Williams #394751 v. Ionia Correctional Facility

Filing 6

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ray Kent (fhw)

Case 1:21-cv-01049-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.31 Filed 01/07/22 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______

GREGORY WILLIAMS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:21-cv-1049
Honorable Ray Kent

IONIA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Defendant.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
state law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States
magistrate judge. (ECF No. 4.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state
a claim.

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Discussion
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues ICF.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ICF is responsible for the conduct and decisions of
various medical staff who stopped administering a blood thinner to Plaintiff for approximately 23
days. Plaintiff contends that as a result, he suffered swelling in his left leg and on the left side of
his body as well as other medical issues.
Plaintiff seeks $210,000 in “declaratory” relief and damages.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
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to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
ICF is a facility operated by the MDOC. Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action
against the MDOC or its facilities. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their
departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the
state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity
by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994).
Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in
federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the
Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under
the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013);

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Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x
646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against ICF, a subdivision of the
MDOC, is properly dismissed on the grounds of immunity.
In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC and ICF) is not a
“person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535
U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison,
722 F.3d at 771. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against ICF also is properly dismissed for failure to
state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss Plaintiff’s federal-law claims against Defendant ICF.
State-law claims
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental
jurisdiction over a state-law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where
a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental
jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining
state-law claims. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not reach
state law claims.”) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)); see
also Southard v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC, 7 F.4th 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Moon v. Harrison
Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that once a federal court no longer
has federal claims to resolve, it “should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims));
Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining
whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of
judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests
against needlessly deciding state law issues.”
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Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182; see also

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Moon, 465 F.3d at 728 (“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests
of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over
needlessly deciding state law issues.”) (internal quotations omitted). Dismissal, however, remains
“purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims will be dismissed
without prejudice.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide
whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same
reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes
that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good
faith.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

January 7, 2022

/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge

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