Morris #205193 v. Henson et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

LAVARON MORRIS, #205193,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:11-cv-138

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

CHRISTINE HENSON, et al.,
Defendants.
/

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lavaron Morris, an inmate currently confined at Chippewa Correctional
Facility (URF), filed this pro se civil rights law suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Law Library Worker Christian Henson (it appears from the filings that this
defendant’s name is actually Christine), Law Library Manager Amanda Winnicki, Warden
Greg McQuiggin, and MDOC Director Patricia L. Caruso. On June 21, 2011, this Court
entered an Order dismissing defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso for failure to
state a claim, leaving Defendant Henson as the only remaining defendant. Doc. No. 9.
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56.

Doc. No. 14.

The Court has reviewed this motion, along with its

accompanying brief [Doc. No. 15] and Plaintiff’s responses [Doc. No. 19, 20], and the matter
is now ready for decision.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk
Western Railroad, Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). Material facts are those facts
that might affect the outcome of the action under the governing substantive law. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61
F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1995).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the facts in the record
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge credibility
of witnesses, or determine the truth of matters reasonably in dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249; Talley, 61 F.3d at 1245.
Defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of
material fact in dispute. Defendant may satisfy this burden either by presenting affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, or by demonstrating the
absence of evidence to support a claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Rodgers v. Banks, 344
F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). Once Defendant meets this initial burden, Plaintiff is required
to come forward with probative evidence and facts to support his claim and show that a trial
is necessary to resolve a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322;
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Van Gorder, 509 F.3d at 268. A scintilla of evidence is
insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. Rather, there

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must be admissible evidence on which a reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Van Gorder, 509 F.3d at 268.
Facts
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the posted rules at URF require that prisoners
requesting a loan for copies must include documentation showing that the photocopies are
necessary as defined by policy. Plaintiff states that on July 18, 2010, he requested
photocopies for a Michigan Supreme Court deadline of July 23, 2010 in People v. Morris,
Case No. 297264. On July 20, 2010, Plaintiff asked his unit Corrections Officer Shroeder
to check on the photocopies. When Corrections Officer Shroeder asked Defendant Henson
if the copies were ready, she said that they were not. Defendant Henson denied Plaintiff’s
request on July 21, 2010, stating that Plaintiff had insufficient funds to pay for the
photocopies and that his deadline was not her problem. On July 22, 2010, Plaintiff wrote
to the Michigan Supreme Court clerk and explained that he had to send his pleadings to his
sister, who copied them and overnighted them to the court. However, the Michigan
Supreme Court did not receive the pleadings until after the deadline and they were rejected
by the court as untimely. Plaintiff filed the present suit, seeking equitable relief.
Access to the Courts
In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant Henson argues that Plaintiff has
failed to allege that his underlying claim was nonfrivolous and cannot show intentional
conduct on the part of Defendant Henson. It is well established that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). In
order to state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must
show “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Talley-Bey v.

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Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999). In order to show actual injury, the underlying
cause of action must be described in the complaint, and the underlying cause of action must
assert a non-frivolous claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis, 518
U.S. at 353.
Plaintiff’s complaint states that, “[o]n July 18, 2010, Prisoner Morris had a Michigan
Supreme Court deadline of July 23, 2010. People v. Morris, COA#297264[.]” Compl., Doc.
No. 1, p. 4 of 21. He further states that he has “suffered irrapable [sic] damage where he
is now permanently barred to appeal his wrongful conviction and may possibly face the rest
of his life in prison as an innocent man.” Compl., Doc. No. 1, p. 6 of 21. These are the only
references in Plaintiff’s complaint to the underlying cause of action. By only making a
conclusory statement that his underlying claim was to pursue a wrongful conviction,
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the nature of the claims that he sought to present to the
Michigan Supreme Court. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his
burden of describing the underlying cause of action in his complaint in a manner sufficient
to “apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying
claim is more than hope.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416.
In Brown v. Matauszak, the plaintiff similarly failed to include a description of the
underlying cause of action in his complaint. 2011 WL 285251, at *614-15 (6th Cir. Jan 31,
2011). The Sixth Circuit, however, was able to review the plaintiff’s motion for relief from
judgment, which did describe the underlying claim. Id. at 614. The Court, finding that the
plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment presented sufficient facts to raise non-frivolous
issues and noting that, “in th[o]se unique circumstances,” the district court had discretion

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to grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to include those non-frivolous issues,
remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Id. at 614, 617.
The Court finds the present case to be distinguishable from Brown. In this case,
unlike in Brown, the Court has not received any evidence of the claims alleged by Plaintiff
in his attempted filing with the Michigan Supreme Court, and therefore has no knowledge
of any non-frivolous claims being asserted in the underlying cause of action. The Court
does not have the benefit of reading the proposed documents that were to be filed with the
Michigan Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s response to Defendant Henson’s summary judgment
motion also does not clarify what his underlying claims were. The Court therefore does not
find it necessary or appropriate to allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint based on Brown.
In Dorn v. Lafler, the Sixth Circuit found that a plaintiff was entitled to a presumption
of prejudice when the alleged actions of defendants interfered with his timely filing of a
direct appeal and led to the dismissal of that appeal. 601 F.3d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 2010),
abrogated on other grounds by Werth v. Bell, 2012 WL 3667226 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2012).
The Sixth Circuit based its conclusion on the following Supreme Court case language: “The
even more serious denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted
at the time and to which he had a right, ... demands a presumption of prejudice.” Id., citing
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000). In the present case, Plaintiff’s direct
appeals of his conviction had already been filed and denied, and he had most recently filed
a delayed application for leave to appeal an order denying a successive motion for relief
from judgment with the Michigan Court of Appeals. Doc. No. 15-5, Ex. D, p. 2 of 2. That
application was denied. Id. Presumably then, Plaintiff was attempting to file an appeal of
that most recent denial with the Michigan Supreme Court. Since the procedural posture of

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the present case is significantly different from that found in Dorn, which involved the filing
of a direct appeal, the Court does not find a presumption of prejudice to be appropriate.
Given Plaintiff’s failure to describe a non-frivolous claim in his underlying cause of
action within his complaint, Defendant Henson is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
First Amendment access to the courts claim. Given that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim is
proper on this basis, the Court finds it unnecessary to address Defendant Henson’s
qualified immunity argument.
Retaliation
In his response to Defendant Henson’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states
that he was attempting to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim in his complaint. Doc.
No. 20, p. 5 of 9. Specifically, Plaintiff states that he was taking the protected action of
trying to gain access to the courts when Defendant Henson took adverse action against
him, and that he was “racially discriminated against and this is a retaliatory action.” Id., p.
4 of 9.
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates
the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he
was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would
deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse
action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at
394. Moreover, Plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was
a substantial or motivating factor in Defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v.

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Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001), citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a causal connection between his conduct of
accessing the courts and Defendant Henson’s alleged adverse action. A complaint “must
contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements necessary
to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108
F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997), citing In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.
1993). Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim.
Sovereign Immunity
Defendant Henson argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
official capacity claim against her because such claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Any claims against Defendant Henson in her official capacity do not state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989) (claims against a state agency or an official in his/her official capacity
are claims against the state, and are not claims against a “person” subject to Section 1983
liability); Frederick v. Abramajtys, 1995 WL 564321 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1995). Moreover, the
Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State or one of its agencies in federal court
unless the state has given express consent, regardless of the relief sought. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), overruled in part on other
grounds by Will, 491 U.S. 58; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 731, 732 (1978) (state and board
of corrections).1 The State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in the federal

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The Sixth Circuit has held that since an official capacity suit for retroactive relief,
such as monetary damages, is deemed to be against the State, whose officers are the
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courts. See Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6t Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Amendment
therefore bars official capacity suits for damages against its employees. Plaintiff’s official
capacity claim against Defendant Henson is properly dismissed.
Conclusion
The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Henson’s motion for summary judgment [Doc.
No. 14]. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A judgment consistent with this Memorandum and Order will be entered.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

9/17/2012

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. ALLAN EDGAR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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nominal Defendants, the claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Doe v. Wigginton,
21 F.3d 733, 736-737 (6th Cir. 1994).
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