Daniels #657826 v. Smith
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 ; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
QUINTON JAMAL DANIELS,
Petitioner,
Case No. 1:18-cv-490
v.
HON. JANET T. NEFF
WILLIE O. SMITH,
Respondent.
____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a habeas corpus action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred
to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R), recommending that
this Court deny Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The matter is presently before the Court on
Petitioner’s objections to the Report and Recommendation. In accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3), the Court has performed de novo consideration of those
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections have been made. The Court
denies the objections and issues this Opinion and Order.
Petitioner essentially presents three objections, related to the Magistrate Judge’s alleged
failure to recognize the invalidity of Petitioner’s plea (ECF No. 13 at PageID.256-258).1 First,
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Petitioner characterizes his claim as involving “an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, the analysis
in the Report and Recommendation considers his claim under § 2254(d)(1), appropriately
concluding that “the state courts’ determinations that the plea is valid, and the courts’ rejection of
Petitioner’s claim of innocence, are neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law” (ECF No. 12 at PageID.253). Regardless, Petitioner’s objections are
properly denied.
Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in “using a reference to a record that was
developed during the sentencing phase,” when the heart of the matter pertained to the plea hearing
(id. at PageID.257). Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. While the Magistrate Judge did reference
a quote from the sentencing proceeding, she also globally referenced “[t]he transcripts from
Petitioner’s trial court proceedings” (ECF No. 12 at PageID.247). Trial court proceedings are not
exclusive to the sentence proceeding. However, even if the Magistrate Judge only referred to the
transcripts from the sentence proceeding, Petitioner still failed to “provide any evidentiary support
for his contention that bipolar disorder or his medications rendered him incompetent for the trial
court proceedings” (id.). This objection is denied.
Next, Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to conclude that Petitioner
has a valid ineffective-assistance claim (ECF No. 13 at PageID.257-258). Petitioner opines that
his claim is supported by the Magistrate Judge’s acknowledgment that “‘Petitioner’s counsel
thought that the [sentencing guideline] estimate might be high,’” when in fact it was low (id. at
PageID.257, quoting ECF No. 12 at Page.250). Petitioner argues that this acknowledgement is
proof that he was “uninformed and more than likely fed” inaccurate information by counsel that
confused Petitioner (ECF No. 13 at PageID.258). However, the Magistrate Judge addressed such
concerns, noting that Petitioner had provided the Court no basis to conclude that he would have
not entered the plea if counsel had told him the higher minimum guideline range, and further
stating with regard to counsel’s purported promise of a one-year minimum sentence:
Even if counsel had promised such a sentence, and thereby caused Petitioner any
misperceptions regarding the range of outcomes, the trial court corrected those
misperceptions at the plea hearing. Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir.
1999) (“[T]he state trial court’s proper colloquy can be said to have cured any
misunderstanding Ramos may have had about the consequences of his plea.”)
(ECF No. 12 at PageID.251). Thus, Petitioner failed to show any prejudice as a result of any
alleged ineffectiveness (id.). This objection is therefore denied.
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Last, Petitioner disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s use of her “interpretation of LOGIC
in her reasoning” in concluding: “It defies logic for Petitioner to say he was willing to enter a plea
in exchange for a 84-month minimum when the minimum guidelines range was 81 to 135 months,
but he would not enter a plea in exchange for an 84-month minimum if the minimum guidelines
range was 108 to 225 months” (ECF No. 13 at PageID.258). Petitioner states that “[f]or most
Petitioners this may be a reasonable interpretation to use when making this decision,” but the
Magistrate Judge still fails to consider Petitioner’s claim that he was unstable due to a heavy
prescription of psychotropic medication (id.).
Petitioner, however, disregards the applicable legal standards for his claims and the
showing necessary to establish ineffective assistance. As the Magistrate Judge observed, “[i]n
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), the Supreme Court established a twoprong test by which to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel” (ECF No. 12 at
PageID.249). The second prong requires Petitioner to prove “that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome” (id.).
Petitioner failed to show “how he was prejudiced by the preliminary estimate error” (id. at
PageID.251). The Magistrate Judge’s reasoning on this issue is sound:
If the Cobbs agreement was a good deal based upon the initial estimate of the
guidelines, it became an even better deal when guidelines were finally scored.
Indeed, the Cobbs agreement minimum was so low that the trial court was
compelled to depart downward from the discretionary guideline minimum sentence
range to go forward with the agreement. Petitioner has provided the Court no basis
to conclude that he would have not entered the plea if counsel had told him the
minimum guidelines range was 108 to 225 months.
This objection is denied.
Having determined Petitioner’s objections lack merit, the Court must further determine
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) whether to grant a certificate of appealability as to the issues
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raised. See RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES, Rule 11 (requiring the district court to “issue or
deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order”). The Court must review the issues
individually. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 466-67 (6th
Cir. 2001). Upon review under the applicable standards, the Magistrate Judge recommended that
a certificate of appealability be denied (ECF No. 12 at PageID.253-254). This Court concurs with
that recommendation and concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s assessment
of the validity of Petitioner’s plea debatable or wrong. A certificate of appealability will therefore
be denied.
Accordingly:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objections (ECF No. 13) are DENIED and the
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 12) is APPROVED and
ADOPTED as the Opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Habeas Corpus Petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c) is DENIED as to each issued asserted.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Dated: March 31, 2020
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge
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