McClinton #507807 v. McQuiggin

Filing 27

ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 25 ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

SHABREA MCCLINTON,
Petitioner,

Case No. 2:10-cv-171

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

GREG MCQUIGGIN,
Respondent.
/

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On May 10, 2013, U.S. Magistrate Judge Greeley entered a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that Petitioner’s § 2254 habeas petition be
dismissed with prejudice. Doc. No. 25. Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. Doc. No.
26. This Court is required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the R&R
to which objections have been filed, and may accept, reject, or modify any or all of the
Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b).
In his objections, Petitioner points out that he is only challenging his conviction for
witness intimidation. Petitioner asserts that Magistrate Judge Greeley erred in failing to
analyze whether the trial court’s decision to deny admission of relevant evidence of Officer
Smigielski’s bias violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights by preventing him from presenting
a defense. As Magistrate Judge Greeley explained in the R&R:
Petitioner asserted that in a prior incident he made a statement
to officer Smiegielski that one day Petitioner would pull

something out of his coat, like a cell phone or something, and
make it look like he had a gun so officer Smigielski would shoot
him. Officer Smigielski then stated if Petitioner pulled
something out, and Smiegielski believed it was a gun, he would
shoot Petitioner. The trial court found that inquiry was not
relevant to the current action. The Michigan Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence
that was not relevant.
Doc. No. 25, pp. ID 102-03. Magistrate Judge Greeley found that Plaintiff had failed to raise
a constitutional issue, and further found that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision did not
result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or result
in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
As Petitioner correctly points out, the Supreme Court has recognized that, for
evidentiary questions, the question turns to “whether the admission of the evidence violated
[Petitioner’s] federal constitutional rights.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s denial of the evidence violated his constitutional rights
by preventing him from presenting a defense.
The Sixth Circuit, in addressing a similar issue, has stated the following:
“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 690 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Attendant to this right is ensuring the defendant an
opportunity to present witnesses in his defense. See Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988). However, “[t]he accused
does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is
incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under
standard rules of evidence.” Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410 (emphasis
added); Rockwell v. Yukins, 341 F.3d 507m, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)
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(“[T]he Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that the right
to present a “complete” defense is not an unlimited right to ride
roughshod over reasonable evidentiary restrictions... Rather,
she ‘must comply with established rules of procedure and
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability ...”
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
The Michigan Rules of Evidence applied by the trial judge mirror
their federal counterparts and are patently “standard rules of
evidence.” Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed its “traditional reluctance to impose constitutional
constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts.”
Crane, 476 U.S. at 689.
Couturier v. Vasbinder, 385 Fed. Appx. 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court finds that the
proposed evidence was irrelevant for the purpose for which it was offered, which was to
establish credibility and bias. The trial court’s exclusion of that evidence therefore did not
violate Petitioner’s constitutional right to present a defense.

The Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Greeley’s finding on this issue.
Petitioner next asserts that Magistrate Judge Greeley erred in concluding that there
was sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of witness intimidation. The Court agrees with
Magistrate Judge Greeley’s analysis of this issue.
Finally, Petitioner asserts that Magistrate Judge Greeley erred in concluding that it
was not a constitutional error for the trial court to shackle Petitioner to the floor during trial,
without providing specific reasons necessitating such a restriction. Petitioner asserts that
the Michigan Court of Appeals and Magistrate Judge Greeley failed to consider the holding
in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). Petitioner states that the trial court did not
provide an “adequate justification” for its shackling, and asserts that this is required by
Deck. Petitioner further asserts that, pursuant to Deck, a defendant need not demonstrate
actual prejudice to make out a due process violation.

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As the Michigan Court of Appeals noted, “nothing in the record supports that the jury
knew defendant was shackled during trial.” Court of App. Op., p. 4. Without such evidence,
prejudice cannot be presumed as it was in Deck, which involved visible restraints. See
United States v. Busch, 411 Fed. Appx. 872, 876 (6th Cir. 2011). Petitioner’s objection is
without merit.
Petitioner’s objections to the R&R [Doc. No. 26] are without merit and are DENIED.
Magistrate Judge Greeley’s R&R [Doc. No. 25] is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the
opinion of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and W.D. Mich. L. Civ. R. 72.3(b).
The petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED and
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
If Petitioner files a notice of appeal, it will be treated as an application for a certificate
of appealability which shall be DENIED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App.
P. 22(b)(1); and Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Reasonable jurists could not find that this decision
to dismiss Petitioner’s claims is debatable or wrong.
A Judgment consistent with this Memorandum and Order will be entered.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

9/30/2013

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. Allan Edgar
United States District Judge

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