Sareini #203519 v. Michigan Parole Board et al

Filing 7

OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

ALI SAREINI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:12-cv-37

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

MICHIGAN PAROLE BOARD et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed because the Michigan Parole
Board is immune and Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the remaining Defendants.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff currently is incarcerated in the Newberry Correctional Facility. He pleaded
guilty in the Wayne County Circuit Court to second-degree murder and was sentenced on September
7, 1989 to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Plaintiff’s complaint concerns parole
proceedings that ultimately resulted in the Michigan Parole Board withdrawing interest in granting
Plaintiff parole. He sues the Michigan Parole Board (MPB), MPB Chairperson Tom Combs and
MPB Members Barbara Sampson and Stephen DeBoer.
Plaintiff had his first parole interview after serving ten years in prison. The parole
board found no interest in considering Plaintiff for parole and scheduled him for another interview
in five years. In 2003, the parole board again passed Plaintiff over for parole consideration. Plaintiff
contends that, in reaching that decision, the Parole Board erroneously considered the parole
eligibility report for prisoner Vernon White #203591, which had been placed in Plaintiff’s file.1 In
November 2008, after serving twenty years in prison, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant
DeBoer. DeBoer found interest in granting Plaintiff parole and a public hearing was scheduled in
accordance with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(6). The public hearing was held on December 15,
2009. The only individuals present at the hearing were Petitioner, DeBoer and the Attorney General.
The hearing record reflected that there was no objection lodged and that the victim’s family had not
registered to be notified in the event of a public hearing on Plaintiff’s parole.
Defendants issued a decision on February 5, 2010, withdrawing interest in paroling
Plaintiff. According to the decision, Plaintiff minimized his involvement in the crime at the public
hearing and the board had received additional information after the hearing that cast doubt on

1

Plaintiff’s prisoner number is #203519.

-2-

Plaintiff’s veracity. Plaintiff filed a request for re-hearing with Defendant Sampson asking for the
statements he made that were considered as minimizing his involvement in the crime, as well as the
new information relied upon by the parole board, but received no response. Plaintiff later learned
that the new information came from the victim’s cousin, Ronald Amen. Plaintiff contends that
Amen made false allegations that the parole board relied upon in making its decision to withdraw
interest in granting him parole.
On April 6, 2010, Plaintiff filed a writ of mandamus in the Ingham County Circuit
Court asserting violations of his due process and equal protection rights in the parole proceedings.
According to Plaintiff, the court requested additional information from the parole board because the
evidence upon which the board relied in making its decision was not on the record. After an in
camera hearing from which Plaintiff was excluded, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss
the mandamus action. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied
Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal on August 11, 2011 and November 21, 2011, respectively.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his due process and equal protection rights
when they denied him parole based upon false and inaccurate information and failed to conduct the
parole proceedings in accordance with Michigan law. Plaintiff does not request release on parole,
but “seeks a new hearing utilizing proper statutes, procedures, and accurate information in the parole
process.”2 (Compl. 10, docket #1, Page ID#10.) He also seeks declaratory relief.

2

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not
the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 494
(1973). The Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an alleged
unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); see also
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997). However, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005), the

-3-

Discussion
I.

Immunity

Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived
immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not
expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341
(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v.
Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit
has specifically held that the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) is absolutely immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54
(6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000).
The Michigan Parole Board is part of the MDOC. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.231a(1). Therefore,
the Michigan Parole Board, as part of the MDOC, is immune from injunctive and monetary relief.
See Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App’x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) (Michigan Parole Board entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd., 104 F. App’x 490, 492 (6th Cir. 2004)

Supreme Court clarified that §1983 remains available to a state prisoner for procedural challenges where success in the
action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner. See also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434,
439-40 (6th Cir. 2007) (a plaintiff’s challenge to parole procedures may proceed under § 1983 because it does not
automatically imply a shorter sentence). Plaintiff does not directly seek release from prison; rather, he requests an
injunction preventing Defendants from violating his federal rights in future parole proceedings. As a consequence, under
Wilkinson, success in this action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of Plaintiff’s continued confinement,
so his action may proceed under § 1983.

-4-

(same); Fleming v. Martin, 24 F. App’x 258, 259 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). Consequently, the
Michigan Parole Board must be dismissed.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

-5-

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.

Due Process

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his due process and equal protection rights
when they denied him parole based upon false and inaccurate information and failed to conduct the
parole proceedings in accordance with Michigan law. To establish a procedural due process
violation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest,
and (2) such deprivation occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer &
Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v.
Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff fails to raise a claim of constitutional
magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional
or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz
v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a
parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give
rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v.
Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an
inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d
233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
-6-

In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth
Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole,” held that the Michigan
system does not create a liberty interest in parole. In a recent published decision, the Sixth Circuit
reiterated the continuing validity of Sweeton. See Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir.
2011). In Crump, the court held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does
not lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole.
See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, the Sixth Circuit
has rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated when changes to parole
procedures and practices have resulted in incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the
sentencing judge. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan
Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan
system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999).
Plaintiff’s related allegation that Defendants relied on false information to deny his
parole also fails to state a claim. Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being paroled, he cannot
show that the false information was relied upon to a constitutionally-significant degree. See
Caldwell v. McNutt, No. 04-2335, 2006 WL 45275, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2006) (“[E]ven if the
Parole Board relied on inaccurate information to deny Caldwell parole, it did not violate any liberty
interest protected by the United States Constitution.”); Echlin v. Boland, No. 03-2309, 2004 WL
2203550, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (prisoner could not bring a § 1983 action to challenge the
information considered by the parole board because he has no liberty interest in parole); see also
Draughn v. Green, No. 97-1263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999) (in order for the
Due Process Clause to be implicated, false information in a prisoner’s file must be relied on to a
constitutionally significant degree); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95-1778, 1996 WL 636140, at *1 (6th Cir.
-7-

Oct. 30, 1996) (no constitutional violation by having false information placed in a prison file);
Carson v. Little, No. 88-1505, 1989 WL 40171, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1989) (inaccurate
information in an inmate’s file does not amount to a constitutional violation). Therefore, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights arising from the denial of his parole.
In summary, the discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out “no more than a
mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. The Michigan Parole
Board’s failure or refusal to consider Plaintiff for parole, therefore, implicates no federal right. In
the absence of a liberty interest, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due
process rights.
B.

Equal Protection

Plaintiff also asserts a violation of his equal protection rights. The Equal Protection
Clause commands that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A state practice generally will not require strict
scrutiny unless it interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class of
individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Plaintiff does not suggest that
he is a member of a suspect class, and “prisoners are not considered a suspect class for purposes of
equal protection litigation.” Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Wilson
v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998). In addition, prisoners do not have a fundamental right
to parole.
Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, the rational basis
review standard applies. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d
286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006). “Under rational basis scrutiny, government action amounts to a
constitutional violation only if it ‘is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
-8-

purposes that the court can only conclude that the government’s actions were irrational.’” Id.
(quoting Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005)). To prove his equal protection
claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is, he
must demonstrate that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Plaintiff does not make any allegations whatsoever that Defendants
intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated prisoners. Accordingly, Plaintiff
fails to state an equal protection claim.
C.

State Law

Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to conduct the parole proceedings in
accordance with Michigan law. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.
Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir.
1994). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction
over the state-law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. In determining whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding
state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).
Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue
of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss
the remaining state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866-67 (2009), cited in Orton v.
Johnny’s Lunch Franchise,LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 2012 WL 539373, at *6 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012).
Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of
-9-

supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claim will be dismissed without
prejudice.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), because the Michigan Parole Board is immune and Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
the remaining Defendants.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

3/28/2012

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. Allan Edgar
United States District Judge

- 10 -