Gresham #272603 et al v. Canlis et al
Filing
11
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL GRESHAM,
RALPH DENNIS,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 2:11-cv-179
v.
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell
B. CANLIS et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by two state prisoners pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff Ralph Dennis leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read
Plaintiffs’ pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the claims by Plaintiff Ralph Dennis
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.1
1
The claims by Plaintiff Michael Gresham are addressed in a separate order entered on this date.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Michael Gresham presently is incarcerated at the Marquette Branch Prison
(MBP) and Plaintiff Ralph Dennis is incarcerated at the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility
(AMF). Plaintiffs sue Dr. B. Canlis; Physician’s Assistant Margaret Comfort; Nurse Gloria Gill;
Resident Unit Officer (RUO) Ty Hyatt; Sergeant (unknown) Frechen; Assistant Resident Unit
Supervisor (ARUS) Tammy Gajewski; Hearing Investigator Juli Green; Lieutenant Steven
Santorelli; RUO Lance Miller; Lieutenant (unknown) Yakovich; George Pramstaller; Nancy Martin;
Craig Hutchinson; and unknown parties at Correctional Medical Quality Assurance Services.
The bulk of the complaint centers on conduct by prison officials directed at Plaintiff
Michael Gresham. According to the complaint, Gresham has filed claims against employees of the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) that are still pending in separate actions. Gresham
claims that staff at all MDOC prisons “have commenced a campaign of harassment and retaliation
against him due to his litigation.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#6.) The complaint states that
Gresham was sexually assaulted and a razor was placed in his food. When Gresham arrived at AMF,
Defendants Hyatt and Miller shook him down, wrote two false misconduct tickets, stole his property,
and placed him on food loaf. Lieutenant Santorelli assisted in confiscating Gresham’s property and
gave false responses to Plaintiff’s grievances. Hearing Investigator Green refused to investigate the
misconduct charges against Gresham, refused to interview witnesses, and told Gresham he was a
“nigger who was white and a nigger [be]cause he helped both black [and] white and people of all
nationality and color.” (Id. at Page ID#10.)
On April 26, 2011, Gresham gave legal mail to Gajewski for approval. The mail
included affidavits from Plaintiff Dennis and other prisoners who had witnessed retaliation against
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Gresham. Gajewski took the mail, issued a “class 2” ticket, and never returned the mail. (Compl.,
at Page ID#10.) Gajewski also refused to provide legal supplies and aided staff in opening
Gresham’s letters to the Court and removing their contents. Gajewski told Gresham that he would
never see the general population yard or his family alive if he kept reporting to the courts what was
happening in MDOC prisons.
On May 6, 2011, RUOs Hyatt and Miller told Gresham “You ain’t got no court
coming, your mail will never make it to the Judge Batchelder or [Maloney.] If we can outsmart you
we can always outsmart the district court.” (Compl., at Page ID#11.) Defendant Santorelli found
Plaintiff guilty of falsifying documents, claiming that Gresham was sending legal forms to a nonlegal mailing address. According to the complaint, Gajewski, Hyatt, Miller, Santorelli, and Green
retaliated against, or conspired to retaliate against, Gresham for his involvement in litigation against
MDOC officials.
With respect to Plaintiff Dennis, the complaint alleges: (1) that he needs corrective
surgery for his right ankle, an ankle brace and pain medication (Compl., at Page ID#1); (2) that he
held certain medical kites for Gresham (id. at Page ID#10); (3) that he prepared affidavits for
Gresham, which were stolen by prison officials (id. at Page ID#13); (4) that separation from
Gresham would hinder Dennis’s ability to bring a case (id. at Page ID#14); (5) that Plaintiffs “had
a basic human right to have supervision and relief under that supervision of AMF healthcare mental
health units grievance procedure to ensure safe and humane conditions per [MDOC Policy Directive]
03.03.130 was a basic human need that both Plaintiffs were deprived of” (id. at Page ID#18); (6) that
supervising Defendants did not respond to grievances, follow operating procedures, or correct
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violations of Plaintiffs’ rights after learning of them (id. at Page ID#19); and (7) that the totality of
the conditions of the prison violated Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights (id. at Page ID#21).
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
The allegations in the complaint identify conduct by various prison officials
implicating the rights of Plaintiff Gresham; however, none of the allegations states a claim for relief
by Plaintiff Dennis. Construing Plaintiffs’ complaint indulgently, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any
particular Defendants engaged in conduct that violated Dennis’s constitutional rights. It is a basic
pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, Plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to
give a defendant fair notice of the claim). See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (“[A] plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.”). Plaintiffs’ allegations fall short of the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Where a person is named as a defendant without an
allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal
construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.
2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims where complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation
of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000)
(requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-
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1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals
are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would
suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”) Thus, to the extent Dennis pursues
a claim on his own behalf, he has not alleged any unconstitutional conduct on the part of any named
Defendants. To the extent Dennis pursues claims based on the violation of Gresham’s rights, he
lacks standing to do so. See Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989).
Moreover, to the extent Dennis claims that MDOC officials failed to treat his medical
conditions or otherwise violated his Eighth Amendment rights, there are no allegations supporting
such a claim. In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). There is no allegation that
any of the named Defendants made decisions regarding Plaintiff’s medical care, much less that they
were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to Dennis’s health or safety.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff Dennis sues any of the Defendants for their
supervisory role over conduct at issue in the complaint, government officials may not be held liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional
violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575
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(6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates
are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d
at 575; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Furthermore,
§ 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance
or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Defendants are not liable to Plaintiff Dennis merely because
of their supervisory role over conduct at issue in the complaint.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff Dennis’s claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: July 29, 2011
/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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