Sanders #872470 v. Jensen et al

Filing 4

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ray Kent (fhw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
CLAUDE SANDERS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24-cv-1025

v.

Honorable Ray Kent

UNKNOWN JENSEN et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under

longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendants Fuller and Camp. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, any due
process claims related to misconduct tickets received by Plaintiff on April 18, 2024. Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Jensen, Piggott, and Barna remain
in the case.
Discussion
I.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which
he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia

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But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Corrections Officers Unknown Jensen, Unknown Piggott, and
Unknown Barna, Lieutenant Unknown Fuller, and Sergeant Unknown Camp. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that on the morning of April 18, 2024, Defendants Piggott and Barna
forced him out of his cell with no shoes on and walked him to base where Defendant Jensen was
waiting for him. (Id., PageID.3.) Defendant Jensen tried to force Plaintiff to put on shoes that had
been worn by another prisoner. When Plaintiff refused, the three Defendants took Plaintiff into
Housing Unit 1 Vestibule and started hitting him in the face, ribs, stomach, and legs and picking
him up by his “jaw line.” (Id.) After this, Defendants Jensen, Piggott, and Barna took Plaintiff
outside and continued to hit him and to pick him up by his jaw, putting their hands around
Plaintiff’s neck. (Id.) Defendants took Plaintiff to the property room where transportation was
waiting for him, all the while continuing to abuse him by bending his legs. When Plaintiff arrived
at the property room, one of the three Defendants punched Plaintiff in the face and bent his arm
downward through the slot. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected him to excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Plaintiff also boldly asserts that he received a misconduct for assault and battery on
staff and threatening behavior. Plaintiff seeks damages.
II.

Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
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court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A.

Defendants Fuller and Camp

Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to name Defendants Fuller or Camp in the body
of his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to
particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a
plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth

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Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged
violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each
defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.
2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the
complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.
See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims
where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants
were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v.
Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (citing Salehpour v.
Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)) (requiring allegations of personal involvement
against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19,
1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is
totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events
leading to his injuries.”). Plaintiff fails to even mention Defendants Fuller and Camp in the body
of his complaint. Because Plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of the minimal pleading standards
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief”), Defendants Fuller and Camp are properly dismissed from this action.
B.

Misconduct tickets

Plaintiff alludes to the fact that he received misconduct tickets for assault and battery on
staff and threatening behavior. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff fails to allege any
details regarding the misconduct tickets, including who wrote them, whether he was found guilty
of the misconducts, or whether he received any sanctions as a result of the tickets. Nevertheless,

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the Court generously construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process claim regarding these misconduct tickets.
In order to establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, Plaintiff
must show that a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State and that the
procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally insufficient . . . .” Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)
(citations omitted) The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect
every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Court set
forth the standard for determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to that Court, a prisoner is entitled to the
protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his
sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87; see also Jones v.
Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir.
1995).
Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation that will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.
A prisoner like Plaintiff, who is serving an indeterminate sentence for an offense committed after
2000, can accumulate “disciplinary time” for a major misconduct conviction. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 800.34. Disciplinary time is considered by the Michigan Parole Board when it determines
whether to grant parole. Id. § 800.34(2). It does not necessarily affect the length of a prisoner’s
sentence because it is “simply a record that will be presented to the parole board to aid in its
[parole] determination.” Taylor v. Lantagne, 418 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore,

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Plaintiff cannot show that any deprivation he received as a result of the misconduct convictions
affected the duration of his sentence. Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts showing that he suffered a
“significant and atypical deprivation.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). Conclusory
allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim
under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, to the extent
that Plaintiff may wish to assert a due process claim based on his misconduct tickets, such a claim
is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
C.

Excessive force by Defendants Jensen, Piggott, and Barna

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Jensen, Piggott, and Barna assaulted him by beating him,
lifting him by his jaw, and placing their hands around his neck. The Eighth Amendment embodies
a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime.
Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of
decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which,
although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are
“totally without penological justification.” Id.
Plaintiff states that Defendants began to assault him when he refused to wear shoes that
had been worn by another prisoner and that they continued the assault for an extended period of
time in three separate locations. The Court concludes that at this point in the litigation, Plaintiff
has stated sufficient facts to avoid dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants
Jensen, Piggott, and Barna.

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Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the
review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants Fuller and Camp will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, any due process claims related
to misconduct tickets received by Plaintiff for assault and battery on staff and threatening behavior
on April 18, 2024. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants
Jensen, Piggott, and Barna remain in the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

March 12, 2025

/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge

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