Williams #788891 v. Washington et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green (jkw)
Case 1:23-cv-00474-PJG ECF No. 5, PageID.15 Filed 05/22/23 Page 1 of 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
RICKY ARISTER WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:23-cv-474
Honorable Phillip J. Green
HEIDI WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff
consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United
States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is
required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re
Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the
named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s
relationship to the proceedings.
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“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by
formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347
(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is
fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne
becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon
service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within
which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is,
“[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to
function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil
action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA,
by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service,
creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the
plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty.
Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district
court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was
made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party
to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting
all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that
“[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may
conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”
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28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the
undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required
to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the
same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion.
See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain
a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they
were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”). 1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought
under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or
wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on grounds of immunity.
But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir.
2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to
proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context
matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy
Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500,
503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
“parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to
its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of
‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Charles E. Egeler Reception and Guidance Center (RGC)
in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan.
The events about which he complains
occurred during Plaintiff’s incarceration at the St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF)
in St. Louis, Gratiot County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi
Washington and SLF Warden John Christiansen. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing
Defendants in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
Plaintiff’s complaint concerns Defendants’ response to the COVID-19
pandemic in 2021.
Plaintiff alleges that in January of 2021, Defendants
demonstrated deliberate indifference to his “health and safety” during a “worldwide
pandemic.” (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff contends that he contracted COVID-19 while
incarcerated at SLF in January of 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff further contends that if
Defendants had “followed the mandatory testing of employees of the MDOC,” Plaintiff
would not have contracted COVID-19. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that COVID-19 has
damaged him “for the rest of his life,” because his eyesight, nervous system, and
senses of smell and taste are still affected. (Id.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff
asserts violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.)
He seeks $19,000.00 in compensatory damages, as well as $1 million in punitive
damages. (Id.)
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Immunity
As noted above, Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities only. A
suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against
the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994).
The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from
suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has
expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has
not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights
suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In
numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir.
2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v.
Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. Official capacity defendants,
however, are absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71;
Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). For that
reason alone, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed on grounds of
immunity, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good
faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims
are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might
raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in
good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00
appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule
of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing
fee in one lump sum.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: May 22, 2023
/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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