Morris #205193 v. Henson et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
LAVARON MORRIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:11-cv-138
v.
Honorable R. Allan Edgar
CHRISTIAN HENSON, et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso. The Court will serve the
complaint against Defendant Henson.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff Lavaron Morris, an inmate at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF),
filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Law Library
Worker Christian Henson, Law Library Manager Amanda Winnicki, Warden Greg McQuiggin, and
MDOC Director Patricia L. Caruso. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the posted rules at URF
require that prisoners requesting a loan for copies must include documentation showing that the
photocopies are necessary as defined by policy. Plaintiff states that on July 18, 2010, he requested
photocopies for a Michigan Supreme Court deadline of July 23, 2010 in People v. Morris, Case No.
297264. On July 20, 2010, Plaintiff asked his unit Corrections Officer Shroeder to check on the
photocopies. When Corrections Officer Shroeder asked Defendant Henson if the copies were ready,
she said that they were not. Defendant Henson denied Plaintiff’s request on July 21, 2010, stating
that Plaintiff had insufficient funds to pay for the photocopies and that his deadline was not her
problem. On July 22, 2010, Plaintiff wrote to the Michigan Supreme Court clerk and explained that
he had to send his pleadings to his sister, who copied them and overnighted them to the court.
However, the Michigan Supreme Court did not receive his pleadings until after the deadline and they
were rejected by the court as untimely.
Plaintiff states that Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso failed to take
corrective action, despite his complaints. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants conspired to violate his
right of access to the courts. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief.
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II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
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Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Initially, the court notes that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of
specificity and that vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be
sufficient to state such a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538
(6th Cir. 1987); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff fails to allege any
specific facts showing that Defendants conspired to violate his rights. Rather, it appears that
Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso merely failed to take corrective action, despite his
complaints regarding the conduct of Defendant Henson.
Liability under Section 1983 must be based on more than merely the right to control
employees. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1981); Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, Section 1983 liability cannot be premised upon mere
allegations of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Polk, 454 U.S. at 325. A party cannot
be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party personally participated in, or
otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
See e.g. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932
(1990); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). See also
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 845 (1984).
Supervisory officials can be held liable for the acts of their subordinates only if
plaintiff establishes that the supervisor failed to appropriately discharge his supervisory duties, and
that this failure resulted in a denial or deprivation of plaintiff’s federal rights. See e.g. Leach, 891
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F.2d at 1246; Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the failure of a
supervisor to supervise, control or train the offending employee is not actionable absent a showing
that the official implicitly encouraged, authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, or in some
other way directly participated in, the offensive conduct. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. Such a claim
requires, at a minimum, that the official had knowledge of the offending employee’s conduct at a
time when the conduct could be prevented, or that such conduct was otherwise foreseeable or
predictable. See e.g. Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, plaintiff must
show that defendant had some duty or authority to act. See e.g. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959
(6th Cir. 1989) (lower level official not liable for shortcomings of building); Ghandi v. Police Dept.
of City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 351 (6th Cir. 1984) (mere presence at the scene is insufficient
grounds to impose Section 1983 liability in the absence of a duty to act); accord Hall v. Shipley, 932
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, merely bringing a problem to the attention of a supervisory
official is not sufficient to impose such liability. See Shelly v. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 941, 946 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (Hillman, C.J.), aff’d 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988). Finally, supervisory liability claims
cannot be based on simple negligence. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F. Supp.
335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff’d 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and
Caruso were personally involved in the activity which forms the basis of his claim. The only roles
that Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso had in this action involve the denial of
administrative grievances or the failure to act. Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso cannot
be liable for such conduct under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against
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Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso are properly dismissed for lack of personal
involvement.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Winnicki, McQuiggin, and Caruso will be dismissed for failure
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The
Court will serve the complaint against Defendant Henson.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
6/21/2011
/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. Allan Edgar
United States District Judge
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