Jackson #282320 v. Straub et al
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 29 re 3 , 18 , 12 , 10 , 19 ; Defendants' objections 34 are GRANTED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART; Plaintiff's objections 30 are OVERRULED; Defendants' Motion [ 12] for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; Plaintiff's Motion 3 for TRO and Motions 10 , 18 are DISMISSED AS MOOT; Plaintiff's Motion 19 for Order to Testify is DENIED; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
CURTIS O. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:11-cv-261
v.
HON. GORDON J. QUIST
DENNIS STRAUB, et al.,
Defendants.
/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On February 17, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R &
R”) (docket no. 29) recommending that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in
part and denied in part. The R & R recommended that this Court grant summary judgment in favor
of Defendants Straub, Caron and Larson, but deny summary judgment as to Defendants Alexander
and Salmi. Plaintiff, Curtis Jackson, filed Objections to the R & R. (Docket no. 30.) Defendants
Alexander and Salmi also filed Objections. (Docket no. 34.) “The district judge must determine
de novo any part of the Magistrate Judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After conducting a de novo review of the R & R, all parties’ Objections, and the
pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that the R & R should be adopted, but
Defendant Alexander’s objection will be partially granted.
The R & R also recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order
(docket no. 3) should be dismissed as moot, Plaintiff’s motions for contempt (docket nos. 10 & 18)
should be dismissed as moot, and Plaintiff’s motion for an order that he be allowed to testify on his
own behalf in response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (docket no. 19) be denied.
No party has objected to these findings. Finding no error, the Court will adopt the portions of the
R & R that recommends these motions (docket nos. 3, 10, 18 & 19) be dismissed or denied.
I.
Plaintiff’s Objections (docket no. 30)
Plaintiff objects, very generally, to the R & R’s recommendation that summary judgment
should be granted in favor of Defendants Straub, Caron, and Larson. The objections are conclusory
legal allegations couched in factual terms that the Defendants are liable under the Eighth
Amendment and that the Defendants did have the requisite involvement to be liable under Section
1983. Plaintiff’s filing of general and vague objections is tantamount to a failure to object. See
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, this Court agrees with the R & R that
Plaintiff does not put forth sufficient evidence to maintain a Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim
against Defendants Straub, Caron, and Larson. Therefore, the R & R’s recommendation to grant
summary judgment as to Defendants Straub, Caron, and Larson will be adopted and these defendants
will be dismissed.
II.
Defendants Alexander’s and Salmi’s Objections (docket no. 34)
Defendants Alexander and Salmi raise two objections to the R & R. First, they object that
Plaintiff failed to establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. Second, they
argue that Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation was a reasonable response to the risk
that Plaintiff faced.
1.
Objective component of Eighth Amendment claim
The failure to protect a prisoner from a risk of harm must be objectively “sufficiently
serious.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US.
825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994)). “While a prisoner does not need to demonstrate that he
has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal safety claim, he must establish that he
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reasonably feared such an attack.” Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, in Thompson, although the plaintiffs alleged instances of physical violence, the court
found that the prisoners’ fear were not reasonable because the prisoners did not provide any
evidence that the alleged instances of physical violence were in any way related to the alleged
constitutional wrong. Thompson, 29 F.3d at 243.
Here, Defendants argue, “Plaintiff failed to show that his risk of harm was objectively
sufficiently serious” because his risk of harm was “primarily hypothetical, not actual.” Defendants
contend that “reasonable fear” must stem from past actual violence and, here, Plaintiff has not
provided sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to show he had a reasonable fear of
future attacks stemming from past actual violence.
Plaintiff’s allegations and letters suggest, taken in the light most favorable to him, that he
had a reasonable fear for his safety. According to Plaintiff, many prisoners sought to attack him,
including putting a bounty out for him, and, on or near December 2, 2010, Plaintiff was assaulted
and almost stabbed. These events, if true, create a reasonable fear of attack. Thus, Plaintiff had a
reasonable fear of being attacked which was a direct result of Defendant Alexander’s failure to
sufficiently protect Plaintiff.
As to Defendant Salmi, however, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that Defendant
Salmi’s alleged unconstitutional conduct–discussing Plaintiff’s self-created and false involvement
in a case with other prisoners–was in any way related to his allegations of being attacked or fearing
for his safety. “Eighth Amendment claims may not be based on the totality of circumstances, but
rather must identify a specific condition that violates the inmates’ right to personal safety.”
Thompson, 29 F.3d at 242. The specific condition that Plaintiff alleges violated his right to personal
safety was Defendant Salmi’s inappropriate discussions with other prisoners. To withstand
summary judgment, Plaintiff must provide evidence that he was attacked or feared for his safety
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because of the alleged constitutional wrong. Thompson, 29 F.3d at 243. Plaintiff solely relies on
his attestation that he was attacked by “a prisoner name[d] Daniel” on February 25, 2011, because
of Defendant Salmi’s actions.
Plaintiff does not withstand Defendant Salmi’s motion for summary judgment because he
does not come forth with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor.
First, Plaintiff alleges throughout his complaint that the “Vice Lords” had a death threat put out for
him, he had been assaulted and threatened to be assaulted numerous times, and all prisoners
throughout the MDOC knew of (and apparently many resented) his involvement with the Casey
Anthony trial. Second, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Salmi six weeks before the
alleged attack that occurred “as a result” of Defendant Salmi’s actions. Thus, besides Plaintiff’s
unsubstantiated attestation that he was attacked “as a result” of Defendant Salmi’s discussions,
which amounts to a scintilla of evidence, see infra, n.1, Plaintiff has not put forth any other
admissible evidence to suggest that “Daniel” attacked him because of Defendant Salmi’s purported
discussions with other prisoners, rather than because of the inmates’ general resentment towards
Plaintiff or because of the Vice Lords’ bounty that already existed before Defendant Salmi’s actions.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) (stating that a mere scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position will be insufficient to withstand summary
judgment). In fact, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence, other than his own allegations through
his affidavits and grievances that could lead to the conclusion he was attacked because of Defendant
Salmi’s actions.1 Therefore, Defendant Salmi’s objection will be granted and Plaintiff’s claim
against her will be dismissed.
Therefore, Defendants’ objection is granted as to Defendant Salmi.
1
According to the responses that Plaintiff received from his grievance regarding Defendant Salmi’s alleged
misconduct, the MDOC also found Plaintiff’s allegations wholly unbelievable and without support.
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2.
Reasonableness of Defendants’ response
“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be
found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was
not averted.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1982-83 (1994). “Reasonable
safety” is a standard that takes into account prison officials’ task of keeping dangerous men in safe
custody under humane conditions. Id. at 844-45, 114 S. Ct. at 1983 (internal citations omitted).
Defendant Alexander put Plaintiff in administrative segregation on December 8, 2010. Even
though Plaintiff was classified to administrative segregation for an unrelated misconduct ticket,
administrative segregation was a reasonable response to keep Plaintiff safe. Administrative
segregation is the “most restrictive level of security classification” in the Michigan Department of
Prisons (MDOC). Furthermore, Plaintiff requested protective custody, but Marquette Branch Prison
(MBP) does not have “protective housing.” (Docket no. 17-1 at 19.) Moreover, protective housing
is only for those prisoners “who do not require placement in administrative segregation,” (id.), and
here, after December 8, 2010, Plaintiff required placement in administrative segregation. Therefore,
Defendant Alexander cannot be liable after December 8, 2010, the date which Plaintiff was placed
in administrative segregation at MBP.
However, Plaintiff provides a letter that he allegedly sent to Defendant Alexander on
November 29, 2010. An MDOC Director’s Office Memorandum that Plaintiff provided (docket no.
17-1 at 19-20) states that when a general population prisoner requests protection, the prisoner shall
be placed in temporary segregation. Here, even though the memorandum was sent to prison
wardens after November 29, 2010, the Court considers the letter to describe what would have been
a reasonable response. According to Plaintiff, he was not put into temporary segregation and,
subsequently, prisoners assaulted him and attempted to stab him before he was moved to
administrative segregation. Therefore, this Court does not think that Defendant Alexander
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responded reasonably between the time of receiving the November 29, 2010, letter from Plaintiff
and December 8, 2010. For the time in between these dates, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
against Defendant Alexander will proceed.2
As to Defendant Salmi, discussing Plaintiff’s involvement with other prisoners would only
add more fuel to other prisoner’s fire to be upset with Plaintiff for his alleged participation as a
“snitch.” Even though this Court seriously questions the validity of these allegations, if proven to
be true, Defendant Salmi’s actions would not be considered a reasonable response to Plaintiff’s
safety concerns. Thus, Defendant Salmi’s objection that she responded reasonably is overruled.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
issued February 17, 2012 (docket no. 29) is ADOPTED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ objections (docket no. 34) are GRANTED
IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART. Defendants’ objections are granted insofar as Plaintiff’s
claim against Defendant Alexander is limited to the time between receiving a complaint regarding
the need for protective custody and December 8, 2010, and also granted insofar as Plaintiff’s claim
against Defendant Salmi is dismissed.
2
Like the Magistrate Judge, this Court seriously questions Plaintiff’s ability to prevail on his claims at trial.
His complaint, allegations, and exhibits are riddled with inconsistencies and fallacies. For example, despite being
transferred to a different prison on March 9, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that, as of October, 2011, Defendant Alexander
continues to ignore his requests. Of course, as of any date past March 9, 2011, Defendant Alexander had nothing to do
with Plaintiff’s incarceration. In addition, the most glaring fallacy is Plaintiff’s figment-of-the-imagination ties to the
“Casey Anthony case,” which he continues to allege his matter-of-fact involvement–all of which makes his allegations
and sworn-to statements to be less believable. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges instances when he was assaulted or when his
ankles were cut with razors, yet Plaintiff does not provide a single medical record or evaluation of such an event.
Furthermore, Plaintiff references a great deal of complaints and grievances, but only attaches a select few to his
complaint and response to summary judgment–leading this Court to question the number of actual grievances or letters
Plaintiff filed. Of course, all of this added up leads this Court to question whether Plaintiff’s allegations of assaults,
grievances, Defendants’ inappropriate conduct, and complaints are just as fictional as his letters that he allegedly
received from Casey Anthony. Unfortunately, a jury may have to answer that question.
At the same time, this Court cannot completely rule out the existence, or lack thereof, of documents supporting
or refuting Plaintiff’s claim. If such documents did not exist, this Court expects that Defendants would have provided
that information in their motion for summary judgment to prevent this matter from going to trial.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s objections (docket no. 30) are
OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no.
12) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is granted as to Defendants Straub,
Caron, Larson, and Salmi, and partially granted as to Defendant Alexander. It is partially denied
as to Defendant Alexander.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
(docket no. 3) and Motions for Contempt (docket nos. 10 & 18) are DISMISSED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Testify (docket no. 19)
is DENIED.
Dated: March 28, 2012
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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