Medwick v. Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine

Filing 33

OPINION re 29 ; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALLAN MEDWICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
HOMER STRYKER M.D. SCHOOL OF
MEDICINE,

Case No. 1:17-cv-1088
HON. JANET T. NEFF

Defendant.
_________________________________/

OPINION
This is an action under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. Before the
Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 29.)
The Court will deny the motion.
I.

Background

The following is a summary of facts gleaned from Plaintiff’s complaint and from a
document attached to Defendant’s motion.1 Plaintiff Allan Medwick began medical school at
Western Michigan University (WMU) in the fall of 2016. Medwick suffers from “Type 2 diabetes
mellitis.” (Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1.) During his first term at WMU, his condition worsened. His

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Although a court generally does not consider documents outside the complaint when assessing a motion to dismiss,
the Court may consider some of the documents attached to Defendant’s motion for the reasons discussed in Section
III.A, below.

blood sugar levels increased and he developed a “non-healing foot wound.” (Id. ¶ 15.) In August
of that year, he told his student advisor that he was having trouble concentrating because of his
diabetes. He also told a “student-mentor physician” that he was having difficulty obtaining “good
medical treatment” for his condition. (Id. ¶ 16.) WMU did not take any action in response to
Medwick’s concerns.
Medwick’s difficulty concentrating affected his academic performance. In October, he
failed the exam in his Cellular Foundations (“CEL”) course. When he retook that exam later that
month, he failed it again. (See id. ¶ 17.) These failures caused WMU to place Medwick on
“warning academic status,” which meant that an additional failing grade in that course could lead
to his dismissal from the school. (See Ex. 3 to WMU’s Mot. to Dismiss, 11/1/2016 Student
Learning Contract, ECF No. 29-3.) WMU’s student handbook provided that
a student who: 1) fails the initial summative examination in more than three courses
within two consecutive terms, or 2) fails the first remediation attempt in more than
two courses within two consecutive terms, or 3) fails in three attempts to pass the
summative examination for a course . . . will be dismissed from the medical school.
(Ex. A to Compl., 11/20/2017 Student Learning Contract, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.17.) Because of
his warning status, Medwick had to sign a “Student Learning Contract” in which he agreed to
retake the CEL exam by April 28, 2017. (11/1/2016 Student Learning Contract, ECF No. 29-3.)
The day after signing the learning contract, Medwick allegedly told “WMU” that “he was
having difficulty concentrating and focusing because of his diabetes.” (Compl. ¶ 18.) The school
did not respond.
The following term, Medwick failed his exams in Foundations of Immunology and
Infectious Diseases (“IMM”) and Hematology and Oncology (“HEM”). (Id. ¶ 17.) He passed the
IMM exam on his first retake, but he did not retake the HEM exam.

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Medwick met with the Medical Student Performance Committee (“MSPC”) on April 7,
2017, to discuss his failing grades. He told the committee that his failures were caused by his
diabetes. The committee allegedly told him that he could take a leave of absence or continue his
studies. If and when he continued, he would still be on warning status. Consequently, another
failing grade would result in his dismissal from the school. After this meeting, Medwick believed
that his only realistic option would be to take a leave of absence.
Medwick allegedly attempted to obtain other accommodations from WMU, to no avail.
(See id. ¶ 25.) For instance, on April 19, 2017, Medwick met with the Associate Dean for Student
Affairs, Dr. Peter Ziemkowski, to discuss his situation. Medwick informed Ziemkowski that his
medical condition had worsened and was affecting his “wellbeing and cognitive function.” (Id.
¶ 26.) Medwick asked Ziemkowski to adjust his academic warning status, but Ziemkowski refused
to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Ziemkowski also told Medwick that the MSPC was finalizing a new
student learning contract detailing the terms for Medwick’s leave of absence. (Id. ¶ 33.)
Medwick received the new contract a few days later. (See 4/20/2017 Student Learning
Contract, ECF No. 1-2.) The contract noted Medwick’s four failed exams and stated that Medwick
“has requested and been granted a leave of absence (LOA) to address issues that [Medwick]
believes currently limit the student’s academic performance.” (Id., PageID.16.) The contract
provided that Medwick would “return to the curriculum” on November 27, 2017. (Id.) Upon his
return, he would audit a course while preparing to retake the CEL exam by December 22, 2017.
If he passed the CEL exam, he could continue with other courses and retake the HEM exam the
following term. The contract indicated that Medwick was still on “warning academic status,” and
it reminded him of the criteria for dismissal for repeatedly failing exams, as set forth in the student

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handbook. (Id.) It also indicated that Medwick could work out of warning academic status by
satisfying the requirements in the contract.
That same day, Medwick met with Dr. David Riddle, the Chair of the MSPC, to discuss
the new contract. Medwick raised the same concerns about his condition that he had raised to Dr.
Ziemkowski. In response, Riddle allegedly told Medwick that “there would be ways of working
things out,” and that if Medwick “did what the MSPC wanted,” the committee would be “more
likely” to recommend “making an exception to the one more strike and you’re out rule[.]” (Id.
¶ 39.)
In May, Medwick apparently inquired about having his warning status rescinded upon his
return to classes in the fall. Dean Ziemkowski responded that school policy does not allow for
such a change except under “extraordinary circumstances.” (Ex. D to Compl., 5/16/2017 Email,
ECF No. 1-5, PageID.27.)
In July, Medwick asked Ziemkowski to reconsider his decision. Specifically, Medwick
asked Ziemkowski to “reset” Plaintiff’s “academic warning level to zero and to provide . . . a
clinically and medically reasonable time requirement for what constitutes acceptable notification
when my blood sugars are either exceptionally high or low.” (Ex. D to Compl., 7/31/2017 Email,
ECF No. 1-5, PageID.26.)
Medwick also complained to Ziemkowski that WMU was discriminating against him
because of his disability. His leave of absence had made his situation “significantly worse,” from
a medical and academic standpoint. (Ex. C to Compl., 7/31/2017 Letter, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.23.)
His student health insurance ended and he was unable to see physicians or refill prescriptions due
to the expense. Also, the school had denied him access to evaluation forms for his courses and he

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could not view his class schedule in the school’s online system. In addition, he could not
participate in the student clinic because the school’s insurance would not cover him.
Ziemkowski apparently denied Medwick’s request to change the warning status. He also
indicated that Medwick would need to meet with the Essential Abilities Committee (“EAC”) to
discuss any needed accommodations.

(Ex. F. to Compl., 8/4/2017 Email, ECF No. 1-7,

PageID.31.)
In August, Medwick contacted Dr. David Overton, the Chair of the EAC, to discuss “what
accommodations could be made” in light of Medwick’s condition. (Compl. ¶ 55.) Medwick met
with Overton on September 27, 2017, but the meeting was unfruitful. Overton “merely referred
[Medwick] back to Dr. Ziemkowski.” (Id. ¶ 59.)
Meanwhile, Medwick received a letter from Dr. Michael Redinger, the Chair of the
Professionalism Sub-Committee of the MSPC. In the letter, Redinger informed Medwick that
there were “several professionalism concerns” regarding Medwick’s “perceived disrespect
towards faculty members.” (Ex. J to Compl., 9/15/2017 Letter, ECF No.1-11.) Redinger indicated
that Medwick would need to complete a “professionalism remediation project” before
reinstatement as a medical student, and Redinger asked to meet with Medwick to discuss the
details. (Id.)
Medwick responded to Redinger by letter, denying that he had ever disrespected faculty
and claiming that the professionalism remediation project was evidence of further discrimination
on account of Medwick’s disability. After receiving Medwick’s response, Redinger agreed to
delay their meeting until after Medwick returned from his leave of absence.
In November, Dr. Riddle sent Medwick an email reminder that WMU expected him to
retake the CEL exam by December 22, 2017. (Ex. M to Compl., 11/15/2017 Email, ECF No. 1-

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14.) Riddle indicated that the school intended to schedule the exam for December 15. Medwick
notes that Riddle did not mention any accommodations in this email. The month after receiving
this email, Medwick filed this lawsuit.
Medwick claims that WMU has discriminated against him on account of his disability by
failing to provide reasonable accommodations, in violation of the ADA and the RA. As relief, he
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an injunction. Medwick asks the Court to
enjoin the “three strike rule” that would apply to him upon his return to classes.
II.

Dismissal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is
not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

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misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court generally does
not consider matters outside the pleadings unless the Court treats the motion as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623,
640 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . ,
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). On the other hand, the Court may consider
“exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and
exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the complaint
and are central to the claims contained therein, without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment.” Id.
III.

Analysis

Medwick claims that WMU discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his
medical condition, in violation of the ADA and the RA. “Those statutes ‘allow[] disabled
individuals to sue certain entities . . . that exclude them from participation in, deny them benefits
of, or discriminate against them in a program because of their disability.’” Mbawe v. Ferris State
Univ., 751 F. App’x 832, 838 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Schs., 836 F.3d 672,
681 (6th Cir. 2016)). “Claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act are generally reviewed under
the same standards that govern ADA claims.” Shaikh v. Lincoln Mem’l Univ., 608 F. App’x 349,
353 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 201 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Accordingly, to make out a prima facie claim of discrimination under the ADA or RA, Medwick
must show the following: “‘(1) [he] has a disability; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified; and (3) [he]

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was being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination
under [WMU’s] program because of [his] disability.’” Gati v. W. Ky. Univ., 762 F. App’x 246,
250 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir. 2015)).
To summarize Medwick’s complaint, he told two school employees, including a student
advisor, about his difficulty concentrating because of his diabetes, but the school did not take any
action to assist or accommodate him. He then failed his CEL exam twice. WMU placed him on
warning status, and he again informed the school about difficulties he faced because of his
condition, but WMU took no action to accommodate him other than to give him another
opportunity to take the CEL exam. The following term, he failed two more exams. WMU allowed
him to take a leave of absence, but warned him that another failure could lead to his dismissal.
Medwick asked school officials to adjust his warning status, but they refused to do so. Shortly
before Medwick was to return to classes in the fall of 2017, WMU informed him that it expected
him to retake his failed exams, but it did not provide any specific accommodations for his
condition. In addition, WMU accused him of unprofessional conduct and required him to complete
a professionalism remediation project.
A.

Exhibits to WMU’s Motion

As part of its motion to dismiss, WMU provides documents that purport to offer some
additional facts. For instance, two documents indicate that, in April 2017, Medwick requested the
following accommodations for his condition, and WMU approved them:
Permission to reschedule an exam if experiencing high or low glucose levels; being
excused for diabetes-related absences; permission for more frequent and/or
extended breaks during clinic.
(Request for Reasonable Accommodation, ECF No. 29-4; 4/11/2017 Email from E. Dafoe to
Medwick, ECF No. 29-5.) The Court will exclude these two documents because they are not

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referenced in the complaint and, thus, are not properly before the Court in a motion to dismiss.
See Gavitt, 835 F.3d at 640; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Moreover, Medwick expressly alleges that
WMU rejected his requests for accommodation. (Compl. ¶ 25.) That allegation conflicts with
WMU’s evidence. The Court declines to resolve this factual dispute by treating the motion to
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.
For similar reasons, the Court excludes a statement signed by Medwick on May 31, 2016,
in which he attested that he is capable of completing the medical school’s curriculum without
accommodation. (See ECF No. 29-1.) This statement is neither referenced in the complaint nor
central to Medwick’s claims.
The Court can, however, consider the Student Learning Contract dated November 1, 2016
(ECF No. 29-3), because it is referenced in the Student Learning Contract dated April 20, 2017,
that is attached to, and therefore part of, the complaint. (See 4/20/2017 Student Learning Contract,
ECF No. 1-2, PageID.16 (“This [Learning Contract] replaces [Learning Contracts] dated
November 1, 2016 and April 4, 2017.”).) In addition, the Court can consider the student handbook
(ECF No. 29-2) because it is referenced in the Student Learning Contracts and is central to
Medwick’s claim that the school refused to grant an exception to its policy to accommodate his
condition.
B.

Exhibits to Medwick’s Response

For similar reasons, the Court will exclude Medwick’s affidavit attached to his response to
the motion to dismiss. That affidavit is not part of the complaint and it is not the sort of evidence
that the Court can consider under Rule 12(b)(6), when determining whether the complaint states a
claim.

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C.

Failure to State a Claim

WMU contends that Medwick’s complaint fails to state a claim for several reasons. First,
WMU contends that Medwick did not request specific accommodations for his condition until
April 2017, by which time he had already failed several exams. WMU argues that Medwick cannot
fault WMU for failing to grant accommodations that he never requested. Second, WMU contends
that when Medwick requested specific accommodations in April 2017, WMU granted them, but
the law did not require WMU to excuse his previous failures because doing so would not be a
reasonable accommodation. According to WMU, granting Medwick an exception to its policy
would fundamentally alter WMU’s academic standards.
1.

Failure to Request a Specific Accommodation

WMU asserts that neither the ADA nor the RA required it to extend accommodations to
Medwick until he requested them. Generally, “[a] publicly funded academic institution is not
obligated to accommodate under the ADA until receiving a proper diagnosis and request for
specific accommodation.” See Johnson v. Washington Cty. Career Ctr., 470 F. App’x 433, 437
(6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has stated this principle several times. See, e.g., Kaltenberger
v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he College was not
obligated to provide accommodation until plaintiff had provided a proper diagnosis of ADHD and
requested specific accommodation.”); Carten v. Kent State Univ., 78 F. App’x 499, 500-01 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Kaltenberger); Shaikh, 608 F. App’x at 353 (same); see also Marble v.
Tennessee, 767 F. App’x 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A] covered entity is generally not liable for
failing to make reasonable accommodation if the plaintiff did not request accommodation or
otherwise alert the covered entity to the need for accommodation.”); Mbawe v. Ferris State Univ.,
751 F. App’x 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2018) (applying rule that “[a]n employee has the burden of
proposing an initial accommodation” to a disabled student seeking an accommodation in the
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“educational context”). But “this rule of thumb may not be absolute.” Marble, 767 F. App’x at
652 n.2. If, for instance, the individual’s needs are “obvious,” that individual’s “failure to
expressly ‘request’ an accommodation . . . is not fatal to an ADA claim [because] the defendant
otherwise had knowledge of an individual’s disability needs, but took no action.” McCoy v. Tex.
Dep’t of Crim. Justice, No. C-05-370, 2006 WL 2331055, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2006)
(collecting cases); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (“It is unlawful for a covered entity not to make
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
applicant or employee with a disability . . . .”) (emphasis added).
WMU faults the complaint for failing to allege that Medwick requested a specific
accommodation through the school’s approved procedures prior to April 2017, before he failed
several exams. However, the Court is aware of no precedent requiring such detailed allegations at
the pleading stage. Two of the cases cited by WMU, Buescher v. Baldwin Wallace Univ., 86 F.
Supp. 3d 789 (N.D. Ohio 2015), and Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir.
1998), provide that it is the “plaintiff’s burden to show he requested an accommodation.” See
Buescher, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 806. However, that burden is an evidentiary one; it is not a pleading
requirement. Indeed, Buescher and Gantt considered motions for summary judgment, not motions
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The issue before this Court is not whether
Medwick has satisfied his burden of production or proof, but whether his allegations in the
complaint, taken as true, suffice to state a plausible claim for relief.
Another case cited by WMU, Carney v. University of Akron, No. 5:15cv2309, 2016 WL
4036726 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2016), is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case never
alleged that she “presented a diagnosis of a recognized disability to any official at [the university].”
Id. at *16. Instead, she alleged that she told university staff that she was “experiencing a difficult

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year” or that she “continued to struggle with medical problems.” Id. Her complaints did not give
the institution notice of a particular condition, let alone notice of a disability and a need for
accommodation.
In contrast, Plaintiff alleges that he notified several faculty/staff members about his
diabetes and its impact on his ability to concentrate in the fall of his first term. He further alleges
that WMU did not respond to his concerns, and he subsequently failed several examinations,
jeopardizing his academic standing. Although it is a close call, the Court finds that these
allegations are minimally adequate to state a plausible claim of discrimination based on a failure
to accommodate. Whether or not Medwick’s specific statements and actions were sufficient to
trigger a duty to accommodate is a question that can and should be resolved at a later stage in these
proceedings. Cf. Bernau v. Architectural Stainless, Inc., No. 17-CV-10766, 2017 WL 2831518,
at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2017) (“Although Plaintiff’s complaint should have specified the
requested accommodations, his failure to do so is not fatal. Defendant’s argument is better suited
at a later stage in the litigation when the legal standard rises above mere plausibility.”).
2.

Unreasonable Accommodation

WMU also contends that Medwick’s request to adjust his warning status is unreasonable
because it would require the school to fundamentally alter its academic policy. This is another
issue that the Court must resolve at a later stage. As the Sixth Circuit has explained,
“Fundamental alteration” is an affirmative defense under the ADA providing that
governmental entities need not accommodate disabled individuals if doing so
“would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or
activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.164.
Affirmative defenses to ADA claims such as this are typically fact-based and not
capable of resolution on the basis of the pleadings alone.
Hindel v. Husted, 875 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 2017).

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WMU compares this case to Kaltenberger, in which a graduate student did not seek any
accommodations for her ADHD until the end of her second semester. 162 F.3d at 434. By that
time, she had already failed two courses, so the school dismissed her. Id. After she challenged
her dismissal, the school reinstated her, required her to retake her failed courses, and gave her
specific accommodations for ADHD, including allowing her to take her exams in a separate room
and having extra time to take them. The school’s dean denied her request to take an abbreviated
summer course in biochemistry, and instead required her to take the full length course. Even with
the accommodations provided, however, the plaintiff failed her biochemistry course a second time.
School policy did not permit her to retake that exam again, so the school dismissed her for a second
time. She then filed suit against the school, claiming that it should have allowed her to take an
abbreviated summer course in biochemistry and to take the biochemistry exam one more time.
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the student’s claim on summary judgment,
noting that “discrimination laws do not require ‘an educational institution to lower or to effect
substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person.’” Id. at 436
(quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979)). An educational institution, like any
other covered entity, “‘need not be required to make fundamental or substantial modifications to
accommodate the handicapped’”; it is only required to make “‘reasonable ones.’” Id. (quoting
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore,
when academic decisions are at issue, “Courts must . . . give deference to professional academic
judgments when evaluating the reasonable accommodation requirement.” Id.
In Kaltenberger, the court gave deference to the dean’s professional judgment that the
plaintiff needed a full length course in biochemistry, rather than a summer remedial course. The
court also deferred to the school’s judgment not to waive its standard policy regarding retaking

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failed exams because such a waiver would “lower the standards for continued training in podiatric
medicine[.]” Id. at 437. Indeed, the plaintiff had already failed the exam twice, including one
time when she had the assistance of specific accommodations.
Kaltenberger is inapposite. Unlike the court in that case, this Court is not reviewing a
motion for summary judgment. Consequently, this Court does not possess, and is not in a position
to consider, evidence of a professional academic judgment by WMU that adjusting Medwick’s
warning status would lower WMU’s academic standards.
Moreover, it is not at all clear from the complaint that WMU denied Medwick’s request
because it determined that altering his status would lower its academic standards. The fact that
Medwick sought an exception to the school’s standard policy does not necessarily mean that
granting his request would lower WMU’s standards. Indeed, the policy itself permits exceptions
in “extraordinary circumstances.” (See Medical Student Handbook, ECF No. 29-2, PageID.387
(“Under extraordinary circumstances, the [MSPC] may recommend an exception to the dean of
the requirement for dismissal for a student who is not making satisfactory academic progress[.]”).)
In addition, the Chair of the MSPC allegedly told Medwick that the MSPC might grant an
exception if Medwick complied with his Student Learning Contract. From these facts, the Court
can infer that granting Medwick an exception to the policy would not necessarily alter WMU’s
academic standards. Accordingly, Medwick can plausibly claim that his request was a reasonable
one.
WMU also contends, relying on Profita v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 709 F.
App’x 917 (10th Cir. 2017), that Medwick is essentially seeking a “second chance,” and that
second chances are not reasonable accommodations under the ADA or RA. In Profita, a medical
school put the plaintiff, a medical student, on academic probation after he failed two clinical

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rotations in his third year. Id. at 918. After he retook one of those rotations, he failed it again, so
the school dismissed him. He later attributed his failures to depression, anxiety and lack of sleep.
After getting treatment for these conditions, he asked the school to readmit him at the point where
his failures began. The school denied his request and told him to reapply for admission. The
district court and the court of appeals held that the school had not discriminated against him
because he never sought any accommodations until after his dismissal, and in denying his request
for reinstatement, the school treated him like all other students who had been dismissed. Applying
a “no second chance rule” that excludes “retroactive leniency” from reasonable accommodations,
the court held that the school was not obligated to give the plaintiff a “greater opportunity for
reinstatement than that given to a terminated person who is not disabled.” Id. at 921-24.
Unlike the plaintiff in Profita, Medwick alleges that he sought accommodations from the
school before he failed his courses, but the school failed to provide them. If that is the case, then
Medwick is not seeking a “second chance” as that term is used in Profita. He is not asking to undo
negative consequences that befell him through no fault of the school. Instead, he asks not to be
penalized for failures that occurred because the school did not accommodate him as it should have.
Although WMU contends that Medwick did not, in fact, seek accommodations before he failed his
exams, the Court must find otherwise at this stage because it must construe Medwick’s complaint
in the light most favorable to Medwick. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588 (6th Cir.
2018). Accordingly, the rule in Profita does not apply to the facts before this Court.
In short, the reasonableness of Medwick’s requests for accommodation is an issue that must
be resolved at summary judgment or at trial. His allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal at
this stage.

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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny WMU’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Opinion.

Dated: February 19, 2020

/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge

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