Bruneau v. Hillsdale, City of et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSEPH BRUNEAU,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:18-CV-598
CITY OF HILLSDALE, STEVE PRATT,
BRADLEY MARTIN, SHELBY RATHBUN,
DUSTIN ZIMMERMAN, and COREY DOW,
in their individual and official capacities,
HON. GORDON J. QUIST
Defendants.
/
OPINION
Plaintiff, Joseph Bruneau, proceeding pro se, has sued the City of Hillsdale and several
individuals who were police officers with the Hillsdale Police Department. Bruneau alleges that on
September 4, 2014, the individual Defendants repeatedly tasered him while he was being treated at
the Hillsdale Community Health Center. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2–3.) Bruneau alleges that
Defendants tasered him even though he was restrained, with his wrists and ankles strapped securely
to the gurney. Bruneau makes the following claims: (1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
individual Defendants for using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) against
the City for liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018
(1978); and (3) state-law claims against the individual Defendants for gross negligence and assault
and battery.
On June 5, 2018, the magistrate judge issued an order granting Bruneau leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to
dismiss any action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding that "§ 1915(e)(2) applies only to in forma pauperis proceedings"). The Court must
read Bruneau’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.
594, 596 (1972), and accept his allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Detailed factual allegations are
not required, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957)). The court must accept all of
the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). The court must determine
whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)).
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State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims
asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942–43
(1985). For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.
See M.C.L. § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the
claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.
1996); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins to run
when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of is action.
Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.
Bruneau’s complaint is untimely. Bruneau’s § 1983 claims are based solely on conduct that
occurred on September 4, 2014—more than three years prior to the date Bruneau filed his complaint.
Bruneau knew or had reason to know of the harm done to him (use of excessive force) at the time
it occurred. Moreover, it is well established that ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable
tolling. See Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991).
When a plaintiff’s allegations “show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . .” Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 215, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920–21 (2007). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Bruneau’s claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim. Bruneau’s state-law claims will be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 13, 2018
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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