Longacre #626648 v. Snyder et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KYLE JOSEPH LONGACRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:12-cv-248
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
RICK SNYDER,
Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis without payment of an initial
partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Kyle Joseph Longacre, a state prisoner currently confined to the Baraga
Maximum Correctional Facility (AMF), filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Defendants Governor Rick Snyder, Director Daniel H. Hens, Warden Unknown
Curley, Acting Warden J. Larson, Unknown Michigan Parole Board Members, Psychological
Services Unit Supervisor Unknown Bouchard, Psychologist Tonia M. Wolak, and Psychologist
Unknown Francies.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that he began his custody in the MDOC on April
1, 2008, with diagnoses of Bi-Polar Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and Manic
Depression. Plaintiff states that in December of 2009, he became tired of the constant mood swings,
severe depression, and inability to concentrate. Plaintiff states that he had been suffering from
nightmares which caused him to jump off the top bunk while sleeping. Plaintiff attempted to obtain
psychological treatment, without success. Plaintiff subsequently assaulted another inmate in order
to be placed in segregation so that he could be guaranteed a bottom bunk.
For the next eleven months, Plaintiff was evaluated by Defendants Wolak, Bouchard,
and Francies, who falsely stated that Plaintiff suffered solely from an Anti-Social Personality
Disorder. Plaintiff filed grievances regarding this diagnosis, which were denied by Defendants
Curley and Larson. Plaintiff also states that Defendant Parole Board Members denied him parole,
which prevented him from receiving appropriate mental health care. Plaintiff seeks damages and
equitable relief.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
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more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ conduct violated his Eighth Amendment right to
mental health treatment. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide medically
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necessary mental health treatment to inmates. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976);
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2001); Lay v. Norris, No.
88-5757, 1989 WL 62498, at *4 (6th Cir. June 13, 1989); Potter v. Davis, No. 82-5783, 1985 WL
13129, at * 2 (6th Cir. April 26, 1985).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective
component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In
other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here
the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves “minor
maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
898, the inmate must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental
effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Napier v. Madison County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir.
2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
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Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court
explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to
be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In
order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate
and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not
enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir.
1995); Ward v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so
even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering.
Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a
complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received
inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). In this
case, Plaintiff alleges that he was evaluated by Defendant Psychologists, who diagnosed him as
having an Anti-Social Personality Disorder. Plaintiff disagrees with this diagnosis. However, such
a claim does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Where, as here, “a prisoner has received some
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally
reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state
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tort law.” Id.; see also Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v.
Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir.
2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440
(6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998).
The court also notes that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Parole Board Members fail
to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude. Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being released on
parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration
of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so, and thus, the presence of a
parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole
release. Id. at 7; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is
present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio
State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth
Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the Michigan procedural authorities to deny parole,” has held
that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. Subsequent to its 1994
decision, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the continuing validity of Sweeton and has continued to
find that Michigan’s Parole scheme creates no liberty interest in being released on parole. See Ward
v. Stegall, No. 03-1804, 2004 WL 614581 (6th Cir. March 24, 2004); Martin v. Ohio Adult Parole
Auth., No. 03-3642, 2003 WL 22976604, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2003); Bullock v. McGinnis, No.
00-1591, 2001 WL 180978, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2001); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000
WL 1679478, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000); Hawkins v. Abramajtys, No. 99-1995, 2000 WL
1434695, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000); Irvin v. Michigan Parole Bd., No. 99-1817, 2000 WL
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800029, at *2 (6th Cir. June 14, 2000); Clifton v. Gach, No. 98-2239, 1999 WL 1253069, at *1 (6th
Cir. Dec. 17, 1999). Also, in unpublished decisions, the Sixth Circuit has held that particular parts
of Michigan’s statutory parole scheme do not create a liberty interest in parole. See Fifer v.
Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 96-2322, 1997 WL 681518, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1997); Moran v.
McGinnis, No. 95-1330, 1996 WL 304344, at *2 (6th Cir. June 5, 1996); Leaphart v. Gach, No. 951639, 1995 WL 734480, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); Vertin v. Gabry, No. 94-2267, 1995 WL
613692, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995); Neff v. Johnson, No. 92-1818, 1993 WL 11880, at *1 (6th
Cir. Jan. 21, 1993); Janiskee v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 91-1103, 1991 WL 76181, at *1 (6th
Cir. May 9, 1991); Haynes v. Hudson, No. 89-2006, 1990 WL 41025, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 1990).
Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there is no liberty interest in parole under
the Michigan system. Glover v. Michigan Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has no liberty interest at stake. Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest at
stake, he fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights. See Sweeton, 27
F.3d at 1164-65.
Finally, liability under Section 1983 must be based on more than merely the right to
control employees. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1981); Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, Section 1983 liability cannot be
premised upon mere allegations of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Polk, 454 U.S.
at 325. A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party personally
participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct. See e.g. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
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U.S. 833 (1982). See also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S.
845 (1984).
Supervisory officials can be held liable for the acts of their subordinates only if
plaintiff establishes that the supervisor failed to appropriately discharge his supervisory duties, and
that this failure resulted in a denial or deprivation of plaintiff’s federal rights. See e.g. Leach, 891
F.2d at 1246; Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the failure of a
supervisor to supervise, control or train the offending employee is not actionable absent a showing
that the official implicitly encouraged, authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, or in some
other way directly participated in, the offensive conduct. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. Such a claim
requires, at a minimum, that the official had knowledge of the offending employee’s conduct at a
time when the conduct could be prevented, or that such conduct was otherwise foreseeable or
predictable. See e.g. Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, plaintiff must
show that defendant had some duty or authority to act. See e.g. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959
(6th Cir. 1989) (lower level official not liable for shortcomings of building); Ghandi v. Police Dept.
of City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 351 (6th Cir. 1984) (mere presence at the scene is insufficient
grounds to impose Section 1983 liability in the absence of a duty to act); accord Hall v. Shipley, 932
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, merely bringing a problem to the attention of a supervisory
official is not sufficient to impose such liability. See Shelly v. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 941, 946 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (Hillman, C.J.), aff’d 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988). Finally, supervisory liability claims
cannot be based on simple negligence. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F. Supp.
335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff’d 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants Snyder, Heyns, Curley,
and Larson were personally involved in the activity which forms the basis of his claim. The only
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roles that Defendants Snyder, Heyns, Curley, and Larson had in this action involve the denial of
administrative grievances or the failure to act. Defendants Snyder, Heyns, Curley, and Larson
cannot be liable for such conduct under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants Snyder, Heyns, Curley, and Larson are properly dismissed for lack of personal
involvement.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: July 11, 2012
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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