White #285964 v. Renico et al

Filing 13

OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION

KALA WHITE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:13-cv-158

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

PAUL RENICO, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has denied Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the entire
filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996),
the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court
must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972),
and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Kala White, a state prisoner currently confined at the Baraga Maximum
Correctional Facility (AMF), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
Defendants St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF) Warden Paul Renico, Central Michigan
Correctional Facility Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Joseph Michalski, Carson City Correctional
Facility (DRF) Hearing Officer Susanne E. Harris-Spicer, Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility
(AMF) Warden Ken Tribley, AMF Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Harold Warr, AMF Assistant
Resident Unit Supervisor Tammy L. Gajewski, and MDOC Grievance Specialist Sean Lockhart.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he was found guilty of a false misconduct in 2002 while at
for allegedly telling his roommate that he would kill him if he did not “suck [Plaintiff’s] dick.”
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Michalski knowingly fabricated this ticket. Defendant Harris-Spicer
found Plaintiff guilty of the misconduct and Plaintiff received a homosexual predator designation.
Plaintiff requested a rehearing, which was granted. However, Defendant Renico subsequently
informed Plaintiff that he had decided to dismiss the misconduct conviction and terminate the
homosexual predator designation.

Defendant Renico provided Plaintiff with a “Security

Classification Screen-Review” which verified that the homosexual predator designation had been
terminated. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Renico offered him a $5,000.00 settlement for the
incident. Plaintiff refused the settlement offer and refused to return to the general population at SLF.

Plaintiff claims that a “violent incident” occurred between himself and SLF staff
which resulted in Plaintiff’s immediate transfer to the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility.
Following the transfer, Plaintiff was served with another Security Classification Screen-Review,
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which indicated that the homosexual predator designation had been reinstated. Plaintiff was then
transferred to AMF, where Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the MDOC regarding his improper
designation as a homosexual predator. See White v. MDOC, No. 2:07-cv-86 (W.D. Mich., Nov. 15,
2007). However, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was dismissed because his claims against the MDOC was barred
by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
In May of 2011, Defendant Gajewski informed Plaintiff that the MDOC predator
designation policy directive had been repealed and that she did not think that the new policy was
going to be applicable to Plaintiff. Defendant Gajewski stated that she was going to recommend that
all the restrictions that were keeping Plaintiff confined to a Level V facility be removed. Defendant
Gajewski subsequently met with Plaintiff a few times and assured him that all of the necessary
paperwork had been completed and mailed to Lansing.
Several months later, Plaintiff met with Deputy Warden Jondreau, who told Plaintiff
that AMF was about to open a new wing, which would serve as a reintegration ward, and offered
Plaintiff the opportunity to be placed on that wing. Plaintiff refused because he did not want to
interact with other inmates who might make a false homosexual claim against him. Plaintiff claims
that Deputy Warden Jondreau gave him an absolute guarantee that would not happen, stating that
all prisoners on the new wing would be subjected to a high level of scrutiny during any out-of-cell
movement. Plaintiff agreed and was placed on the new wing on October 10, 2011.
Sometime in 2012, Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting that the sanctions against him
finally be lifted. In responding to Plaintiff’s grievance, Defendant Warr stated that the 2002
misconduct conviction was still in Plaintiff’s record, but pursuant to the new policy directive,
Plaintiff was no longer considered a sexual predator, but was merely considered “sexually
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aggressive.” Plaintiff seeks a removal of the misconduct from his records, as well as a removal of
all labels and sanctions. Plaintiff also seeks damages.
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff claims that he has been improperly labeled as a homosexual predator and
/ or sexually aggressive in violation of the Due Process Clause. However, a prisoner does not have
a protected liberty interest in the procedures affecting his classification and security because the
resulting restraint does not impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a prisoner has no constitutional right to be incarcerated in
a particular facility or to be held in a specific security classification. See Olim, 461 U.S. at 245;
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 244 (1976).
Relying on Sandin, the Sixth Circuit has held that a Michigan prisoner can no longer claim a liberty
interest in his security classification. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir.2005);
Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir.1995); accord Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460
(6th Cir.1997). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that a prisoner does not have a
liberty interest arising from designation as a homosexual predator. See Washington v. Wiest, No. 971289, 1998 WL 466555, at * 2 (6th Cir. July 31, 1998); O'Quinn v. Brown, No. 92-2183, 1993 WL
80292, at * 1 (6th Cir. Mar.22, 1993). Plaintiff’s designation as a “homosexual predator” is nothing
more than a security classification used by the prison.
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Because Plaintiff does not have a

constitutional right to a particular security level or classification, he fails to state a due process claim.

Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
In addition, Plaintiff’s pending motions (docket ##5-8) are DENIED as moot.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

3/4/2014

/s/ R. Allan Edgar
R. Allan Edgar
United States District Judge