Margosian #799744 v. Martinson et al

Filing 6

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ray Kent (fhw)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______

CHRISTIAN MARGOSIAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:21-cv-1061
Honorable Ray Kent

UNKNOWN MARTINSON et al.,
Defendant.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff previously sought and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff
consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate
judge. (ECF No. 5.)
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if
the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendants Nurse Rosalinda, Dr. Russell Morris, Unknown Doctor, the Unknown Parties from

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Munson Healthcare Hospital, Grievance Coordinator T. Bassett, Sergeant Lively, Assistant
Deputy Warden Clouse, and Warden Les Parish. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants Correctional Officer Martinson, Correctional Officer Sheppard, Dr. Robert Crompton,
Registered Nurse Jack D. Bellinger, and the Unknown Parties from the Oaks Correctional Facility,
however, remain in the case.
Discussion
I.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections

(MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains occurred at that facility, as well as the Munson Healthcare
Hospital in Manistee, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following ECF personnel: Warden Les Parish;
Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Clouse; Grievance Coordinator T. Bassett; Doctor Robert
Crompton; Nurse Jack D. Bellinger; Sergeant Unknown Lively; Correctional Officers Unknown
Martinson and Unknown Sheppard; and Unknown Parties #3. Additionally, Plaintiff sues the
following personnel from Munson Healthcare Hospital in Manistee, Michigan: Doctors Russell
Morris and Unknown Party #2; Nurse Rosalinda Unknown Party #1; and Unknown Parties #4.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 11, 2019, he was playing in a 3-on-3 basketball game
during recreation when he “collapsed to the ground for a right knee dislocation.” (ECF No. 1.,
PageID.3.) Plaintiff began screaming for help and saw that his lower extremity was “visibly
[crooked].” (Id.) After fifteen minutes had passed, Defendant Bellinger brought a wheelchair,
and Plaintiff told Defendant Bellinger that he needed to go to the hospital. (Id.) Defendant
Bellinger ordered Plaintiff to get in the wheelchair; Plaintiff responded that he was unable. (Id.)
Plaintiff told Defendant Bellinger to “back off” because he was not helping, and he was able to get
into the wheelchair with help from inmate Ferman Riverra Averrado. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff
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avers that he was forced to hold his leg in place to prevent his foot from falling off the footrest and
causing more pain. (Id.)
Defendant Bellinger wheeled Plaintiff to the health care room within Plaintiff’s
housing unit. (Id.) Plaintiff twice told Defendant Bellinger that he needed emergency care;
Defendant Bellinger ignored his requests. (Id.) Defendant Bellinger refused to provide Plaintiff
something for pain and “tossed Plaintiff an ace bandage.” (Id.) Plaintiff tried to wrap his knee,
but “the compression of the bandage exacerbated the pain level greatly[, so he] immediately took
the bandage off and put it to his side.” (Id.) Defendant Bellinger also refused Plaintiff’s request
for assistance in securing his foot by tying the ace bandage around the footrest. (Id., PageID.4–5.)
Defendant Bellinger left the room, leaving Plaintiff with Officer Weller. (Id.,
PageID.5.) Plaintiff’s foot then slid off the wheelchair footrest and “slapped against the floor,”
causing Plaintiff to scream loudly. (Id.) Plaintiff was “forced to raise his foot off the floor by
lifting from the leg.” (Id.) Defendant Bellinger returned and did not answer Plaintiff’s questions
regarding where Defendant Crompton was and why he was not being taken to the Control Center
for transport to a hospital. (Id.) Ultimately, forty minutes after the initial injury had occurred,
Officer Bartarue arrived and took Plaintiff to the Control Center. (Id., PageID.5–6.) Plaintiff
asked Officer Bartarue to secure his foot to the footrest using the ace bandage, and she did. (Id.,
PageID.6.)
Forty-five minutes later, Plaintiff was wheeled to the main entrance, where he
encountered Defendant Martinson. (Id.) A non-wheelchair accessible transport van pulled up for
transport. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that Defendants Martinson, Sheppard, and other unknown parties
responsible knew that Plaintiff “could not just simply rise up from the wheelchair, and walk and
jump into a regular state transport van.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Defendant Martinson for a

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wheelchair-accessible van, and one pulled up twenty minutes later. (Id., PageID.6–7.) Defendants
Martinson and Sheppard then spent twenty-five minutes unsuccessfully trying to get the
wheelchair lift to lower.

(Id., PageID.7.)

Ultimately, the lift was manually lowered, and

Defendants Martinson and Sheppard transported Plaintiff to the Munson Healthcare Hospital in
Manistee. (Id.)
After Plaintiff was removed from the transport van, Defendant Martinson pulled
out his cellphone and told Plaintiff, “We’re not going anywhere until I get this on Snapchat.” (Id.,
PageID.8.) He directed Plaintiff to lift his shorts. (Id.) Plaintiff felt “helpless and vulnerable” and
ultimately complied. (Id.) Defendant Martinson took a picture of Plaintiff’s knee, then told
Plaintiff he was “typing in the message, ‘a knee shouldn’t look like that,’ to go with the picture
when he posted it to social media.” (Id.)
Plaintiff was then wheeled into the emergency room, and Defendant Sheppard had
to call Oaks Correctional Facility to have unknown personnel forward Plaintiff’s medical file to
the hospital because no one had called the hospital to inform them that a prisoner was being
transported there. (Id.) Plaintiff told unnamed individuals at the front desk that he had not been
provided anything for his pain and requested that he be provided pain medication and antiinflammatories. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, was only wheeled into a room close to the front desk.
(Id.)
Twenty minutes later, Defendant Rosalinda entered, and Plaintiff asked her for pain
medication. (Id.) She refused, stating “We don’t give prisoners pain medication for something
like this.” (Id.) She “flashed a grin then left the room.” (Id.) Defendant Morris came in, and
Plaintiff asked for “some form of pain medication or at a minimum anti-inflammatories.” (Id.)
Defendant Morris, however, refused. (Id.) He told Plaintiff, “You’re a prisoner, I just can’t give

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you whatever you want,” and left the room. (Id., PageID.10.) Defendant Martinson then pulled
out his phone and “announced that the Snapchat he previously sent out was ‘blowing up’” and told
Plaintiff that “he was sending out a message to those who inquired, that the injury was not his own,
but rather was a prisoner’s injury he was on transport for.” (Id.)
Defendant Rosalinda returned and told Plaintiff that he needed to get on the hospital
bed; Plaintiff responded that he “could not move because his knee was dislocated and he was in
full body shackles.” (Id.) Defendant Rosalinda told Plaintiff that if he did not get on the bed, he
would not receive care. (Id.) Defendant Morris heard that statement and seconded it, and both
then left the room. (Id.) Plaintiff untied the ace bandage and tried to get out of the wheelchair;
Defendants Martinson and Sheppard refused his requests for help. (Id.) Plaintiff “somehow
managed to raise himself out of the wheelchair to stand on his left uninjured foot.” (Id.,
PageID.11.) Plaintiff’s dislocated knee began “sliding/shifting in and out,” causing “tortuous
pain.” (Id.) Ultimately, Plaintiff was “able to position himself with half his bottom on the hospital
bed and half of it off,” and Defendant Rosalinda eventually held his injured leg to stabilize it. (Id.)
Defendant Morris returned, and Defendant Sheppard removed the shackle from
Plaintiff’s right leg. (Id., PageID.12.) Defendant Morris began “to pull, straighten, shift, yank,
and push on Plaintiff’s leg and knee,” causing Plaintiff to scream in pain. (Id.) He screamed for
Defendant Morris to stop and again asked for pain medication, which Defendants Morris and
Rosalinda refused. (Id.) Defendants Morris and Rosalinda left and two unknown individuals
entered to prep Plaintiff for X-rays. (Id.) After the X-rays, Defendants Morris, Rosalinda, and
Unknown Doctor came in. (Id., PageID.13.) Defendant Unknown Doctor refused Plaintiff’s
request for pain medication. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that by this time, over three hours had passed
from his initial injury. (Id.) Defendant Unknown Doctor told everyone to hold Plaintiff down and

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eventually put Plaintiff’s knee back in place. (Id.) All hospital staff left, and Defendant Martinson
took out his phone and took another picture of Plaintiff’s knee. (Id.) When Plaintiff asked what
he was doing, Defendant Martinson responded that he “just want[ed] to post the before and after
pictures online.” (Id.) Ten to fifteen minutes later, Defendants Morris and Rosalinda returned,
and Plaintiff asked for an MRI to determine if any ligaments or tendons had been damaged, as well
as crutches. (Id.) Both requests were refused. (Id.) Plaintiff was discharged, and the ECF medical
department was instructed to provide Plaintiff “crutches, ice, and pain and anti-inflammatory
medication” upon his return. (Id. PageID.14.)
When he returned, Plaintiff reminded Defendant Martinson about seeing the
medical staff at ECF. (Id.) Defendant Martinson responded that the medical department had been
contacted and would see Plaintiff “shortly.” (Id.) He also stated, “One last thing Margosian . . . if
I were you, I wouldn’t write a grievance on me for anything. I got friends all over and we wouldn’t
want something to happen to you.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he was never seen by the medical
department that day and was unable to relax or move because of the pain. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
further that his sleep condition, parasomnia, exacerbated his pain. (Id., PageID.15.)
Plaintiff was called to medical to see Defendant Crompton at 9:00 a.m. on July 12,
2019. (Id.) Defendant Crompton examined his knee and “affirmed it was severely swollen and
significantly larger in comparison to Plaintiff’s left knee.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked for an MRI, knee
brace, and pain medication. (Id.) Defendant Crompton told Plaintiff that “he would only be
prescribing him crutches, ice, and ibuprofen.” (Id.) When Plaintiff responded that ibuprofen
would not help the pain, Defendant Crompton “told Plaintiff that because he was a prisoner, he
couldn’t give him anything stronger, and that he didn’t care either way.” (Id.)

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Plaintiff received ice and crutches later that day. (Id., PageID.16.) However, he
did not receive ibuprofen until July 13, 2019, and avers that it “did absolutely nothing to combat
the severe pain.” (Id.) On July 14, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a medical kite request asking for a
cane because the “crutches provided were inadequate and [he] had almost fallen twice while using
them.” (Id., PageID.17.) The next day, Nurse Drake informed Plaintiff that a cane would be
provided. (Id.)
On July 17, 2019, Plaintiff submitted two medical kites, asking for stronger pain
medication and a knee brace, and reminding Defendant Crompton that, per Defendant Morris’s
instructions, he was to be seen one week after his injury. (Id.) Plaintiff also submitted a mental
health request, asking to speak with a psychologist. (Id.) The next day, Plaintiff submitted another
medical kite, stating that he had seen Defendant Crompton in the main lobby of his unit and asked
him if he was scheduled to see Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Crompton responded that Plaintiff was
not scheduled “and would not know when he could schedule to see Plaintiff.” (Id.) On July 19,
2019, Plaintiff received a response to his request from RN Pant indicating that his chart review
had been sent to Defendant Crompton and that he would be scheduled for an evaluation. (Id.,
PageID.17–18.)
Plaintiff saw Defendant Crompton again on July 19, 2019, at which time he again
denied Plaintiff’s requests for stronger pain medication, a knee brace, and MRI. (Id., PageID.18.)
Plaintiff avers that his medical records indicate that he was given strengthening exercises, but that
“he was not provided with any such treatment.” (Id.) That same day, medical issued an order
extending Plaintiff’s use of a cane to August 15, 2019. (Id.)
On July 30, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a request for stronger pain medication,
alleging that “the ibuprofen was not strong enough to combat the pain and was making [him]

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constipated.” (Id.) On July 31, 2019, Plaintiff had a therapy session, during which he expressed
his concerns over being deprived adequate medical care. (Id.) Plaintiff saw Nurse Mason on
August 1, 2019, and avers that she was “very rude” and told Plaintiff he would have to pay a copay
because his request did not constitute follow-up care. (Id., PageID.18–19.) Plaintiff “politely
excused himself” and left. (Id., PageID.19.) Shortly thereafter, he was given naproxen to replace
the ibuprofen, but avers that it “was not effective as well to combat the severe pain [he] was in.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff’s allegations resume after a two-month gap when he submitted another
medical request on October 11, 2019, stating that the ibuprofen and naproxen had not helped and
that he continued to experience sharp pain in his knee. (Id.) Plaintiff indicated that he could not
jog or squat “without excruciating pain and a feeling of collapsing.” (Id.) He could not walk up
and down stairs without pain and stated that his knee constantly “pops.” (Id.) Plaintiff reiterated
his requests for an MRI, knee brace, and stronger medication. (Id.) On October 13, 2019, Nurse
Mason responded, but Plaintiff avers that the response only “documents the need to consult about
stronger pain medication.” (Id., PageID.19–20.) Plaintiff saw Nurse Pant on October 15, 2019,
in response to his medical request. (Id., PageID.20.) Nurse Pant “notably documented the
existence of (1): tenderness (2): palpable distal pulses (3): pain with movement (4): swelling (5):
crepit[u]s and popping with passive range of motion, and (6): tenderness to medial knee and patella
tendon area.” (Id.) He noted that Plaintiff’s requests for an MRI, knee brace, and stronger pain
medication would be forwarded to Defendant Crompton. (Id.)
Plaintiff saw Defendant Crompton on October 16, 2019. (Id.) Defendant Crompton
checked Plaintiff’s blood pressure and heart, had Plaintiff weigh himself, and used a tape measure
to check the circumference of Plaintiff’s right thigh and calf muscles. (Id.) Defendant Crompton

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asked Plaintiff to perform a squat, and Plaintiff responded that he was physically unable to comply.
(Id., PageID.20–21.) Plaintiff reasserted his requests for an MRI, knee brace, and stronger pain
medication. (Id., PageID.21.) Defendant Crompton “acknowledged the knee was swollen and the
presence of pain existed, but wholly failed to document that in his medical report of October 16,
2019, . . . even though RN Pant documented it in his report the previous day.” (Id.) Plaintiff also
asked to see an orthopedic surgeon, but Defendant Crompton “replied that with a patella
dislocation, an orthopedic surgeon is never required to consult with, nor is an MRI ever needed
because no structures are ever damaged.” (Id.) He told Plaintiff that “it could be up to 2 years
before the knee could become healed.” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning Defendant Crompton’s care on October 18,
2019. (Id.) Defendant Bellinger responded, noting that Plaintiff was being referred to Defendant
Crompton because of his continued complaints. (Id., PageID21–22.) Plaintiff, however, avers
that Defendant Crompton “never again consulted with [him] about his injury.” (Id., PageID.22.)
On November 23, 2019, Plaintiff requested medical care after injuring his lower
back “when he went to reach down to retrieve a book but bent awkward[ly] because he was forced
to factor in his injured right knee.” (Id.) Plaintiff saw Nurse Dankert on November 26, 2019, for
his lower back and sciatic pain. (Id., PageID.23.) Nurse Dankert “ordered a hot water bottle detail
and rest.” (Id.)
More than a year after the initial injury, Plaintiff saw Defendant Crompton in
August 2020 for chronic care. (Id.) He told Defendant Crompton that he “was still experiencing
problems with his knee; constant pain, discomfort, popping and grinding, a feeling the knee would
give out, and constant instability.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Crompton responded that
“he didn’t care because Plaintiff must be lying, and that Plaintiff needed to leave the medical

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room.” (Id.) Plaintiff left, but returned to ask a question, at which time Defendant Crompton
allegedly “rose from his chair and aggressively began charging after Plaintiff.” (Id.)
On January 24, 2021, Plaintiff was moved to an adjacent cell because of close
contact regarding COVID-19. (Id.) As he was cleaning the new cell on January 25, 2021, “he
made a quick turn and his knee slipped out of place, but then slid back into place again; the injury
is medically referred to as a subluxation. And it was very painful.” (Id.) Plaintiff saw Defendant
Bellinger the next day for a rapid COVID-19 test and told him what happened; Defendant Bellinger
stated, “I’m not here for that, just for Covid testing.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he was in severe
pain, his right knee was swollen and unstable, and he could not shower for four days because of
the injury. (Id.)
On February 7 or 8, 2021, Plaintiff was bunked with inmate O’Brien, who also had
COVID-19. (Id., PageID.23–24.) Plaintiff avers that inmate O’Brien required health care for
breathing complications, and Defendant Crompton ultimately responded.

(Id., PageID.24.)

Plaintiff relayed inmate O’Brien’s responses to Defendant Crompton. (Id.) Afterwards, Defendant
Crompton asked Plaintiff how he was. (Id.) Plaintiff told him about the subluxation that had
occurred two weeks prior. (Id.) Defendant Crompton responded that Plaintiff was lying and
“needed to stop faking the injury.” (Id.) Plaintiff “swore that he was telling the truth.” (Id.)
Defendant Crompton responded, “You’re not in pain; you have since fully recovered; and I doubt
you slipped the kneecap out again.” (Id.)
Plaintiff saw Defendant Crompton again on August 6, 2021, for an annual checkup
for his high blood pressure and bottom-bunk status for his parasomnia. (Id.) Plaintiff told
Defendant Crompton that he was still having issues with his knee. (Id.) Defendant Crompton
responded that Plaintiff could not have any problems and that it was “in his head.” (Id.) Plaintiff

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asked to see an orthopedic specialist. (Id.) Defendant Crompton denied the request and said that
Plaintiff was lying about his pain, discomfort, and instability. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that his “knee
remains in constant pain and instability.” (Id., PageID.25.)
Plaintiff submitted various grievances about the events set forth supra. He was
interviewed about his grievance concerning Defendant Martinson by Defendant Lively. (Id.,
PageID.29.) Defendant Lively told Plaintiff that she would speak to Defendants Martinson and
Sheppard, and then “get back with” Defendant Bassett. (Id., PageID.31.) According to Plaintiff,
Defendant Lively said the process “would be continued most likely with Internal Affairs.” (Id.)
Plaintiff, however, received a rejection of his grievance as untimely from Defendant Bassett on
August 27, 2019. (Id.) Ultimately, all of Plaintiff’s grievances were denied, and Defendants
Bassett, Clouse, and Parish were involved in those denials. (Id., PageID.31–41.)
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief directing that he be seen by an orthopedic specialist,
declaratory relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., PageID.71–75.).
II.

Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A.

Defendants Morris, Nurse Rosalinda Unknown Party #1, Doctor Unknown
Party #2, and Unknown Parties #4 from the Munson Healthcare Hospital
Plaintiff has sued Defendants Morris, Nurse Rosalinda Unknown Party #1, Doctor

Unknown Party #2, and various Unknown Parties #4, all of whom are employed at the Munson
Healthcare Hospital in Manistee, Michigan. The Court must first determine whether Plaintiff has
properly named these Defendants as parties to his § 1983 claims.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
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Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). In order for a private party’s conduct to be under color of state law, it must be “fairly
attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Street, 102 F.3d
at 814. There must be “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of
[the defendant] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”
Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
Where the defendants are not state officials, their conduct will be deemed to
constitute state action only if it meets one of three narrow tests. The first is the symbiotic
relationship test, or nexus test, in which the inquiry focuses on whether “the State had so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint
participant in the enterprise.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357–58. Second, the state compulsion test
describes situations “in which the government has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the
action alleged to violate the Constitution.” NBC v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022,
1026 (11th Cir. 1988); accord Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). Finally, the public function test covers private actors performing
functions “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353; accord
West, 487 U.S. at 49–50. See generally, Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936–39 (discussing three tests).
Plaintiff has presented no allegations from which the Court could fairly attribute
the actions of these Defendants to the state. The fact that the Munson Healthcare Hospital may
receive public funding and that the hospital and the various medical providers are licensed by the
State does not render them “state actors” for purposes of § 1983. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (nonprofit, privately operated school’s receipt of public funds did not make

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its employee discharge decisions acts of state subject to suit under federal statute governing civil
action for deprivation of rights); Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006) (allegation
that hospital and social worker were subject to state licensing was insufficient to support finding
that defendants were acting under color of state law); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 315–
16 (6th Cir. 1988) (fact that nonprofit corporation was funded almost entirely by public sources,
and was subject to state regulation, without more, is insufficient to make private entity’s decision
to discharge employees attributable to state for purpose of § 1983 action). Moreover, even if these
Defendants treated Plaintiff at the State’s request and expense, they did not thereby become state
actors. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 (“[a]cts of such private contractors do not become acts
of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public
contracts”); Styles v. McGinnis, 28 F. App’x 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2001) (agreeing that an emergency
room doctor did not become a state actor solely because he provided healthcare to a State inmate).
The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Morris, Nurse
Rosalinda Unknown Party #1, Doctor Unknown Party #2, and the Unknown Parties #4 at the
Munson Healthcare Hospital for failure to allege state action.
B.

Defendants Bassett, Lively, Clouse, and Parish
Plaintiff explicitly indicates that he has sued Defendants Bassett, Lively, Clouse,

and Parish based upon a theory of supervisory liability. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Government
officials, however, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir. 2009). Rather, a claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional
behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d

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889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory
liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899;
Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be
imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based
upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Here, Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Bassett, Lively, Clouse, and Parish are solely based upon their
involvement in the grievance process, and he has failed to allege that any of them engaged in any
active unconstitutional behavior. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim against Defendants
Bassett, Lively, Clouse and Parish.
C.

Defendants Martinson, Sheppard, Crompton, Bellinger, and Unknown Parties
#3 at the Oaks Correctional Facility
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Martinson, Sheppard, Crompton, Bellinger, and

Unknown Parties from ECF violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate
medical care and delaying the receipt of medical care for his right knee injury. Plaintiff also avers
that Defendant Martinson violated his Eighth Amendment rights by delaying his medical treatment
to take pictures of his injury and post them on social media. (See generally ECF No. 1.)
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the
states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it
contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–
46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial
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of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson
v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every
unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine
discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence,
“extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show
that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted
with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate
indifference standard to medical claims)); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)
(applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). The deliberateindifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting
or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is
the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually

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knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
As part of the obligation to protect prisoners from substantial risks to their health
or safety, the Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to
incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is
violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner.
Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference
may be manifested by a doctor’s failure to respond to the medical needs of a prisoner, or by “prison
guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with
the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05.
Although Plaintiff has by no means proven deliberate indifference on the part of
the remaining ECF Defendants, his factual allegations, accepted as true, support the inference that
Plaintiff suffered a serious medical need and that the Defendants may have been deliberately
indifferent to that need. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
to support Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Martinson, Sheppard, Crompton,
Bellinger, and the Unknown Parties at the Oaks Correctional Facility.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Dr. Russell Morris, Nurse Rosalinda Unknown Party #1, Doctor
Unknown Party #2, the Unknown Parties #4 from the Munson Healthcare Hospital, Grievance
Coordinator T. Bassett, Sergeant Lively, Assistant Deputy Warden Clouse, and Warden Les Parish
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42
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U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Correctional Officer
Martinson, Correctional Officer Sheppard, Dr. Robert Crompton, Registered Nurse Jack D.
Bellinger, and the Unknown Parties #3 at the Oaks Correctional Facility remain in the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

January 11, 2022

/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge

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