is larger than the rod that it receives “so
that there is ‘play,’ allowing the whip to rotate around the rod”; and (2) the narrowed entrance
channel leading to the receiving space is “temporarily enlarged under bias” and then “springs back
to its starting . . . position” when the whip is snapped onto the rod (ECF No. 38 at PageID.715;
ECF No. 40 at PageID.1247).
In response, Plaintiffs persuasively argue that Defendant’s construction improperly imports
limitations from the specification into the claim language (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1221).
According to Plaintiffs, it is the words of the claims that limit the patented invention, not the
preferred embodiments provided in the specification (id.).
The Court agrees. “It is the claims that define the metes and bounds of the patentee’s
invention.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Courts “do not read limitations from the specification into claims.” Id. at 1366. See also Oatey
Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We normally do not interpret claim terms
in a way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.”). Consequently, the Court is
not convinced of the propriety of Defendant’s addition of a “without biasing” requirement to the

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construction of the term “female receiving space.” Rather, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs’
construction stays true to the claim language. “Female receiving space” is properly construed as
“a space within the female coupling member that is designed to receive a male counter-coupling
member during use of the brush element.”
3.
4.

“narrowed entrance channel” (claims 1, 13 & 19)
“narrowed entrance” (claim 20)
The third and fourth terms in dispute are “narrowed entrance channel” and “narrowed

entrance,” terms that also appear in claims 1, 13, 19 and 20. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction is
“a space that (1) connects the outside of the female coupling member with the female receiving
space and (2) when viewed in a cross-section with the female receiving space, has a smallest
dimension that is narrower than the greatest dimension of female receiving space” (ECF No. 35-1
at PageID.2). Defendant’s proposed construction is “[a] channel narrower than the female
receiving space that starts at the outside of the female coupling member and ends at the female
receiving space” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that their proposed construction is more precise than Defendant’s
construction (ECF No. 37 at PageID.397).

According to Plaintiffs, Defendant’s proposed

construction does not specify which dimension of the entrance must be “narrower” than which
dimension of the receiving space, whereas Plaintiff specifies that the smallest dimension of the
entrance channel must be narrower than the greatest dimension of the receiving space (id.).
Defendant argues that its construction is consistent with the specification because the
construction ensures that the narrowed entrance channel does not extend beyond the female
coupling member by “constraining the other end of the ‘narrowed entrance (channel)’ to that which
‘starts at the outside of the female coupling member’” (ECF No. 38 at PageID.716). “Thus, the
8

end of the entrance channel is where the female receiving space starts—that is, where the counter
coupling member does not bias a portion of the coupling member” (id. at PageID.716-717).
However, in response, Plaintiffs point out that the female receiving space, not just the
entrance channel, can be under bias (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1226). Also, according to Plaintiffs,
the specification does not define a beginning and end of the entrance channel, as Defendant’s
construction does; instead, the specification simply describes the two spaces as being associated
with one another (id.). Plaintiffs persuasively argue that there is no reason to import a “no bias”
requirement to the receiving space (id. at PageID.1226-1227).
Again, the Court is not convinced of the propriety of Defendant’s addition of a “no biasing”
requirement, nor is the Court convinced of the propriety of defining a specific boundary between
the narrowed entrance and the receiving space. The Court is instead persuaded that Plaintiffs’
construction stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description
of the invention.
5.
6.

“the narrowed entrance channel widens into the female receiving space” (claims 1 & 13)
“the narrowed entrance channel widens into the receiving space” (claims 19 & 20)
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the fifth and sixth terms in dispute, which appear in

the same claims at issue, is “the width of the space within the female coupling member increases
while transitioning from the entrance channel to the female receiving space” (ECF No. 35-1 at
PageID.2). Defendant’s proposed construction is “[t]he narrowed entrance channel itself (and not
the female receiving space) increases in width at the end of the narrowed entrance channel that is
closest to the female receiving space” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that their proposed construction specifies that the transition must occur
when moving from the “narrowed entrance channel” into the “receiving space” (ECF No. 37 at
9

PageID.399). Plaintiffs argue that their interpretation is correct because under the plain and
ordinary meaning, regardless of the shape of the entrance channel, it widens when it intersects the
receiving space (id.).
Defendant argues that the widening of the entrance channel must be more than just the
termination of the entrance channel into the receiving space, which is “substantially larger” than
the narrowed entrance channel (ECF No. 38 at PageID.717). Defendant argues that the prosecution
history is likewise clear that it is the structure of the narrowed entrance channel that “widens” into
the female receiving space (id. at PageID.718). Defendant asserts, as it asserted at the Markman
hearing, that the '225 patent discloses “an hourglass shape of the channel itself” (ECF No. 40 at
PageID.1249).
In response, Plaintiffs persuasively argue that Defendant’s construction fails to appreciate
that “widens into” only requires “larger,” not “substantially larger” (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1228).
Plaintiffs also argue that rather than comparing the size of the narrowed entrance channel to the
size of the female receiving space at the location where the entrance channel transitions into the
female receiving space, the “substantially larger” requirement focuses on comparing the size of
the entrance channel to the size of the female receiving space at a different location: “along the
longitudinal axis of the whip” (id.).
The Court is not convinced of the propriety of Defendant’s construction, which relies on
determining “the end of the narrowed entrance channel.” Rather, as Plaintiffs emphasized at the
Markman hearing, there is “no hard and fast line” between the narrowed entrance channel and the
receiving space. Plaintiffs’ construction, which identifies the transition area as widening, most
naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention. “[T]he narrowed entrance channel
widens into the [female] receiving space” is properly construed as “the width of the space within

10

the female coupling member increases while transitioning from the entrance channel to the female
receiving space.”
7.

“the receiving space being substantially larger than the narrowed entrance channel
along the longitudinal axis of the whip” (claims 1, 13, 19 & 20)
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the seventh term appearing in these same claims is “the

dimension of the female receiving space as measured along the longitudinal axis of the whip is
sufficiently larger than the smallest dimension of the narrowed entrance channel that, during use
of the brush element, the male counter-coupling member for which the female receiving space is
designed is able to stay reliably attached to the female coupling member” (ECF No. 35-1 at
PageID.2-3). Defendant’s proposed construction is “[t]he female receiving space has to be
substantially larger than any part of the narrowed entrance channel in a direction parallel to the
length of the whip.” (id. at PageID.2).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s construction, which compares the size of the receiving
space to “any part” of the narrowed entrance channel, finds no support in the '225 patent; rather,
the patent, like Plaintiffs’ construction, compares the “smallest dimension” of the narrowed
entrance to the “greatest dimension of the female receiving space” (ECF No. 37 at PageID.401).
Moreover, Plaintiffs point out that their construction defines the term “substantially larger,”
whereas Defendant’s construction merely repeats the term (id. at PageID.402).
Defendant argues that “the specification’s requirement that the whip rotate around the rod
while the rod stays within the female receiving space necessitates Lornic’s definition” (ECF No.
38 at PageID.722). Further, Defendant opines that Plaintiffs’ proposed construction “literally
encompasses every snap-fit connection ever” and is therefore directly contrary to the prosecution
history (ECF No. 40 at PageID.1253-1254).
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However, as Plaintiffs point out in response, all that is required for the coupling member
to stay on the rod is that there be at least one portion of the narrowed entrance channel that is
narrow enough to keep the coupling member on the rod (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1235). The Court
agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant’s requirement—that the female receiving space has to be
“substantially larger than any part of the narrowed entrance channel”—is not a necessary
requirement for keeping the coupling member on the rod. The term “the receiving space being
substantially larger than the narrowed entrance channel along the longitudinal axis of the whip” is
therefore properly construed as “the dimension of the female receiving space as measured along
the longitudinal axis of the whip is sufficiently larger than the smallest dimension of the narrowed
entrance channel that, during use of the brush element, the male counter-coupling member for
which the female receiving space is designed is able to stay reliably attached to the female coupling
member.”
8.

“along the longitudinal axis of the whip” (claims 1, 13, 19 & 20)
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the eighth term appearing in these same claims is

“along an imaginary line that runs in a direction parallel to the length of, and through the middle
of, the whip” (ECF No. 35-1 at PageID.3). Defendant’s proposed construction is “[i]n a direction
parallel to the length of the whip” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s proposed construction cannot be correct because—once
again—the construction does not specify which of the receiving space’s many dimensions should
be used (ECF No. 37 at PageID.400). Plaintiffs point out that under Defendant’s definition, a jury
could choose a dimension that is smaller than the narrowest dimension of the narrowed entrance
channel, which would cause the claim (which requires that the receiving space as measured “along

12

the longitudinal axis of the whip” to be “substantially larger than the narrowed entrance channel”)
to fail to cover even the preferred embodiment (id. at PageID.400-401).
Defendant argues that its construction is consistent with the plain meaning of the phrase
(ECF No. 38 at PageID.720) and that Plaintiffs misunderstand what is the “middle of the whip”
(ECF No. 40 at PageID.1252).

Defendant argues that the prosecution history supports its

construction because the phrase was first added to “provide directional context for the relative
size recitations” (ECF No. 38 at PageID.720-721).
The Court determines that the term “longitudinal axis” means “an imaginary line that runs
in a direction parallel to the length of, and through the middle of, an object.” As Plaintiffs point
out (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1234), there is case law consistent with this determination. See, e.g.,
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a
“longitudinal axis” is a “center line”).
9.

“the narrowed entrance channel is directed facing away from the profiled side of the
whip” (claims 1, 13 & 19)
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the ninth term appearing in claims 1, 13 and 19 is “the

exterior opening of the narrowed entrance channel is located on one side of the brush element and
the profiled side of the whip is located on the opposite side of the brush element” (ECF No. 35-1
at PageID.3). Defendant’s proposed construction is “[t]he narrowed entrance channel faces in an
opposite direction (in an approximately 180° direction) from the profiled side of the whip” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s construction is unclear because the construction does not
provide a way to know if the profiled side of the whip is facing in an “approximately 180°
direction” (ECF No. 37 at PageID.403). Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s construction is also too
narrow because the narrowed entrance channel does not have to be 180° (or approximately 180°)
13

from the direction that the profiled side faces (id.). Plaintiffs assert that the purpose of this claim—
“reducing the chance of undesired uncoupling” of the brush element from the rod—is met if the
narrowed entrance channel is located anywhere on the side opposite the profiled side (id. at
PageID.403-404).
Defendant argues the plain meaning of the words “away from” is “in an opposite direction”
(ECF No. 38 at PageID.719). Defendant points out that the specification likewise states that the
entrance channel is “oriented” away from the profiled surface (id. at PageID.719-720).
In response, Plaintiffs reiterate that Defendant’s “narrow definition unnecessarily excludes
situations using an orientation other than 180 degrees in which that purpose is met, whereas
Plaintiffs’ definition harmonizes with that purpose” (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1232). The Court
agrees. There is no reason apparent to the Court to impose a 180-degree requirement. “[T]he
narrowed entrance channel is directed facing away from the profiled side of the whip” is properly
construed as “the exterior opening of the narrowed entrance channel is located on one side of the
brush element and the profiled side of the whip is located on the opposite side of the brush
element.”
10.

“the whip and the female coupling member are manufactured as a single material part”
(claims 1 & 19)
The last term in dispute is “the whip and the female coupling member are manufactured as

a single material part,” which appears in only claims 1 and 19. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction
is “the whip and the female coupling member are both made substantially from the same material
and are made so as to be together in one part” (ECF No. 35-1 at PageID.3). Defendant’s proposed
construction is “[t]he entire whip and the coupling member are formed from a single homogeneous
material” (id.).
The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ construction.
14

Plaintiffs argue that the requirement is that the coupling member be manufactured
substantially from “a resilient plastic,” which allows for it to be partially manufactured from
another material (ECF No. 37 at PageID.405). Plaintiffs emphasize that contrary to Defendant’s
construction, there is no requirement for the whip and the coupling member to be “homogeneous”
(id. at PageID.405-406).
Emphasizing that homogeneity is a state of “consistency,” not “purity,” Defendant argues
that its construction is supported by the plain meaning of the term and its contextual usage (ECF
No. 38 at PageID.724; ECF No. 40 at PageID.1257). Defendant argues that the prosecution history
“reinforces the requirement that the claimed invention is directed to a single homogeneous
material, as that is one of the ways in which the claimed invention was distinguished from the prior
art” (id. at PageID.725).
In response, Plaintiffs emphasize, as they did at the hearing, that Defendant offers no
justification for its “homogeneous” limitation, a word that is not found in the claim language,
specification or prosecution history (ECF No. 39 at PageID.1238). And, Plaintiffs point out that
Defendant’s proposed construction fails to account for dependent claim 9, which further requires
that “the female coupling member is manufactured substantially from a resilient plastic” (ECF No.
39 at PageID.1238-1239). The Court agrees that Defendant’s proposed “homogeneous” limitation
is inconsistent with the use of the word “substantially” in dependent claim 9. An independent
claim must not be construed to be narrower than the dependent claims that depend from it. AK
Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v.
Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
In sum, having fully considered the parties’ arguments, both oral and written, the Court
determines that Plaintiffs properly construe each of the ten terms in dispute. Accordingly:

15

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following constructions apply to the claims of U.S.
Patent No. 9,433,225:
1.

“integrated with” (claims 1 & 19): “joined with so as not to be separable from in
normal use”

2.

“female receiving space” (claims 1, 13, 19 & 20): “a space within the female
coupling member that is designed to receive a male counter-coupling member
during use of the brush element”

3-4.

“narrowed entrance channel” (claims 1, 13 & 19) and “narrowed entrance” (claim
20): “a space that (1) connects the outside of the female coupling member with the
female receiving space and (2) when viewed in a cross-section with the female
receiving space, has a smallest dimension that is narrower than the greatest
dimension of the female receiving space”

5-6.

“the narrowed entrance channel widens into the female receiving space” (claims 1
& 13) and “the narrowed entrance channel widens into the receiving space” (claims
19 & 20): “the width of the space within the female coupling member increases
while transitioning from the entrance channel to the female receiving space”

7.

“the receiving space being substantially larger than the narrowed entrance channel
along the longitudinal axis of the whip” (claims 1, 13, 19 & 20): “the dimension of
the female receiving space as measured along the longitudinal axis of the whip is
sufficiently larger than the smallest dimension of the narrowed entrance channel
that, during use of the brush element, the male counter-coupling member for which
the female receiving space is designed is able to stay reliably attached to the female
coupling member”

8.

“along the longitudinal axis of the whip” (claims 1, 13, 19 & 20): “along an
imaginary line that runs in a direction parallel to the length of, and through the
middle of, the whip”

9.

“the narrowed entrance channel is directed facing away from the profiled side of
the whip” (claims 1, 13 & 19): “the exterior opening of the narrowed entrance
channel is located on one side of the brush element and the profiled side of the whip
is located on the opposite side of the brush element”

10.

“the whip and the female coupling member are manufactured as a single material
part” (claims 1 & 19): “the whip and the female coupling member are both made
substantially from the same material and are made so as to be together in one part”

/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge

Dated: August 3, 2018

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