Watts #664661 v. Collins et al

Filing 4

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Sally J. Berens (jln)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JUSTIN MICHAEL WATTS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:25-cv-243
Honorable Sally J. Berens

UNKNOWN COLLINS et al.,
Defendants.

____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining
a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a
defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a
court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S.
344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is

fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a
party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or
other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and
defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the
summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate
in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by
requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a
circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district
court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir.
2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it
without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the
plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendant Unknown Party #1, named as “Unknown Medical Provider.” The Court will also
dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the remaining
Defendants. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Collins, Schutt, Rewerts,
Mates, Garcia, and Nevins, and Wuest remain in the case.
Discussion
I.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in

1

But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following DRF staff in their
individual and official capacities: Correctional Officer Unknown Collins, Sergeant Unknown
Schutt, Medical Professional Stephanie Wuest, Warden Unknown Rewerts, Deputy Warden
Unknown Mates, Assistant Deputy Wardens Unknown Garcia and Unknown Nevins, and
Unknown Party #1, identified as the Unknown Medical Provider.
Plaintiff alleges that, on December 7, 2023, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Rewerts
with copies to Defendants Mates, Nevins, and Garcia, informing them that Defendant Collins, a
regular officer in Plaintiff’s unit, was “constantly” harassing and threatening to physically assault
Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Plaintiff told these Defendants that he did not feel safe around
Defendant Collins and asked to be moved, placed in protective custody, or transferred to a different
facility. (Id.) Nothing was done in reference to Plaintiff’s requests. (Id.)
On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff wrote a second letter again explaining that Defendant
Collins was continuing to threaten Plaintiff and was becoming more aggressive. (Id., PageID.7.)
Plaintiff told Defendants Rewerts, Mates, Nevins, and Garcia that he feared for his life and again
made requests that he be separated from Defendant Collins. (Id.) Plaintiff did not receive a
response. (Id.)
On December 18, 2023, around 7:30 a.m., Plaintiff was struggling with the symptoms of
his mental illness and asked to speak with his “psyche.” (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff was not given
that opportunity. (Id.) When Plaintiff yelled through the cell door that he needed to see his psyche,
Defendant Collins came to Plaintiff’s cell door and made jokes about Plaintiff’s mental health,
encouraging Plaintiff to kill himself. (Id.)
Sometime between 9:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. that same day, Plaintiff’s cell door was
opened, and Plaintiff went to the officers’ desk. (Id.) Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Schutt and

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again asked to see his “psyche.” (Id.) Defendant Schutt told Plaintiff to wait in the dayroom, where
Defendants Schutt and Collins met Plaintiff and placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id.) Defendants
Schutt and Collins escorted Plaintiff to his cell; Defendant Collins told Plaintiff’s cellmate to leave,
and Defendants Schutt and Collins physically assaulted Plaintiff, slamming Plaintiff’s head into
the concrete floor and punching and kneeing Plaintiff repeatedly until Plaintiff lost consciousness.
(Id., PageID.4–5.) Defendants Schutt and Collins left Plaintiff on the cell floor. (Id., PageID.5.)
Once Plaintiff “regained [his] composure,” Plaintiff went to his cell door and yelled that
he needed medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff was not sent to healthcare until seven hours later. (Id.)
Plaintiff was examined and told to return if his symptoms worsened. (Id.) Around 8:00 p.m.,
Plaintiff began vomiting and was taken to healthcare, where he was “in and out of consciousness.”
(Id.) He was examined and transferred by ambulance to the local hospital where he was diagnosed
with a severe concussion and prescribed three medications. (Id.)
The following day, December 19, 2023, Plaintiff requested his medications that had been
prescribed by the hospital but was not given any medications. (Id., PageID.6.) Eight or nine days
later, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Wuest and explained that he was constantly throwing up,
nauseous, and experiencing migraines. (Id.) Defendant Wuest told Plaintiff that “just because the
hospital prescribes medications doesn’t mean that she has to give them to [Plaintiff].” (Id.)
Defendant Wuest refused to follow the recommendations of the hospital and did not provide
Plaintiff with any medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff eventually received two of the three medications
eleven days after the assault. (Id.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff brings Eighth Amendment claims against all
Defendants and seeks monetary relief. (Id., PageID.8.)

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II.

Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983

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is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994).
Here, Plaintiff brings Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force and failure to protect,
and for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
A.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2–
3.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the
governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments
are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has
waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has
not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court.
Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting
through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under Section 1983 for money damages.
See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison v.
Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) However,
as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under Section 1983 for money
damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official
capacities, and any claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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B.

Claims Against Unknown Party #1, named as “Unknown Medical Provider,”
and to the Extent Alleged, any Official Capacity Claims against any Party
Employed by “Unknown Medical Provider”

In listing the parties to his complaint, Plaintiff lists “Unknown Medical Provider,” which
the Court has identified as Unknown Party #1. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) It is a basic pleading
essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555–61 (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a
defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation
of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction
afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir.
2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was
involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged
violation of rights).
Here, Plaintiff does not make any factual allegations against Unknown Medical Provider
in the body of his complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant
did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556,
564 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)). In this action,
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Unknown Party #1, named as Unknown Medical Provider,
fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
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Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff intends Unknown Medical Provider to refer to an
outside entity that employs DRF healthcare staff, a private entity that contracts with the state to
perform a traditional state function like providing healthcare to inmates can “be sued under § 1983
as one acting ‘under color of state law.’” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993)
(quoting West, 487 U.S. at 54). The requirements for a valid Section 1983 claim against a
municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of
Section 1983. See Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that the holding in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), has been
extended to private corporations); Street, 102 F.3d at 817–18 (same); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t
Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 851–
52 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same).
As discussed above, official capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55). That is, an official capacity suit is to
be treated as a suit against the entity itself. Id. at 166 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–
72 (1985)). If Plaintiff intends to allege that any Defendant is employed by Unknown Medical
Provider, then an official capacity suit is treated as a suit against Unknown Medical Provider itself.
“Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while a municipality can be held liable for a constitutional
violation, there is no vicarious liability based on the acts of its employees alone.” Lipman v. Budish,
974 F.3d 726, 747 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 690–91). Instead, a municipality “can
be sued under § 1983 only when a policy or custom of that government caused the injury in
question.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he finding of a custom or policy is the initial determination
to be made in any municipal liability claim.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir.

9

1996). Further, the policy or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury,
and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity, and show
that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Turner v. City of
Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003)); Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d at 508–09.
Consequently, because the requirements for a valid Section 1983 claim against a
municipality apply equally to any outside medical provider, like a municipality’s liability, an
outside provider’s liability “must also be premised on some policy [or custom] that caused a
deprivation of [a prisoner’s constitutional] rights.” Starcher, 7 F. App’x at 465. Additionally, an
outside provider’s liability in a Section 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citation
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not identify any custom, policy, or practice by Unknown Medical
Provider that could be said to have caused any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Again,
Plaintiff does not refer to any actions by Unknown Medical Provider at all. Where a plaintiff fails
to allege that a policy or custom existed, dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim is
appropriate. Rayford v. City of Toledo, No. 86-3260, 1987 WL 36283, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1987).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to make any factual allegations against Unknown
Medical Provider, his claims against this party and any official capacity claims against any
individual Defendants employed by Unknown Medical Provider will be dismissed.
C.

Eighth Amendment Excessive Force and Failure to Protect Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schutt and Collins used excessive force against him, and
that Defendants Rewerts, Mates, Nevins, and Garcia failed to protect Plaintiff from the excessive
use of force.
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1.

Excessive Force

As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of
confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are
“totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to
a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and
discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under
common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth
Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034,
1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).
There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of Eighth
Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the
state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted
to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments
necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided
that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.
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at 9–10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The objective component requires
a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. at 8
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury
may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether
an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and in the light most favorable to him. Therefore, on initial review, the Court will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Schutt and Collins.
2.

Failure to Protect Claims

Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth
Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). For a prisoner to state an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d
757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011). An officer or other prison official is liable for another prison official’s
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use of excessive force where the defendant “‘observed or had reason to know that excessive force
would be or was being used’ and ‘had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm
from occurring.’” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997)); accord Alexander v. Carter for Byrd,
733 F. App’x 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2018); Partin v. Parris, No. 17-6172, 2018 WL 1631663, at *3
(6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018).
Again taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true as is required at this stage, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants
Rewerts, Mates, Nevins, and Garcia for failure to protect Plaintiff from the assault by Defendants
Schutt and Collins.
D.

Eighth Amendment Failure to Provide Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wuest failed to provide Plaintiff with medical care after
Plaintiff explained that he was constantly throwing up, nauseous, and experiencing migraines
following his hospitalization for the use of force by Defendants Schutt and Collins.
“The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a constitutional
obligation to provide medical care to those whom it detains.” Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d
554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Rhinehart v. Scutt,
894 F.3d 721, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2018); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.
2004)). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege
that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that
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he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective
component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s
need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899; see Phillips
v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited
to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may
be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would
deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–
51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an
“objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the
medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d
868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical
need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not
visually obvious).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can
be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Here, Plaintiff describes a grievous assault and a medical condition sufficiently serious that
outside medical providers determined that Plaintiff required continued medical care. Given
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Wuest was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition and the

14

recommendations for treatment but nonetheless refused to provide Plaintiff with any medical care,
the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Wuest at this
time.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendant
Unknown Party #1, named as “Unknown Medical Provider,” will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will
also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the remaining
Defendants. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Collins, Schutt, Wuest,
Rewerts, Mates, Garcia, Nevins, and Wuest in their induvial capacities remain in the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated:

March 11, 2025

/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
United States Magistrate Judge

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