Williams #962925 v. Sices et al

Filing 5

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat (cam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JEFFERY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24-cv-1130

v.

Honorable Maarten Vermaat

PETER SICES et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all
matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1,
PageID.6.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,

Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Defendants are not
presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary
review under the PLRA, in the same way Defendants are not parties who will be served with or
given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record

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does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they
were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s action for failure to state a
claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains occurred there. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi Washington,
as well as the following MTU personnel: Warden Melinda Braman, Health Unit Manager Heidi
Smith, Medical Provider Peter Sices, and Registered Nurses Diana Whitelock, Mary Eikenhout,
Michelle Kidd, and Melissa Lorenz. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants Sices,

But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
1

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Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz in their official and personal capacities. He does not
indicate in what capacity he is suing Defendants Washington, Braman, and Smith.
Plaintiff alleges that before he arrived at MTU on April 2, 2024, he saw the healthcare
department at his previous facility “for a routine check[-]up prior to [his] arrival.” (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff avers that he had been experiencing rashes on his upper chest, arms,
shoulders, legs, stomach, and back. (Id.) Healthcare providers at Plaintiff’s previous facility had
prescribed betamethasone dipropionate cream and Bactrim sulfameth-trimeth. (Id.) Plaintiff was
told to finish the medication and that he would be seen in one week. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that his skin “became more inflamed” and “specific areas turned into
bloody rashes.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s leg was swollen, and on some days he could not walk or get out of
bed. (Id.) Plaintiff saw Defendant Sices on April 26, 2024, and Defendant Sices diagnosed Plaintiff
with psoriasis. (Id.) Defendant Sices prescribed more Bactrim, as well as clindamycin capsules.
(Id.)
Plaintiff was sent offsite to see a dermatologist on August 19, 2024. (Id.) The dermatology
nurses told Plaintiff that his skin condition was eczema, not psoriasis. (Id.) Plaintiff contends this
diagnosis shows that Defendant Sices misdiagnosed Plaintiff and “repeatedly prescribed
medication for a skin disease [that] [P]laintiff [does not] have.” (Id.) Plaintiff goes on to state that
Defendants Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz were aware of Plaintiff’s medical issue “and
failed to see [him] on numerous [] occasions,” telling Plaintiff that he would have to wait to be
seen by Defendant Sices. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the “last few months [have] been very difficult and [have caused]
emotional distress.” (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff states that there are “black blotches” on his skin, and
that he experiences difficulty using many soaps and lotions because many of those items cause his

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skin to burn and flare up. (Id.) Plaintiff experienced “uncontrollable” itching and avers that “it took
months before healthcare would give anything to reduce the itching.” (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that he has been in physical altercations because of people talking about
his skin, and that he has lost relationships from this issue. (Id.) Plaintiff used to work out, but is
now “very insecure about taking off his shirt because of all the black spots.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims
that when his skin was “leaking bloody fluids,” he would need his sheets and clothes washed
multiple times a day. (Id.)
Plaintiff has attached several pages of medical records and medical kites to his complaint.
The Court may consider documents that are attached to a pro se complaint when considering
whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief should be granted. See, e.g., Powell v.
Messary, 11 F. App’x 389, 390 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming the Eastern District of Michigan District
Court’s consideration of the attachments to the plaintiff’s complaint to determine that the plaintiff
had received medical treatment and, therefore, failed to state a claim under the Eighth
Amendment); Hardy v. Sizer, No. 16-1979, 2018 WL 3244002 (6th Cir. May 23, 2018) (affirming
this Court’s consideration of the plaintiff’s complaint allegations and the documents attached to
the complaint to support the determination that the plaintiff failed to state a claim); Hogan v. Lucas,
No. 20- 4260, 2022 WL 2118213, at *3 n.2 (6th Cir. May 20, 2022) (stating that “[b]ecause the
documents attached to Hogan’s complaint are referenced in the complaint and ‘central to the claims
contained therein,’ they were properly considered at the § 1915(e)(2) screening stage” (citations
omitted)). The Court will generally accept as true the statements that Plaintiff makes in the
documents he has attached to the complaint. The Court will generally not accept as true statements
made by others in the documents Plaintiff attaches to the complaint except to the extent that
Plaintiff relies on the truth of those statements in his complaint.

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Because Plaintiff has submitted documents regarding his treatment and when he received
it, the Court accepts as true the statements made by the providers at MTU. “When a document
attached to the complaint contradicts the allegations, the document trumps the allegations . . .[if
the] document . . . ‘utterly discredit[s]’ the allegations.” In re Flint Water Cases, 960 F.3d 303,
329 (6th Cir. 2020).
On May 5, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a kite about his skin, stating that the condition had not
gotten any better with the medication he had been prescribed. (ECF No. 1-3, PageID.15.) Plaintiff
asked for “some type of medical lotion” such as “minerin cream” (Id.) Defendant Eikenhout
responded and noted that Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with the medical provider
scheduled once he finished his antibiotic regimen and noted that lotion and minerin cream would
“not change [the] lesions.” (Id.) Defendant Eikenhout told Plaintiff to continue to take his
antibiotics, to wash his hands frequently, and to avoid scratching the areas. (Id.)
On May 16, 2024, Defendant Eikenhout responded to another kite sent by Plaintiff. (ECF
No. 1-4, PageID.17.) Plaintiff complained that his skin had not gotten better and that his legs were
starting to swell. (Id.) Defendant Eikenhout reiterated that Plaintiff had a medical provider
appointment pending. (Id.)
Defendant sent another kite on May 21, 2024, complaining that his skin was getting worse
and that he was having difficulty walking because of the swelling in his leg. (ECF No. 1-5,
PageID.19.) Defendant Eikenhout responded that Plaintiff could discuss his concerns at his
appointment with the medical provider. (Id.)
On May 29, 2024, Defendant Sices noted that Plaintiff’s lab work indicated deficiencies in
vitamins B12 and D. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID.13.) Defendant Sices noted that he had missed
informing Plaintiff of those deficiencies when “discussing the psoriasis.” (Id.) Defendant Sices

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told Plaintiff to “[p]lease accept [a] vitamin D capsule daily for up to six months: this may also
help with your skin condition.” (Id.) Defendant Sices also noted that Plaintiff would need to receive
vitamin B12 injections. (Id.) Plaintiff would “need one each week for four weeks and then once
each month for now.” (Id.)
On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a kite asking to receive Ensure health drinks because
of his vitamins B12 and D deficiencies. (ECF No. 1-6, PageID.21.) Defendant Eikenhout
responded, telling Plaintiff he did not meet the qualifications for Ensure and that the medical
provider “does have a plan in place to treat the B-12 and D deficiency.” (Id.) She noted that
Plaintiff was to receive “oral replacement” for vitamin D as well as vitamin B12 injections. (Id.)
On June 4, 2024, Plaintiff sent another kite, stating that after receiving a vitamin B12
injection, he had been experiencing shortness of breath. (ECF No. 1-7, PageID.23.) Plaintiff noted
that he was told to notify the doctor if he experienced that side effect. (Id.) Defendant Eikenhout
responded, noting that she had spoken to Plaintiff on the telephone and that he would be scheduled
for an appointment to be evaluated by a nurse. (Id.) She told Plaintiff to notify healthcare or
corrections staff if his symptoms became worse before that appointment. (Id.)
On June 8, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a kite asking about the next step in treatment for his
skin condition since he was almost done with the ointment he was given. (ECF No. 1-8,
PageID.25.) Plaintiff noted that the swelling had gone down, but that he was still experiencing
itching. (Id.) Defendant Kidd responded that Plaintiff would be scheduled for an appointment and
that he should still continue treatment as prescribed. (Id.) She also told Plaintiff to notify the
healthcare department regarding “any signs or symptoms of a skin infection.” (Id.)
On June 9, 2024, Plaintiff submitted another kite about the itching he was experiencing.
(ECF No. 1-9, PageID.27.) Defendant Lorentz responded that Plaintiff was scheduled to see the

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medical provider about his psoriasis in about two weeks. (Id.) She noted that Plaintiff could rekite to be seen by a nurse if he felt that he needed to be seen sooner, but that there would be a copay for a nurse visit. (Id.)
On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a kite asking for a refill on his ointment. (ECF No.
1-10, PageID.29.) Defendant Whitelock responded, telling Plaintiff that it was too soon for a refill
because he had received the last one on May 29, 2024. (Id.) She advised Plaintiff to re-kite closer
to June 29, 2024. (Id.)
On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff submitted another kite, asking when he would seen by the
medical provider and noting that his skin was flaring up and becoming more painful. (ECF No. 111, PageID.31.) Defendant Eikenhout responded, telling Plaintiff that his appointment with the
provider had been rescheduled and that it was scheduled for about “one weeks’ time.” (Id.) She
told Plaintiff to re-kite if he wanted a nursing evaluation scheduled prior to that appointment. (Id.)
On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a kite asking when he would see the medical
provider for a follow-up after his appointment with the dermatologist. (ECF No. 1-12, PageID.33.)
Plaintiff indicated that he had been told his skin condition was eczema and that he would be
receiving Dupixent. (Id.) Non-party Registered Nurse Gerrianne Clark responded and told Plaintiff
that the paperwork from his offsite appointment had been received and given to the provider for
review “to order medication/make an appointment.” (Id.)
On September 4, 2024, Plaintiff sent a kite asking when he would see the medical provider
and receive Dupixent. (ECF No. 1-13, PageID.13.) Plaintiff noted that he had just “picked up some
more [t]herapeutic moisturizing crème” but that it was not helping his skin. (Id.) Defendant
Lorentz responded, noting that Plaintiff was scheduled for his first Dupixent injection “probably
before you even get this kite response, and will be scheduled every 2 weeks thereafter.” (Id.) She

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also told Plaintiff that the medical provider would follow up “some time near the end of October
or beginning of November.” (Id.)
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims premised upon
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Plaintiff
seeks a “permanent injunction ordering each [D]efendant to cease their lack of treatment towards
[Plaintiff].” (Id., PageID.6.) Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994). As set forth supra, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by failing to provide adequate medical treatment.
A.

Claims Against Defendants Washington, Braman, and Smith

Although Plaintiff has named Director Washington, Warden Braman, and Health Unit
Manager Smith as Defendants, he fails to mention them in the body of his complaint, much less
allege that they took any action against him. Where a person is named as a defendant without an
allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal
construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188,
190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named
defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any
degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible
for each alleged violation of rights). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Washington, Braman,
and Smith, therefore, fall short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal rules
of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal for that reason alone. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
(requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Defendants Washington, Braman, and Smith.

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B.

Claims Against Defendants Sices, Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Sices, Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz violated
his Eighth Amendment rights by providing inadequate medical care for his skin condition.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care
to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would result in unnecessary suffering
without serving any penological purpose. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) “The
infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.”
Id. at 103–04. The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent
to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702
(6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs has an objective and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective
component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In
other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied
“[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane
Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008).
“To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would
show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk
to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.”
Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Deliberate indifference “entails
something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or
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omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 835.
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to
constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the
conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become
a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state
a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison
medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state
a deliberate indifference claim. Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020);
Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2018); Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372
(6th Cir. 2017); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (2014).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete
denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate
medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). “Where a prisoner
has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal
courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims
which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 448 (6th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 2010)). Further, “[w]here
the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so
woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting
Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). He must demonstrate that the care he
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received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir.
2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (6th Cir. 1989)).
As set forth above, Plaintiff was initially diagnosed with psoriasis, but that diagnosis was
later changed to eczema. Multiple courts, including this one, have concluded that dermatological
conditions such as eczema and psoriasis are simply not sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth
Amendment. See, e.g., Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that
eczema is not an objectively serious medical condition under the Eighth Amendment); Tsakonas
v. Cicchi, 308 F. App’x 628, 632 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that eczema and athlete’s foot are not
objectively serious medical conditions under the Eighth Amendment); Tasby v. Cain, 86 F. App’x
745 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that although the plaintiff “suffered a rash” that “does not establish
that he suffered ‘serious harm’”); Young v. Jourden, No. 1:19-cv-854, 2021 WL 849324, at *13
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2021), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part on other
grounds, 2021 WL 716896 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2021) (finding that a plaintiff’s eczema, which
caused cracked and dry skin that bled when the plaintiff scratched it, was not an objectively serious
medical condition); Cox v. Hartshorn, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1085 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that a
fungal rash is not an objectively serious medical condition); Gray v. Ghosh, No. 12 C 194, 2013
WL 5497250, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (collecting cases).
In any event, even if the Court presumes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts
suggesting a serious medical need, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts for the subjective
prong of the inquiry. First, with respect to Defendant Sices, it is clear from Plaintiff’s allegations
and exhibits that Defendant Sices provided treatment to Plaintiff. He diagnosed Plaintiff with
psoriasis and prescribed Bactrim and clindamycin. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff was

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later diagnosed with eczema instead. (Id.) Plaintiff faults Defendant Sices for misdiagnosing his
condition and continuing to prescribe medication for a skin disease Plaintiff does not have. (Id.)
However, “[t]he requirement that the official have subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then
disregarded it is meant to prevent the constitutionalizing of medical malpractice claims; thus, a
plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must show more than negligence or the misdiagnosis of
an ailment.” See Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703. That is essentially what Plaintiff has done here—he
has attempted to constitutionalize his claim that Defendant Sices misdiagnosed his skin condition.
The Court does not minimize Defendant’s experience; however, his complaint fails to state a claim
against Defendant Sices. The facts alleged by Plaintiff suggest, at most, that Defendant Sices may
have been negligent when he misdiagnosed Plaintiff with psoriasis, which is insufficient to state
an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (holding that an Eighth Amendment
violation requires a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence”).
Plaintiff also faults Defendants Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz for violating his
Eighth Amendment rights. He suggests that they “had actual and full knowledge” of his skin
condition and “failed to [see] him on numerous occasions but would only inform [him] . . . that
[he] would have to wait to be seen only by Defendant Sices.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
Plaintiff’s allegation that these individuals only told him that he would have to wait to be seen by
Defendant Sices is flatly belied by Plaintiff’s own exhibits. The numerous medical kites that
Plaintiff submitted with his complaint indicate that Defendants Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and
Lorentz timely responded to his kites, often on the same day or the day after receipt. Those
individuals advised Plaintiff not to scratch at his skin, to continue his course of treatment, and that
he was scheduled to see the medical provider. Plaintiff was told that if he wished to be seen prior
to being seen by the medical provider, he could request a nursing evaluation. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s

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complaint does he allege that he took the nurses up on this offer and that they failed to evaluate
him. Moreover, after a dermatologist diagnosed Plaintiff with eczema and prescribed Dupixent,
Defendant Lorentz responded to Plaintiff’s September 4, 2024, kite to inform him that he was
scheduled for his first Dupixent injection and would receive an injection every two weeks.
Although it is clear from Plaintiff’s complaint that he disagrees with the responses to his kites by
Defendants Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz, “a patient’s disagreement with his
physicians [and other medical providers] over the proper course of treatment alleges, at most, a
medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under § 1983.” Darrah, 865 F.3d at 372 (6th
Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (“[A] desire for additional or different
treatment does not suffice by itself to support an Eighth Amendment claim.” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Whitelock,
Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state claims for relief against Defendants Washington,
Braman, and Smith because his complaint is entirely devoid of factual allegations regarding those
individuals. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Sices misdiagnosed him with psoriasis
does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, and he has not alleged facts suggesting
that Defendants Whitelock, Eikenhout, Kidd, and Lorentz were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
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1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does
not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not
be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00
appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is
barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is
barred, he will be required to pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

/s/Maarten Vermaat
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge

November 26, 2024

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