Cromer #211902 et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 6

OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD JAMES CROMER et al.,
Petitioners,

Case No. 2:12-cv-399

v.
Honorable R. Allan Edgar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.,
Respondents.
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OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by four state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary
review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, RULES
GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed.
Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen
out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which
raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably
incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the
review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed without prejudice
because it does not seek relief cognizable on habeas review.

Factual Allegations
Petitioners Edward James Cromer, Andre Jamal Freeman, Paul Anthony Davis and
Eddie Armall Julian are presently incarcerated at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility,
Marquette Branch Prison, Marquette Branch Prison and Alger Maximum Correctional Facility,
respectively, but complain of events that occurred at the Marquette Branch Prison. They have listed
the United States of America, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, Warden Robert Napel, Unknown
Hawkins, and Law Librarians Chis Masker and C. Hoffman as Respondents.
Petitioners, however, do not contest their convictions or sentences in their application
for habeas corpus relief. Rather, Petitioners assert that they have been denied access to the law
library in violation of their First Amendment rights. Petitioners also argue that Respondents Masker,
Hoffman, Napel and Hawkins have discriminated against them by denying them materials in the law
library because they are African American and Moors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, Petitioner Cramer argues that he received a major
misconduct conviction for disobeying a direct order without notice or a hearing in violation of his
due process rights.
Discussion
Petitioners filed their application for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Section 2241 generally authorizes district courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state or federal
prisoner who is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The instant petition is subject to summary dismissal because Petitioners are
challenging the conditions of their confinement. Where a prisoner is challenging the very fact or
duration of his physical imprisonment and the relief that he seeks is a determination that he is
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entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy
is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). However,
habeas corpus is not available to prisoners who are complaining only of the conditions of their
confinement or mistreatment during their legal incarceration. See Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710,
714 (6th Cir. 2004); Lutz v. Hemingway, 476 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2007). Complaints
like the ones raised by Petitioners, which involve conditions of confinement, “do not relate to the
legality of the petitioner’s confinement, nor do they relate to the legal sufficiency of the criminal
court proceedings which resulted in the incarceration of the petitioner.” Lutz, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 718
(quoting Maddux v. Rose, 483 F. Supp. 661, 672 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)). Inmates like Petitioners may,
however, bring claims that challenge the conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
(citing Austin v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 1058, 1066 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)). Because Petitioners challenge
only the conditions of their confinement, their claims “fall outside of the cognizable core of habeas
corpus relief.” Hodges v. Bell, 170 F. App’x 389, 393 (6th Cir. 2006).
Although pro se litigants are treated to less stringent pleading formalities, courts still
require such litigants to meet basic pleading standards. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989). “Arguably, hanging the legal hat on the correct peg is such a standard, and ‘[l]iberal
construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf.’” Martin, 391 F.3d
at 714 (quoting Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (dismissing a § 1983 suit
brought as a § 2254 petition)). The Sixth Circuit has held that where, as here, claims about the
conditions of confinement are not cognizable in an action under § 2241, the district court must
dismiss the habeas action without prejudice to allow the petitioner to raise his potential civil rights

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claims properly in a § 1983 action. Martin, 391 F.3d at 714. Accordingly, Petitioners’ claims will
be dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioners’ application
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4 because it does not seek relief cognizable on habeas review.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioners have demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court’s
dismissal of Petitioners’ action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination
that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly
unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that
an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit
that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat
anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v.
Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under
Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm’r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989)
(it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service
under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate
would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of
a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district
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court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is
warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this
Court has examined each of Petitioners’ claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at
484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its
examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioners’ claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal
of Petitioners’ claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioners a
certificate of appealability.
A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

10/31/2012

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. Allan Edgar
United States District Judge

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