Geeter v. Shubert, et al

Filing 17

OPINION; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN N O R T H E R N DIVISION

LO R E N ZO GEETER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Leonard Geeter, P la in tif f , F ile No. 2:08-CV-44 v. H O N . ROBERT HOLMES BELL R O S S SHUBERT and TERRY WILKINS, D e f e n d a n ts . / OPINION O n June 5, 2005, Leonard Geeter died of a massive pulmonary thromboembolism w h ile he was a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Plaintiff Lo re n zo Geeter, personal representative of the estate of Leonard Geeter, filed this civil rights a c tio n against Defendants Ross Shubert and Terry Wilkins, resident unit officers at the p ris o n , who were on duty the night of Leonard Geeter's death. This matter is before the C o urt on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 10). For the reasons that f o llow Defendants' motion will be granted. I. O n June 5, 2005, Leonard Geeter ("Geeter") was housed in Steamboat Unit, the s e gre ga tio n unit at the Chippewa Correctional Center ("URF") in Kincheloe, Michigan. He w a s 34 years old. On that date, Defendants Terry Wilkins and Ross Shubert worked the

2 :0 0 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. shift in Steamboat Unit. Wilkins was the desk officer and Shubert w a s assigned to B-Wing where Geeter was housed. (Dkt. No. 11, Defs.' Br., Ex. 3, Wilkins A f f . ¶¶ 3-4, and Ex. 4, Shubert Aff. ¶ 3.) On that date Geeter complained that he was not feeling well and that he needed m e d i c a t io n for breathing. (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 22.) (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 22.) At 7:30 p.m. Defendant S h u b e rt advised Defendant Wilkins that Geeter needed to be seen by health care. (Shubert A f f . ¶ 7; Wilkins Aff. ¶ 4.) Wilkins contacted Nurse Wendy Ball in health care at 7:30 p.m. a n d advised her of Geeter's complaints. (Wilkins Aff. ¶ 5; Ball Aff. ¶ 4; Pl. Ex. 6, p. 22). N u rs e Ball came to Steamboat Unit to check on Geeter at 7:38 p.m. (Shubert Aff. ¶ 7; W ilk in s Aff. ¶ 5.) At 7:40 p.m. Nurse Ball talked to Geeter at his cell. Geeter told her he w a s fine and refused health care. Geeter did not appear to be in any distress. He was calm, a n d he was able to breathe and move without difficulty. (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 23; Ball Aff. ¶ 5.) At 9:35 p.m. Nurse Ball called the segregation unit and asked the officer to check on G e e te r. (Ball. Aff. ¶ 8.) The officer returned the call and reported that Geeter was lying on th e floor and breathing. (Ball Aff. ¶ 8.) Nurse Ball returned to the segregation unit at 10:08 p .m . to recheck Geeter. Geeter was on the floor and appeared to be breathing. (Ball Aff. ¶ 9; Pl. Ex. 6, p. 24.) Nurse Ball and the officers entered the cell and found that Geeter was u n re s p o n s ive , was not breathing, and had no pulse. (Ball Aff. ¶ 9; Pl. Ex. 6, p. 24.) Nurse B a ll and the officers immediately initiated CPR and requested an AED and an ambulance. (B a ll Aff. ¶ 9; Pl. Ex. 6, p. 24.) The ambulance was summoned at 10:14 p.m. and the

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p a ra m e d ic s were at Geeter's cell at 10:20. p.m. (Pl. Ex. 2, p. 1.) Geeter had no pulse, and w a s not breathing. His skin was blue, he was cold to the touch, and his extremities were s tiff . (Pl. Ex. 2, p. 1.) Geeter was transported to the hospital at 10:38 p.m. (Ball Aff. ¶ 11.) G e e te r was pronounced dead on arrival at Chippewa County War Memorial Hospital at 1 0 :5 8 p.m. (Ball Aff. ¶ 12; Pl. Ex. 2, p. 1; Pl. Ex. 3, p. 3.) The report of the post mortem examination found massive bilateral pulmonary th ro m b o e m b o lu s and deep venous thrombosis of his right leg and determined the cause of d e a th to be pulmonary thromboembolus. (Pl. Ex. 4, p. 4.) Geeter's certificate of death in dic a te s that the causes of death were massive pulmonary thromboembolism and deep ve n o us thrombosis in his right leg. (Defs. Ex. 1 at ¶ 36.) The death certificate also indicates th at the approximate interval between onset and death was "minutes." (Id.) Plaintiff's complaint alleges three causes of action: a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment and two state claims for gross negligence and in te n tion a l infliction of emotional distress. II. D e fe n d a n ts have moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. U n d e r the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials who perform discretionary f u n c tio ns are generally shielded from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct d o e s not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable p e rs o n would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In this circuit

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th e analysis of the qualified-immunity defense generally proceeds under the two-step, s e q u e n tia l inquiry articulated by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2 0 0 1 ). Parsons v. City of Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2008).1 The threshold q u e s tion under Saucier is whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party a s s e rtin g the injury, show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right. S au c ie r, 533 U.S. at 201. "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the a lle ga tio ns established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified im m u nity." Id. "If the plaintiff does not establish the violation of a constitutional or s ta tu to ry right, the inquiry ends there and the official is entitled to immunity." Perez v. O ak lan d County, 466 F.3d 416, 426-27 (6th Cir. 2006). "On the other hand, if a violation c o u ld be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "Evaluating the defense of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment requires that we `a d o pt[ ] . . . the plaintiff's version of the facts.'" Parsons, 533 F.3d at 500 (quoting Scott v . Harris, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1775 (2007)). P la in tif f alleges that Defendants violated Geeter's Eighth Amendment right to be free f ro m cruel and unusual punishment by denying and delaying his access to medical care.

Some cases add a third step to the inquiry, asking whether the official's action was o b je c tive ly unreasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 5 0 3 , 511 (6th Cir. 2008). In light of this Court's determination that qualified immunity is a va ila b le at the first step of the sequential inquiry, the Court need not apply the second or th ird step of the inquiry.

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" T h e Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials from `unnecessarily and wantonly in f lic ting pain' on an inmate by acting with `deliberate indifference' toward the inmate's s e rio us medical needs." Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A deliberate indifference claim h a s both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1 99 4). "The objective component requires the existence of a `sufficiently serious' medical n e e d ." Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 1 0 4 ). "The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have `a s u ff ic ie n tly culpable state of mind in denying medical care.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. B a r g e r y , 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)). Turning first to the objective component, the Court must determine whether, viewing t h e evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has established that Geeter's m e d ic a l needs were "sufficiently serious." Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ). "A serious medical need is `one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating tre a tm e n t or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the n e c e ss ity for a doctor's attention.'" Id. (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897). "`Where the s e riou s n e s s of a prisoner's need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person,' this o b v io u s n e ss is itself sufficient to satisfy the objective component of the adequate medical c a re test." Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Blackmore, 390 F .3 d at 899).

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T h e post mortem examination of Geeter's body revealed that he had a deep venous th ro m b o s is in his right leg that resulted in a massive bilateral pulmonary thromboembolus th a t caused his death. (Pl. Ex. 4.) However, there is no evidence that this medical condition h a d been diagnosed by a physician even though Geeter had been seen by medical personal n u m e ro u s times in the weeks leading up to his death. Geeter was seen by a nurse on April 27, 2005, after complaining of headaches and a sore back and leg. Geeter gave the following history of his condition: States he has had little to no physical exercise in the past year, and has begun e x e rc is in g in cell x2 weeks. States he works out for about 2-3 hours straight a b o u t once a week. 2 days ago tripped while going up stairs. Caught himself w ith right leg. Denies having any pain immediately after tripping, but right c a lf began to ache the next day. States that it was a little tender to walk on ye s te rd a y, but today is much better. Today it only hurt when he was standing u p in cell for long period of time. (P l. Ex. 6, at p. 12.) The nurse diagnosed a calf strain and prescribed acetaminophen. (Id. a t 12-13.) On May 4, Geeter saw the nurse for a recheck of his leg sprain and he denied any d isc o m f o rt. (Id. at 14.) On May 6, Geeter was seen by a nurse regarding his complaints that he had been h a vin g migraine headaches on and off for the past couple of weeks, full sinuses, a stuffy n o s e and a sore throat. (Pl. Ex. 6, pp. 15, 17.) The nurse prescribed acetaminophen and a lle rgy medicine and advised Geeter to call if he had blurred vision, increased headaches, a change in the character of the headaches, or dizziness. (Id. at 17.) On May 24, Geeter was escorted to health services after experiencing a little vertigo

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a f te r working out. (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 19.) Geeter advised the nurse "I think I may have overdone it and felt a little light headed and dizzy after I was working out and sat down and felt a little w e a k but I went back to my cell drank some water and had something to eat and I feel a lot b e tte r." (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 18.) On May 27, Geeter was seen by a nurse regarding recurring symptoms of vertigo and m a l a is e . (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 20.) Geeter wondered if his episodes of dizziness could be from w o rk in g out too much or from sugar. (Id.) Geeter was rechecked on June 1, 2005, at which tim e he denied any dizziness. (Id. at 21.) In hindsight it is possible to question whether the symptoms Geeter had reported over th e course of the preceding weeks might have been related to his deep venous thrombosis. T h ere is no evidence, however, that any of the medical personnel who examined him drew th is connection, or that they had any idea that Geeter had a serious medical condition. B e c a u s e Geeter's serious medical condition was not obvious to the medical staff, there is no b a s is for finding that it would have been obvious to lay persons such as Defendants who d id not have medical training, did not examine Geeter, and did not have access to Geeter's m e d ic a l records. The seriousness of Geeter's condition was not apparent to the medical staff even on th e night of his death. Geeter was seen by a nurse at 7:40 p.m. after he complained to D e fe n d a n t Shubert that he was having difficulty breathing. Although Geeter refused

trea tm e n t from the nurse, the nurse was able to observe him and speak with him at the cell

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s id e . Geeter told the nurse he was fine and, according to the nurse, he did not appear to be in any distress. "He was calm, respirations easy and he was able to move without

d iff ic u lty." (Ball Aff. ¶ 5.) Because the nurse did not recognize the seriousness of Geeter's c o n d itio n on the evening of his death, there is no basis for finding that the seriousness of his c o n d itio n should have been obvious to Defendants. The fact that Geeter's need for medical care was not obvious does not end the Court's in q u iry under the objective component. "Where the claimed injury is minor or nonobvious, `th e seriousness of a prisoner's medical needs may also be decided by the effect of a delay in treatment.'" Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 877 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blackmore, 3 9 0 F.3d at 897). However, "`[v]erifying medical evidence' is required in those cases to `a ss e ss whether the delay caused a serious medical injury.'" Id. (quoting Blackmore, 390 F .3 d at 898). See also Johnson, 398 F.3d at 874 (holding that if the need involves minor m a la d ie s or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care, the inmate must p la c e verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment). Plaintiff has alleged that treatment was delayed, and he has presented affidavits from tw o prisoners who have stated that Defendants ignored Geeter's requests for medical a s s ista n c e earlier in the day. According to prisoner Brock-Bey, the following occurred while h e was locked in cell 5-201, and Geeter was in cell 5-205: At 2:00 PM I heard prisoner Geeter ask RUO Shubert to get the nurse for him b e c a u s e he was experiencing chest pains. I hear RUO Shubert tell Geeter "die

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b itch ." I then also seen RN Amy make nurse rounds and come to Geeter's c e ll + tell him that "you are just faking." (Pl. Ex. 9, Brock-Bey Aff.) According to prisoner John Nunley, the following occurred w h ile he was at Chippewa Correctional Facility on June 5, 2005: RUO Shubert walked to the top of the stairs and yelled down to Nurse Dawn a s she was making her medication round at around 6:00 PM and tell her dont w o rry about that peace of shit, theres nothing wrong with him, hes laying on th e floor, you dont have to go over there I'll keep an eye on him, and Nurse D a w n said alright. RUO Wilkins was working the desk that day on second s h if t, there was prisoners on the floor where the guy needed medical attention tryin g to get help for the prisoner but all the correctional officers on second s h if t refused to get him help. It was third shift that finally got help for that p riso n e r. (Pl. Ex. 10, Nunley Aff.) Defendants contend that the testimony of these two prisoners cannot be true because n e ith e r prisoner was in a location to have seen or heard these alleged occurrences. (Dkt. No. 16, Defs.' Reply Br. 2.) In support of their contention Defendants rely on an affidavit of R o s s Shubert that they contend will be filed separately under seal. (Id. at 3 n.1.) "When o p p o s in g parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the re c o rd , so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of th e facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, -- U .S . --, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). D e fe n d a n ts have not filed the affidavit referenced in their brief. 2 Accordingly,

Although Defendants make reference to an affidavit that will be filed under seal, (D k t. No. 16, Defs.' Reply Br., at pp. 2-3, n. 1, and Ex. 1), Defendants never sought leave to file this exhibit under seal and the exhibit has not been filed with the Court. 9

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P la in tif f's prisoner affidavits have not been contradicted by other evidence, and for purposes o f this summary judgment motion the Court is accordingly bound to view these affidavits in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Id. Nevertheless, even if the prisoners' statements a re believed, they do not create an issue of fact for trial because they only report on c o n ve rsa tion s that took place at 2:00 p.m and 6:00 p.m. There is no dispute that Defendants s u m m o ne d a nurse at 7:30 p.m., that Geeter saw a nurse at 7:40 p.m., and that he refused m e d ic a l care at that time. Geeter was not denied medical care, and Plaintiff has not come f o rw a rd with any verifying medical evidence to suggest that any delay in medical treatment c a u se d detriment to Geeter. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not satisfied the objective c o m p o n e n t of his Eighth Amendment claims. In addition, even if Plaintiff could satisfy the objective component of his claim, the e vid e n c e does not support a finding in Plaintiff's favor on the subjective component. "The s u b je c tive component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have `a sufficiently c u lp a b le state of mind in denying medical care.'" Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (quoting B r o w n , 207 F.3d at 867). "[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth A m e n d m e n t for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official k n o w s of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both b e aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious h a rm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "To satisfy

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th e subjective component of the adequate medical care test, an inmate must demonstrate that th e official in question `subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then disregarded it.'" J o h n s o n , 398 F.3d at 875 (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 1 )). "Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the e x is te n c e of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference." Blackmore, 390 F .3d at 895-96 (quoting Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th C ir.1 9 9 4 )). E v e n though Plaintiff has presented evidence of delay in treatment and a culpable s ta te of mind, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Defendants were a w a re of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious h a rm existed, or that they drew such an inference. In fact, it is undisputed that Defendants d id seek medical assistance on Geeter's behalf, and that even the medical professional who c a m e to treat Geeter did not perceive that there was a substantial risk of harm. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff h a s not come forward with evidence of an Eighth Amendment violation and the Defendants a re accordingly entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's constitutional claim. III. H a vin g determined that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's c o n s titu tio n a l claim, the only remaining claims in this case are Plaintiff's state law claims f or gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because no federal

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c la im s remain, the Court must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the re m a in in g state law claims. District courts have discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over s ta te law claims if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original ju risd ic tion ." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "`When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, th e balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or re m a n d in g them to state court if the action was removed.'" Novak v. MetroHealth Med. C tr ., 503 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 2007)(quoting Musson Theatrical v. Fed. Express Corp., 8 9 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir.1996)). The decision on whether to exercise supplemental ju ris d ic tio n depends on "judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Musson, 89 F .3d at 1254 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). Because the Court is entering summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal claim on the gro un ds of qualified immunity at the early stages of this case, considerations of judicial e c o n o m y, convenience, fairness, and comity do not weigh in favor of exercising s u p p le m e n ta l jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Plaintiff's state law claims will a c c o rd in gly be dismissed without prejudice. An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

D a te :

October 10, 2008

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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