Davis v. Benson et al
Filing
21
AMENDED COMPLAINT Per the Court's September 23, 2020 Order #20 against All Defendants filed by Robert Davis (Paterson, Andrew) Modified text on 10/8/2020 (ns).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 20-cv-00768
Hon. JANET NEFF
v.
JOCELYN BENSON, in her official and individual capacities as the
Detroit City Clerk, and
MARIO MORROW, an individual,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________________________/
ANDREW A. PATERSON (P18690)
Attorney for Plaintiff
2893 E. Eisenhower Pkwy
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
(248) 568-9712
aap43@outlook.com
________________________________________________________________/
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
NOW COMES Plaintiff, ROBERT DAVIS1, by and through his
attorney, ANDREW A. PATERSON, and for his Second Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand (“Second Amended Complaint”)2, states as
follows:
Prior to filing the instant action, Plaintiff Robert Davis advised counsel that he may
want to proceed in propria persona.
1
In accordance with the Court’s September 23, 2020 Order (ECF No. 20), Plaintiff
timely files this second amended complaint.
2
Page 1 of 40
I.
NATURE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
1. Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1367; and, the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et. seq.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337, 1343, and 1367.
3. This Court also has jurisdiction to render and issue a declaratory
judgment pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201, et. seq.
4. Venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper
in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located.”
5. Public officials sued in their official capacity “reside” in the county
where they perform their official duties. See O'Neill v. Battisti,
472 F.2d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 1972).
Page 2 of 40
6. Defendant Jocelyn Benson’s principal office is in Lansing, MI, and
Defendant Jocelyn Benson performs her official duties in Lansing,
MI.
7. Lansing, MI is in the Western District of Michigan. Therefore,
venue is proper within the Western District of Michigan under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).3
8. Events giving rise to the causes of action plead and alleged herein
occurred in the Western District of Michigan.
III.
PARTIES
9. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
10.
Plaintiff, Robert Davis (“Plaintiff Davis” or “Plaintiff”), is
a resident and registered voter of the City of Highland Park,
County of Wayne, State of Michigan. Plaintiff Davis is also a
State of Michigan employee and is a well-known political activist.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located.” The determination of the proper venue for a civil action in federal court is
“generally governed by 28 U.S.C. 1391.” Atlantic Marine Const. Co. v U.S. District.
Court for W.Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 55 (2013). “[T]he court must determine
whether the case falls within one of the three categories set out in 1391(b). If it does,
venue is proper[.]” Id. at 55.
3
Page 3 of 40
11.
Defendant, Jocelyn Benson (“Defendant Secretary of
State”), is the duly elected Secretary of State for the State of
Michigan. Defendant Secretary of State “the chief election officer
of the state” with “supervisory control over local election officials in
the performance of their duties under the provisions of” the
Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq. Mich. Comp. Laws
§168.21.
12.
Defendant, Mario Morrow (“Defendant Morrow”), is a self-
proclaimed media and political consultant that resides in the City
of Detroit.
13.
An actual controversy exists between the Plaintiff and the
named Defendants.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
Plaintiff Davis Was Denied Equal Protection Under The Law
Under The “Class-of-One” Theory By Defendant Secretary of
State When She Denied Plaintiff’s Request To Recuse Herself
From The Campaign Finance Investigation Requested By
Defendant Morrow.
14.
Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
Page 4 of 40
15.
This claim is brought by Plaintiff Davis against Defendant
Secretary of State, in her official and individual capacities,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, et. seq.
16.
For this count/claim, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages
against the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual capacity.
17.
On or about May 10, 2019, Plaintiff Davis received at his
home address via U.S. Mail a large envelope from the Defendant
Secretary of State.
18.
Inside of the large envelope was a letter from the Defendant
Secretary of State dated May 6, 2019 informing Plaintiff Davis
that the “Department of State (Department) received a formal
complaint filed by Mario Morrow against you, alleging that you
violated the Michigan Campaign Finance.”
19.
Attached to the Defendant Secretary of State’s May 6, 2019
letter were copies of Defendant Morrow’s formal complaint dated
May 1, 2019 and exhibits referenced in Defendant Morrow’s
formal complaint.
Page 5 of 40
20.
Defendant Morrow’s May 1, 2019 formal complaint falsely
alleges that Plaintiff Davis failed to file a statement of
organization in violation of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act.
21.
Specifically, Defendant Morrow’s May 1, 2019 formal
complaint falsely alleges that Plaintiff Davis “received over
$50,000 in financial commitments from Detroit area businessmen
to recall Mayor Duggan” and that Plaintiff Davis was
“coordinating with Detroit businessman Robert Carmack” relating
to Plaintiff Davis recall effort of Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan.
22.
In accordance with the Michigan Campaign Finance Act,
Plaintiff Davis, through counsel, responded to Defendant
Morrow’s false and defamatory allegations.
23.
On June 3, 2019, Plaintiff Davis, through counsel, filed a
response with the Defendant Secretary of State refuting
Defendant Morrow’s baseless and meritless claims and
allegations.
24.
On or about June 20, 2019, Defendant Morrow filed a
rebuttal statement to Plaintiff Davis’ response refuting Defendant
Morrow’s baseless and meritless claims and allegations.
Page 6 of 40
25.
In later part of August 2019, Defendant Morrow appeared on
WXYZ Channel 7 news and represented himself as a spokesman
and/or representative for Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan and/or the
secretive nonprofit organization associated with Detroit Mayor
Mike Duggan’s alleged mistress, Dr. Sonia Hasan.
26.
Defendant Morrow during the Channel 7 Action News
telecast was defending the actions of the Detroit Mayor Mike
Duggan and the City of Detroit’s donations make to Dr. Sonia
Hasan’s Make Your Date organization.
27.
On September 4, 2019, Plaintiff Davis, through counsel,
requested the Defendant Secretary of State recuse herself from
deciding Defendant Morrow’s formal complaint because Defendant
Secretary of State’s husband, Ryan Friedrichs, at the time, was a
high-level appointee of Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan and was
closely tied to the controversy surrounding the alleged improper
payments to Detroit Mayor Duggan’s alleged mistress’ nonprofit
organization.
28.
Plaintiff Davis requested the Defendant Secretary of State to
recuse herself because Defendant Morrow, appeared on
Page 7 of 40
Channel 7 Action News and represented that he was the
spokesman for Mayor Mike Duggan's and his alleged
mistress’ secretive nonprofit organization.
29.
This development was problematic considering the
Defendant Secretary of State's husband, Ryan Friedrichs,
at the time, was an appointee of Detroit Mayor Mike
Duggan. In fact, Mr. Friedrichs is a named defendant in
the lawsuit filed by a former city employee who alleged
Mr. Friedrichs was involved in a cover-up to hide funds
funneled to Mayor Mike Duggan's mistress, Dr.
Sonia Hasan, and her nonprofit organization.
30.
Considering Defendant Morrow's frivolous complaint
was concerning the purported recall effort of Detroit
Mayor Mike Duggan, which cited his alleged affair with
Dr. Sonia Hasan, Plaintiff Davis strongly believe the
Defendant Secretary of State could not fairly adjudicate
Defendant Morrow's frivolous complaint against the
Page 8 of 40
Plaintiff and must immediately recuse herself and her
office.
31.
On October 22, 2019, the Defendant Secretary of State,
through counsel, issued a response denying Plaintiff Davis’
request for the Defendant Secretary of State to recuse herself.
32.
Defendant Secretary of State refused to recuse herself
because the Defendant Secretary of State believed Defendant
Morrow’s formal complaint did not directly involve the Defendant
Secretary of State, a member of her immediate family, or a
campaign or committee with which the Defendant Secretary of
State was connected to.
33.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Davis strongly believes the
Defendant Secretary of State’s husband, Mr. Friedrichs, is directly
involved in Defendant Morrow filing the frivolous complaint
against Plaintiff Davis.
34.
Defendant Secretary of State has personal animus and
dislike for Plaintiff Davis.
35.
In 2013, Defendant Secretary of State and Plaintiff Davis
appeared on Fox 2 News’ Let It Rip, to discuss the legal issues
Page 9 of 40
surrounding then candidate, Mike Duggan, who was removed
from the ballot as a candidate for the elective office of Mayor of the
City of Detroit.
36.
Defendant Secretary of State and her husband, were staunch
supporters of Mike Duggan being elected Mayor of the City of
Detroit, as evidenced by the fact Mayor Mike Duggan appointed
Defendant Secretary of State’s husband to a high-level position
after being elected.
37.
Defendant Secretary of State has expressed publicly her
dislike for Plaintiff Davis.
38.
Similarly, Plaintiff Davis has expressed his dislike publicly
for Defendant Secretary of State.
39.
Defendant Secretary of State did not like the fact how
Plaintiff Davis publicly associated her husband to the public
controversy surrounding Mayor Duggan and his alleged mistress,
Dr. Sonia Hasan.
40.
Defendant Secretary of State has personal animus and
dislike for Plaintiff Davis because of his association with Detroi
Businessman Robert Carmack.
Page 10 of 40
41.
Moreover, Defendant Secretary of State has personal animus
and dislike for Plaintiff Davis because Plaintiff Davis filed a
formal request with the Wayne County Circuit Court requesting
the empaneling of a one-man grand juror to investigate whether
Defendant Secretary of State’s husband, committed any felonies or
misdemeanors while assisting the Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan to
cover up the questionable donations the city made to Mayor
Duggan’s alleged mistress’ nonprofit organization.
42.
Since the filing of Defendant Morrow’s frivolous complaint, it
shall be noted that Defendant Secretary of State’s husband, Mr.
Friedrich, was named in search warrants issued by the Michigan
Attorney General for records pertaining to the donations the City
of Detroit made to the Dr. Sonia Hasan’s nonprofit organization,
as well as the email deletion controversy regarding said donations.
43.
Since the filing of Defendant Morrow’s frivolous complaint, it
shall be noted that Defendant Secretary of State’s husband, Mr.
Friedrich, has since resigned his position with the City of Detroit.
Page 11 of 40
44.
Additionally, Defendant Secretary of State does not like the
fact Plaintiff Davis publicly discredited Defendant Secretary of
State’s lack of knowledge of Michigan Election Law.
45.
The animus and dislike Defendant Secretary of State has
expressed towards Plaintiff Davis contributed to and caused
Defendant Secretary of State to deny Plaintiff Davis’ request for
the Defendant Secretary of State from adjudicating Defendant
Morrow’s formal complaint against Plaintiff Davis.
46.
Defendant Secretary of State has honored other requests for
her to recuse herself when members of her immediate family have
been implicated or involved in a matter.
47.
Defendant Secretary of State treated Plaintiff Davis’ request
differently due to the personal animus and dislike Defendant
Secretary of State has for Plaintiff Davis.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Davis requests this Court enters
judgment against Defendant Secretary of State as follows:
a. compensatory damages in whatever amount above
$75,000.00 Plaintiffs are found to be entitled, which
shall be assessed and awarded against the Defendant
Secretary of State in her individual capacity;
Page 12 of 40
b. an award of exemplary and punitive damages against
the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual
capacity;
c. an award of interest, costs and reasonable attorney fees
under 42 USC §1988;
d. a declaration that Plaintiff Davis was denied equal
protection under the law under the “class-of-one” theory
by the Defendant Secretary of State; and
e. an order awarding whatever other equitable relief
appears appropriate at the time of final judgment.
COUNT II
Defendant Secretary of State Has Retaliated Against Plaintiff
Davis For Exercising His First Amendment Rights By Seeking
and Attempting To Have Plaintiff Davis Terminated From His
State Employment.
48.
Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
49.
This claim is brought by Plaintiff Davis against Defendant
Secretary of State, in her official and individual capacities,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, et. seq.
50.
For this count/claim, Plaintiff Davis seeks an award of
damages against the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual
capacity.
Page 13 of 40
51.
Since May 2020, Plaintiff Davis has filed a couple of
meritorious state-court lawsuits against Defendant Secretary of
State for purportedly violating various provisions of Michigan
Election Law.
52.
In May/June 2020, Plaintiff Davis filed an action in the
Michigan Court of Claims against the Defendant Secretary of State
after the Defendant Secretary of State unlawfully mailed
unsolicited absentee voter applications to Plaintiff Davis and other
registered voters in the State of Michigan.
53.
After Plaintiff Davis’ Court of Claims action was filed,
Plaintiff Davis was quoted in various published media articles
criticizing the Defendant Secretary of State for her unlawful actions
of mailing unsolicited absentee voter applications to the Plaintiff
and other registered voters in the State of Michigan.
54.
After Plaintiff Davis’ Court of Claims action was filed,
Defendant Secretary of State engaged in private, confidential
conversations with high-level elected officials and/or state
employees regarding Plaintiff Davis’ Court of Claims lawsuit.
Page 14 of 40
55.
Defendant Secretary of State engaged in private, confidential
conversations to with high-level elected officials and/or state
employees regarding ways to apply pressure to Plaintiff Davis to
drop and/or dismiss Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
56.
After
Plaintiff Davis’ Court of Claims action was filed,
Defendant Secretary of State caused certain high level official(s) to
contact Plaintiff Davis’ boss, who is a well-known state legislator
from the City of Detroit, to inquire why Plaintiff Davis was suing
the Defendant Secretary of State over the mass mailing of
unsolicited absentee voter applications and whether Plaintiff Davis’
boss could have Plaintiff Davis dismiss the Court of Claims action
against Defendant Secretary of State because the Defendant
Secretary of State was concerned that an adverse ruling could ruing
her efforts and reputation.
57.
Plaintiff Davis was contacted by his boss and was informed of
the Defendant Secretary of State’s efforts to have Plaintiff Davis
fired and/or removed from his employment with the State of
Michigan.
Page 15 of 40
58.
Plaintiff Davis’ boss explained to Plaintiff that having officials
from the Defendant Secretary of State’s office and/or other officials
contact her about Plaintiff Davis’ pending lawsuit against the
Defendant Secretary of State was not a “good look” for the office.
59.
The Defendant Secretary of State and her staff knows the
state legislator that Plaintiff Davis is employed by.
60.
The Defendant Secretary of State knows Plaintiff Davis’ boss,
who is very well-known state legislator from the City of Detroit,
very well.
61.
Defendant Secretary of State’s actions of trying to get Plaintiff
terminated from his employment were in retaliation for the
Plaintiff filing the meritorious state-court action in the Michigan
Court of Claims challenging the Defendant Secretary of State’s
unlawful actions of mailing unsolicited absentee voter applications.
62.
Defendant Secretary of State’s actions of trying to get Plaintiff
terminated from his employment were in retaliation for Plaintiff
making critical statements and/or comments in the media about the
Defendant
Secretary
of
State’s
characterized as unlawful and illegal.
Page 16 of 40
actions,
which
Plaintiff
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Davis requests this Court enters
judgment against Defendant Secretary of State as follows:
a. compensatory damages in whatever amount above
$75,000.00 Plaintiffs are found to be entitled, which
shall be assessed against the Defendant Secretary of
State in her individual capacity;
b. an award of exemplary and punitive damages against
the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual
capacity;
c. an award of interest, costs and reasonable attorney fees
under 42 USC §1988;
d. a declaration that Defendant Secretary of State
retaliated against Plaintiff Davis for exercising his First
Amendment rights by seeking to have Plaintiff
terminated and/or removed from his employment; and
e. an order awarding whatever other equitable relief
appears appropriate at the time of final judgment.
COUNT III
Defendant Morrow Conspired With Defendant Secretary of
State, Defendant Secretary of State’s Husband, and Detroit
Mayor Duggan To Retaliate Against Plaintiff Davis For
Exercising His First Amendment Rights By Filing A Frivolous
Complaint With Defendant Secretary of State and Making
Defamatory Statements To Media About Plaintiff.
63.
Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
64.
This claim is brought by Plaintiff Davis against Defendant
Morrow for conspiring with Defendant Secretary of State, Mr.
Ryan Friedrich, and Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan to retaliate
Page 17 of 40
against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, et. seq.
65.
On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff Davis filed with the Wayne
County Election Commission a petition seeking to recall Detroit
Mayor Mike Duggan.
66.
Plaintiff Davis’ recall petition cited the ongoing criminal
investigation into whether Mayor Mike Duggan and the City of
Detroit gave favor to a nonprofit dedicated to preventing
premature births and the mayor's alleged ties to Dr. Sonia Hasan
who heads it.
67.
Plaintiff Davis also prepared and drafted the wording for the
recall petition submitted on the same day by Detroit resident
Brenda Hill.
68.
In May 2019, the Wayne County Election Commission
convened to determine whether the wording contained on the
recall petitions submitted by Plaintiff Davis and Brenda Hill were
of sufficient clarity in accordance with Michigan Election Law.
Page 18 of 40
69.
During the May 2019 meeting of the Wayne County Election
Commission, Plaintiff Davis presented arguments on behalf of
himself and Brenda Hill.
70.
The Wayne County Election Commission approved the
wording for the recall petition submitted by Brenda Hill, but
denied the recall petition submitted by Plaintiff Davis.
71.
Shortly after the May 2019 meeting of the Wayne County
Election Commission, Plaintiff Davis was contacted by Christine
Ferretti, a reporter for the Detroit News, about Defendant
Morrow’s accusations and allegations that Plaintiff Davis violated
Michigan Election Law.
72.
Specifically, in a May 2, 2019 Detroit News article,
Defendant Morrow is quoted as stating the following: “It doesn't
seem above board to me as a political observer and a political
watchdog. I have no problem with people calling for recalls or
filing complaints, but if you are going to hold somebody to a higher
standard, you better make sure that you are holding yourself to a
high standard as well.”4
See https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2019/05/02/recallpetitions-against-duggan-can-move-forward/3651162002/
4
Page 19 of 40
73.
Defendant Morrow then filed the frivolous complaint with
the Defendant Secretary of State falsely alleging Plaintiff violated
Michigan’s Campaign Finance Act and Defendant Morrow’s
complaint further requested the Defendant Secretary of State to
have Plaintiff charged with a misdemeanor.
74.
Defendant Morrow’s complaint filed with the Defendant
Secretary of State constitutes adverse action because Defendant
Morrow seeks to have Plaintiff criminally prosecuted by the
Michigan Attorney General.
75.
Defendant Morrow had knowledge of the recall petitions
Plaintiff Davis filed with the Wayne County Election Commission
as a result of the private conversations Defendant Morrow had
with Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan, Defendant Secretary of State
and Mr. Friedrichs.
76.
Defendant Morrow discussed with Mayor Mike Duggan, and
Mr. Friedrichs ways to discredit Plaintiff Davis’ attempt to have
Mayor Mike Duggan recalled.
77.
Defendant Morrow had secret and private conversations
with Mayor Mike Duggan, Mr. Friedrichs and Defendant
Page 20 of 40
Secretary of State about filing a complaint with the Defendant
Secretary of State alleging false allegations against Plaintiff Davis
for purportedly violating Michigan’s Campaign Finance Act.
78.
Defendant Morrow, Mayor Mike Duggan, Mr. Friedrichs and
Defendant Secretary of State all agreed that Defendant Morrow
would file a complaint with the Defendant Secretary of State
alleging Plaintiff violated various provisions of Michigan’s
Campaign Finance Act and that Defendant Morrow’s complaint
would also request for the Defendant Secretary of State to refer
Plaintiff Davis to the Michigan Attorney General for criminal
prosecution.
79.
Defendant Secretary of State then agreed to commence an
investigation into Defendant Morrow’s allegations against
Plaintiff Davis.
80.
Defendant Morrow and Mike Duggan then agreed that
Defendant Morrow would be retained to make public comments to
the press on behalf of Dr. Sonia Hasan’s nonprofit organizations.
81.
Defendant Morrow and Mike Duggan also secretly agreed
that Defendant Morrow would make public statements about
Page 21 of 40
Plaintiff Davis possibly committing a crime by violating certain
provisions of Michigan Election Law.
82.
All of the conversations Defendant Morrow had with
Defendant Secretary of State, Mayor Mike Duggan, and Mr.
Friedrichs were private and confidential.
83.
Defendant Morrow also had secret and private conversations
with employees from the Defendant Secretary of State’s office
about filing a complaint against Plaintiff Davis.
84.
Defendant Morrow executed the plan secretly developed by
filing the frivolous complaint with the Defendant Secretary of
State and by making false and defamatory remarks to the reporter
from the Detroit News about Plaintiff Davis violating the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act and accusing Plaintiff Davis of
committing a crime.
85.
Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan was acting in his official
capacity as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Detroit when he
had private conversations with Defendant Morrow about Plaintiff
Davis, Dr. Sonia Hassan and the filing of the frivolous complaint
with the Defendant Secretary of State against Plaintiff Davis.
Page 22 of 40
86.
Defendant Secretary of State was acting in her official
capacity as the duly elected Secretary of State when she had
private conversations with Defendant Morrow.
87.
Defendant Secretary of State’s husband, Mr. Friedrichs, was
acting in his official capacity as a high-level appointee of Detroit
Mayor Mike Duggan when he had private conversations with
Defendant Morrow.
88.
Defendant Morrow conspired with state and local officials to
retaliate against Plaintiff Davis for exercising his First
Amendment rights by filing the frivolous complaint with
Defendant Secretary of State and by making false and defamatory
remarks to the reporter from the Detroit News about Plaintiff
Davis violating the Michigan Campaign Finance Act and accusing
Plaintiff Davis of committing a crime.
89.
Defendant Morrow’s filed complaint requesting the
Defendant Secretary of State to refer Plaintiff to the Michigan
Attorney General to be criminally prosecuted, constitutes adverse
action against the Plaintiff.
Page 23 of 40
90.
Because Defendant Morrow is politically connected, and the
Defendant Secretary of State has publicly expressed animus and
ill will towards the Plaintiff, Plaintiff fears of being unjustly
referred by the Defendant Secretary of State to the Michigan
Attorney General for criminal prosecution.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Davis requests this Court enters
judgment against Defendant Morrow as follows:
a. compensatory damages in whatever amount above
$75,000.00 Plaintiffs are found to be entitled;
b. an award of exemplary and punitive damages;
c. an award of interest, costs and reasonable attorney fees
under 42 USC §1988;
d. a declaration that Defendant Morrow conspired with
state and local officials to retaliate against Plaintiff
Davis for exercising his First Amendment rights; and
e. an order awarding whatever other equitable relief
appears appropriate at the time of final judgment.
COUNT IV
Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) And 169.206(1), On Their Face
And As Applied To Plaintiff Davis Are Unconstitutional For
They Violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights.
91.
Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
92.
This claim is brought by Plaintiff Davis against Defendant
Secretary of State, in her official and individual capacities,
Page 24 of 40
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, et. seq.
93.
For this count/claim, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages
against the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual capacity.
94.
In a May 2019 Detroit News’ article, the following was
reported: “Davis contends that he's complied with the rules, since
no donations have been accepted yet, only ‘verbal commitments.’”
95.
Notably, the May 2019 Detroit News’ article did not identify
any specific “businessmen” Plaintiff Davis purportedly received
“verbal commitments” from.
96.
Based upon this Detroit News’ article, Defendant Morrow
filed a frivolous complaint with the Defendant Secretary of State
alleging Plaintiff Davis violated the Michigan Campaign Finance
Act by failing to file a committee because Plaintiff Davis had
received a “contribution” and/or made an “expenditure” in excess of
$50,000.
97.
Defendant Morrow cites the definitions of the terms
“contribution” and “expenditure” set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws
§§169.204(1) and 169.206(1).
Page 25 of 40
98.
The definitions of the terms “contribution” and “expenditure”
set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and 169.206(1) on their
face and as applied to Plaintiff Davis are unconstitutional and
overly broad for they violate Plaintiff Davis’ First Amendment
rights.
99.
Defendant Morrow’s complaint seeks to have Defendant
Secretary of State punish Plaintiff for the exercise of core political
speech to reporters from the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press.
100.
Defendant Secretary of State has initiated an investigation
based upon Plaintiff exercising his right to engage in core political
speech to reporters from the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press.
101.
The application of the terms “contribution” and “expenditure”
set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and 169.206(1) as
applied to Plaintiff Davis are unconstitutional for they punish
Plaintiff Davis for exercising his right to engage in core political
speech.
102.
The application of the terms “contribution” and “expenditure”
set forth in Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and 169.206(1) on their
Page 26 of 40
face are unconstitutional for they punish Plaintiff Davis for
exercising his right to engage in core political speech.
103.
Defendant
Morrow
filed
a
complaint
without
first
determining whether or not the statements made in the articles
printed and published in the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press
were indeed factual or false.
104.
Defendant Secretary of State initiated an investigation
without fist determining whether or not the statements made in
articles printed and published in the Detroit News and Detroit Free
Press were indeed factual or false.
105.
The statements attributed to Plaintiff Davis in the articles
written in the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press as having
received “verbal commitments” from businessmen were false.
106.
Plaintiff Davis did not receive any “verbal commitments” from
any businessmen to support Plaintiff Davis’ and Brenda Hill’s
recall campaign against Detroit Mayor Duggan.
107.
Plaintiff Davis was exercising his constitutional right to
engage in core political speech when Plaintiff made the false
statements/comments to reporters from the Detroit News and
Page 27 of 40
Detroit Free Press about having received “verbal commitments”
from unnamed and/or unidentified businessmen.
108.
Plaintiff Davis, in exercising his constitutional right to engage
in core political speech, deliberately told the reporters from the
Detroit News and Detroit Free Press a falsehood in an effort to
scare, and to get the attention and to get a reaction out of Detroit
Mayor Duggan and his loyal supporters, which include both of the
named Defendants.
109.
False or untruthful speech in the context of core political
speech is protected by the First Amendment.
110.
Plaintiff’s false statements/comments made to reporters from
the Detroit News and Detroit Free Press were made in the context
of Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment right to engage in core
political speech.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Davis requests this Court enters
judgment against Defendant Secretary of State as follows:
a. compensatory damages in whatever amount above
$75,000.00 Plaintiffs are found to be entitled, which
shall be awarded and assessed against the Defendant
Secretary of State in her individual capacity;
Page 28 of 40
b. an award of exemplary and punitive damages against
the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual
capacity;
c. an award of interest, costs and reasonable attorney fees
under 42 USC §1988;
d. a declaration that Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and
169.206(1) as applied to Plaintiff Davis is
unconstitutional for they violate Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights; and
e. a declaration that Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and
169.206(1) on their face are unconstitutional for they
violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights;
f. injunctive relief enjoining the Defendant Secretary of
State from enforcing or applying the provisions of Mich.
Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and 169.206(1).
g. an order awarding whatever other equitable relief
appears appropriate at the time of final judgment.
COUNT V
Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) And 169.206(1) Are
Unconstitutionally Void For Vagueness.
111.
Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
112.
This claim is brought by Plaintiff Davis against Defendant
Secretary of State, in her official and individual capacities,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, et. seq.
113.
For this count/claim, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages
against the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual capacity.
Page 29 of 40
114.
The definitions of the terms “contribution” and “expenditure”
as defined under the Michigan Campaign Finance Act are vague
because its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
115.
The definition of the term “contribution” as it is defined under
Mich.Comp.Laws §169.204(1) is vague because its prohibitions are
not clearly defined.
116.
The definition of the term “expenditure” as it is defined under
Mich.Comp.Laws §169.206(1) is vague because its prohibitions are
not clearly defined.
117.
Specifically, the definition of the term “expenditure” as it is
defined under Mich.Comp.Laws §169.206(1) did not put Plaintiff on
notice that a false statement relative to an individual’s promise to
make a donation was an actual “expenditure” under the Michigan
Campaign Finance Act.
118.
It is unclear under the definition of the term “expenditure”
whether a person’s reliance on a false statement made by a
potential donor truly constitutes an actual “expenditure” under the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act.
Page 30 of 40
119.
This ambiguity and uncertainly in the definition of the term
“expenditure” under Michigan Campaign Finance Act has led to an
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the Michigan
Campaign Finance Act against the Plaintiff by the Defendants.
120.
Mich.Comp.Laws §§169.204 and 169.206 do not provide the
Defendant Secretary of State with clear standards guiding the
discretion of the Defendant Secretary of State in enforcing the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act.
121.
Under the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, the Defendant
Secretary of State is statutorily empowered to enforce the
provisions of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act.
122.
Mich.Comp.Laws §§169.204 and 169.206 and the Michigan
Campaign Finance Act give the Defendant Secretary of State
unbridled discretion to investigate Plaintiff Davis for an unfounded
violation
of
Michigan
Campaign
Finance
Act,
which
is
impermissible.
123.
The vague provisions of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act,
which defines the terms “contribution” and “expenditure” have
caused Plaintiff severe harm because Plaintiff has been punished
Page 31 of 40
for exercising his First Amendment right to engage in core political
speech by making false statements/comments to the media about a
political campaign to recall the Mayor of the City of Detroit.
124.
Plaintiff, after
reading the
definitions
of the terms
“contribution” and “expenditure” as those terms are defined under
Mich.Comp.Laws §§169.204 and 169.206, was not of the belief that
Plaintiff would be in violation the Michigan Campaign Finance Act
by exercising his First Amendment right to engage in core political
speech by making false statements/comments to the media about a
political campaign to recall the Mayor of the City of Detroit.
125.
Mich.Comp.Laws §§169.204 and 169.206 mislead Plaintiff
into thinking and believing Plaintiff’s conduct was not proscribed
and/or prohibited by the Michigan Campaign Finance Act.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Davis requests this Court enters
judgment against Defendant Secretary of State as follows:
a. compensatory damages in whatever amount above
$75,000.00 Plaintiffs are found to be entitled, which
shall be awarded and assessed against the Defendant
Secretary of State in her individual capacity;
b. an award of exemplary and punitive damages against
the Defendant Secretary of State in her individual
capacity;
Page 32 of 40
c. an award of interest, costs and reasonable attorney fees
under 42 USC §1988;
d. a declaration that Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and
169.206(1) are unconstitutionally void for vagueness;
e. injunctive relief enjoining the Defendant Secretary of
State from enforcing or applying the provisions of Mich.
Comp. Laws §§169.204(1) and 169.206(1); and
f. an order awarding whatever other equitable relief
appears appropriate at the time of final judgment.
COUNT VI
State-Law Claim- Defendant Morrow Defamed Plaintiff Davis’
Character In September 2019 At Teresa’s Place and In
June/July 2020 Private Conversations With Wayne County
Prosecutor Kym Worthy and High-Level Appointees.
126.
Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates, the foregoing
allegations, as though fully set forth and stated herein.
127.
This state-law claim is brought by Plaintiff Davis against
Defendant Morrow for defamation under Michigan law.
128.
This state-law claim is brought in accordance with Michigan’s
defamation statute, being Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2911.
129.
“The elements of a cause of action for defamation are (1) a
false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an
unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at
least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm
Page 33 of 40
(defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication (defamation per quod).” Burden v Elias Bros. Big Boy
Restaurants, 240 Mich.App. 723, 727-728; 643 NW2d 378, 381
(2000).
130.
“At common law, words charging the commission of a crime
are defamatory per se, and hence, injury to the reputation of the
person defamed is presumed to the extent that the failure to prove
damages is not a ground for dismissal.” Burden v Elias Bros. Big
Boy Restaurants, 240 Mich.App., 723, 727-728; 643 NW2d 378, 381
(2000) (citations omitted).
131.
In the May 2019 Detroit News’ article, Defendant Morrow
falsely accused Plaintiff of committing a crime.
132.
Specifically, in a May 2, 2019 Detroit News article, Defendant
Morrow is quoted as stating the following: “It doesn't seem above
board to me as a political observer and a political watchdog. I have
no problem with people calling for recalls or filing complaints, but
if you are going to hold somebody to a higher standard, you better
make sure that you are holding yourself to a high standard as well.”
Page 34 of 40
133.
Defendant Morrow’s false and defamatory comments to the
Detroit News’ reporter were malicious and intentional.
134.
Plaintiff requested Defendant Morrow to retract his false and
defamatory statements, but Defendant Morrow refused to do so.
135.
Plaintiff has been severely harmed and damaged by
Defendant Morrow’s false and defamatory statements.
136.
Defendant Morrow’s false and defamatory statements caused
Plaintiff to be questioned by his employer and almost caused
Plaintiff to be reprimanded by his employer.
137.
Then in September 2019, while Plaintiff and Defendant
Morrow were both in attendance at the popular neighborhood bar,
Teresa’s Place, on 6 mile and Schaefer in the City of Detroit,
Defendant Morrow again defamed Plaintiff Davis’ character by
accusing Plaintiff of committing a crime while in the presence of
other popular, well-established, and politically-connected patrons.
138.
Specifically,
in
September
2019,
while
Plaintiff
and
Defendant Morrow were both at Teresa’s Place, Defendant Morrow
expressed to some influential people in attendance that Plaintiff
Davis committed a crime by violating Michigan’s Campaign
Page 35 of 40
Finance Act by failing to establish a committee for Plaintiff’s recall
campaign against Detroit Mayor Duggan, and that Plaintiff Davis
would be prosecuted by the Michigan Attorney General for his
alleged criminal conduct.
139.
Defendant Morrow further expressed to some of the
influential and politically-connected people that were in attendance
at Teresa’s Place in September 2019 that Plaintiff Davis was a
“crook”, “phony”, “a fraud”, and “could not be trusted”.
140.
These comments and/or statements made by Defendant
Morrow while Plaintiff and Defendant Morrow were at Teresa’s
Place in September 2019 were false and defamatory.
141.
At the time Defendant Morrow made these statements to
individuals while the Plaintiff and Defendant Morrow were both at
Teresa’s Place in September 2019, Defendant Morrow knew that
his statements were false and they were made with malice.
142.
Upon hearing Defendant Morrow’s disparaging comments,
Plaintiff asked security at Teresa’s Place to politely ask Defendant
Morrow to leave from the area where Plaintiff was standing and
socializing with other individuals.
Page 36 of 40
143.
Defendant Morrow have stated publicly and privately that he
dislikes and despise Plaintiff Davis.
144.
The individuals who heard Defendant Morrow’s defamatory
remarks about Plaintiff Davis questioned Plaintiff Davis about
Defendant Morrow’s statements and urged Plaintiff Davis to seek
a public apology from Defendant Morrow if they were indeed false.
145.
Teresa’s Place in Detroit is a well-known establishment that
many of the City of Detroit’s “movers and shakers” and “politicallyconnected” professionals socialize, have a drink, and fellowship.
146.
After this September 2019 public incident at Teresa’s Place,
some of the influential and politically-connected individuals
Defendant Morrow made the defamatory remarks to, began to
disassociate themselves with Plaintiff Davis out of fear Plaintiff
Davis would soon be prosecuted by the Michigan Attorney General.
147.
In fact, since the filing of this lawsuit, Defendant Morrow has
repeated these same defamatory remarks to Wayne County
Prosecutor Kym Worthy, whom he serves as a political consultant
for.
Page 37 of 40
148.
In September 2020, Plaintiff Davis learned that Defendant
Morrow defamed Plaintiff Davis’ character again.
149.
This time, Plaintiff Davis has learned that sometime in
June/July 2020, Defendant Morrow verbally expressed to Wayne
County Prosecutor Kym Worthy and to some high-level appointees
in her office that Plaintiff Davis violated the Michigan Campaign
Finance Act by failing to create a committee for Plaintiff’s recall
campaign against Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan and that Plaintiff
Davis should be prosecuted.
150.
Defendant Morrow’s public statements about Plaintiff Davis
are false and defamatory.
151.
Defendant Morrow’s false and defamatory statements made
about Plaintiff Davis have caused Plaintiff Davis harm to his good
name and reputation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Davis requests this Court enters
judgment against Defendant Morrow as follows:
a. compensatory damages in whatever amount above
$75,000.00 Plaintiffs are found to be entitled;
b. an award of exemplary and punitive damages;
c. a declaration that Defendant Morrow defamed Plaintiff
Davis’ character under Michigan law, Mich. Comp.
Page 38 of 40
Laws § 600.2911 while at Teresa’s Place in September
2019;
d. a declaration that Defendant Morrow defamed Plaintiff
Davis’ character under Michigan law, Mich.Comp.Laws
§600.2911 in June/July 2020 when Defendant Morrow
spoke privately with Wayne County Prosecutor Kym
Worthy and/or other high-level appointees in the Wayne
County Prosecutor’s Office about Plaintiff Davis.
e. an order awarding whatever other equitable relief
appears appropriate at the time of final judgment.
Dated: October 7, 2020
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ ANDREW A. PATERSON
ANDREW A. PATERSON (P18690)
Attorney for Plaintiff
2893 E. Eisenhower Pkwy
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
(248) 568-9712
aap43@outlook.com
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully demands a jury trial on all
issues triable to a jury.
Dated: October 7, 2020
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ ANDREW A. PATERSON
ANDREW A. PATERSON (P18690)
Attorney for Plaintiff
2893 E. Eisenhower Pkwy
Ann Arbor, MI 48108
(248) 568-9712
aap43@outlook.com
Page 39 of 40
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, ANDREW A. PATERSON, certify that the foregoing document(s)
was filed and served via the Court's electronic case filing and noticing
system (ECF) this 7th day of October, 2020, which will automatically
send notification of such filing to all attorneys and parties of record
registered electronically.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ ANDREW A. PATERSON
ANDREW A. PATERSON (P18690)
Attorney for Plaintiff
Page 40 of 40
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