Carline #511554 v. Brooks Correctional Facility et al

Filing 5

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ray Kent (fhw)

Case 1:25-cv-00241-RSK

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
SHANE JOSEPH CARLINE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:25-cv-241

v.

Honorable Ray Kent

BROOKS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et
al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all
matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1,
PageID.5.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,

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Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility
(LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues LRF itself, MDOC
Office of Legal Affairs Manager Robert Russell in his official and personal capacities, and the
following LRF personnel in their official and personal capacities: Warden Chris King, Resident
Unit Manager Unknown Fager, Assistant Resident Unit Managers Unknown Boinkins and

1

But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Unknown Short, Sergeants Unknown Jensen and Unknown Wakefield, and Mental Health
Professional Unknown Ackerman.
Plaintiff alleges that staff at LRF conducted a mass shakedown on February 3, 2023.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) During the shakedown, Defendant Fager told Defendant
Ackerman to “go into each room and remove [and] unplug TVs and cable cords that were attached
to 3[-]way splitters.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ackerman tampered with his TV by
“unplugging[,] moving[,] drop[p]ing[,] and/or spilling” something on it. (Id.) Plaintiff contends
that he had purchased the TV less than a year before the shakedown and that it was still covered
by the one-year warranty. (Id.) When Plaintiff returned to his room and plugged his TV in, the TV
“started to spark and blew the power.” (Id.)
Plaintiff asked to speak to Defendant Jensen, who had Defendant Wakefield inspect the
TV and collect it. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants Jensen and Wakefield wrote memos to
Defendant King “that [Plaintiff’s] TV was not altered in any way and was broken due to
mishandling during [the] mass shakedown.” (Id.) Plaintiff continuously wrote to the business
office, as well as Defendants Fager, Boinkins, and Short, about reimbursement. (Id.) According to
Plaintiff, Defendants Fager, Boinkins, and Short lied to him that his reimbursement was approved,
and that Plaintiff would soon receive a replacement. (Id.) Defendant Fager also told Plaintiff that
the TV could not be turned in under the warranty because the administration would not cover the
$25.00 cost. (Id.)
After “waiting 14 months well past [the] warranty,” Defendant Russell informed Plaintiff
that his request for reimbursement was denied “without any reason and that [Plaintiff] was getting
nothing.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that all Defendants are “directly responsible for the d[e]struction
[and] theft of [his] personal property.”

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Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claims against all Defendants premised upon the loss of his
TV. Plaintiff seeks “unspecified monetary compensation,” as well as a new TV “covered under a
one year warranty.” (Id., PageID.5.) He also asks that the amount of the TV be exempt from any
collections “with [a] stipulation [that] the amount to be spent [go towards] ‘only’ on a replacement
TV and nothing else.” (Id.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994). As set forth above, the Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to set forth Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claims premised upon the loss of his TV.
A.

Official Capacity Claims

As set forth above, Plaintiff sues the individual Defendants in their personal and official
capacities. A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against
the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their
departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the
state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity
by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994).
Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in
federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of
Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money
damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66).
Here, Plaintiff seeks damages as well as injunctive relief in the form of provision of a new
TV. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who
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may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary
damages against Defendants in their official capacities.
Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an
official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to
sovereign immunity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The
United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex Parte Young for prospective
injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that unconstitutional acts cannot
have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered done under the state’s
authority. Id.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to
avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law
and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581
(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that
the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983) (addressing injunctive relief); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127
(2007) (addressing declaratory relief). A court should assume that, absent an official policy or
practice urging unconstitutional behavior, individual government officials will act constitutionally.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102.
In the present action, Plaintiff does not allege the existence of an official policy or practice,
or suggest that the activities alleged in the complaint are likely to occur to him again. Instead,

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Plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to past harm, not future risk of harm. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit has held that transfer to another correctional facility moots a prisoner’s injunctive and
declaratory claims. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisonerplaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when the prisoner was
transferred from the prison about which he complained); Mowatt v. Brown, No. 89-1955, 1990
WL 59896 (6th Cir. May 9, 1990); Tate v. Brown, No. 89-1944, 1990 WL 58403 (6th Cir. May 3,
1990); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff is no longer confined at
LRF, which is where he avers that Defendants are employed. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain his
claims for injunctive relief against Defendants, and those claims will be dismissed.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Defendants in their official capacities upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims against Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B.

Personal Capacity Claims
1.

Defendant LRF

Plaintiff has named LRF itself as a Defendant in this action. LRF, however, is not a separate
entity capable of being sued. As this Court noted in Ryan v. Corizon Health Care, No. 1:13-cv525, 2013 WL 5786934 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2013), “individual prisons named as Defendants
. . . (ICF, IBC, LRF and RGC) are buildings used by the MDOC to house prisoners. They are not
the proper public entity for suit.” Id. at *7; see also Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir.
2002) (“The McCracken County Jail is not a legal entity susceptible to suit . . . [; i]t is a department
of the county . . . .”); Caruthers v. Corr. Medical Serv., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-274, 2010 WL 1744881,
at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 27, 2010) (“The Duane Waters Hospital is not an entity capable of being
sued. Rather, it is a building owned by the Michigan Department of Corrections.”); Poole v.
Michigan Reformatory, No. 09-CV-13093, 2009 WL 2960412, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11. 2009)
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(“Plaintiff names the Michigan Reformatory, the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility, and the
Macomb Correctional Facility as defendants in this action. Those entities, however, are institutions
operated by the MDOC and are not . . . legal entities subject to suit . . . .”).
Furthermore, § 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, as set forth above, neither the State of
Michigan nor the MDOC is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
Thus, because LRF is not an entity separate from the MDOC, it is not a “person” under § 1983
either. See, e.g., Tinney v. Detroit Reentry Center, No. 2:19-CV-10894-TGB, 2020 WL 4334964,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2020) (stating “[a] state prison facility is not a person . . . capable of
being sued under § 1983”); Ward v. Healthcare Clinic, No. 16-10646, 2016 WL 3569562, at *1
(E.D. Mich. July 1, 2016) (same); Poole, 2009 WL 2960412, at *1 (same). Moreover, even if
Plaintiff had identified the MDOC or the State of Michigan as a Defendant, those entities, as noted
above, are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, LRF will be dismissed as a Defendant.
2.

Remaining Defendants

The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process claims premised upon the loss of his TV. Such claims, however, are barred by the
doctrine set forth in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Parratt, an individual deprived of property by a “random
and unauthorized act” of a state employee cannot maintain a federal due process claim unless the
state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an adequate post-deprivation remedy
exists, the deprivation, while real, is not “without due process of law.” Id. at 537. This doctrine
applies to both negligent and intentional deprivations of property, as long as the deprivation was
not pursuant to an established state procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530–36
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(1984). Plaintiff must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. See
Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378
(6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit has noted that a prisoner’s failure to sustain this burden requires
dismissal of his § 1983 due process action. See Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that his state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate.
Although Plaintiff has provided exhibits indicating that his property loss claim was denied by the
State Administrative Board (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.10), Plaintiff has available to him other state
post-deprivation remedies. Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting tort
or contract claims “against the state and any of its departments or officers.” Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.6419(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that Michigan provides adequate postdeprivation remedies for deprivation of property. See Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff fails to
allege any reasons why a state-court action would not afford him complete relief for the
deprivation, either negligent or intentional, of any personal property. Accordingly, for the
foregoing reasons, Plaintiff cannot maintain his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
claims regarding the deprivation of his TV.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 611. Although the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue
Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
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Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant
to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in
forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to
pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge

March 12, 2025

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